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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
As a consequence of the News of the World phone hacking scandal, the UK 
press became the focus of a heated public debate. Many questions were 
asked, and several answers offered. The press had behaved badly and 
needed to be tamed (Leveson 2012a, p. 195, para. 1.1–1.4). But how? 
Who guards the guardian? How can press regulation be strengthened? 
How can the press regain its trust? What does this spell for democracy? 
These were some of the questions asked, as politicians, journalists, the 
police, the judiciary and other citizens deliberated on how to ensure a 
viable press: one that can sustain rather than destroy democracy. Thus, the 
media became an arena for a heated debate on how to make the press 
more accountable, if at all. This book analyses how this debate was repre-
sented by the press. The aims are to challenge the press to serve as a demo-
cratic public sphere during debates about their policy, to enlighten readers 
on how the media represent debates about their policy and to stir up dis-
cussions on how to get the public to be more involved in media reform. I 
argue that the way debates about media policy are covered is partly respon-
sible for the continuous emergence of weak press reforms. As a brief back-
ground on the scandal is essential for an understanding of my analysis of 
the debate, that will be my starting point.
The News of the World phone hacking scandal turned the British 
politico- media complex upside down. Newspaper editors, media owners, 
journalists, private investigators and even the police were placed in the 
spotlight for their role in the scandal. The phone hacking scandal came to 
2light in 2005 when some staff of the News of the World were accused of 
hacking the phones of members of the British Royal Family (Keeble and 
Mair 2012, p. 9; Davies 2014). The police report on investigations carried 
out between 2005 and 2007 declared that the crime was perpetrated by 
one “rogue” reporter, royal editor, Clive Goodman, and a private detec-
tive, Glen Mulcaire (Jones and Norton 2014, pp. 147–148). The report 
concluded that the victims were a handful of public figures (Lewis 2013, 
p.  72; Davies 2014). However, further investigations in 2011 revealed 
that not only was phone hacking widespread at the News of the World but 
that bribes were paid to police for information, and the voicemails of crime 
victims and their relations were intercepted in search of scoops (Keeble 
and Mair 2012, p. 9; Davies 2014).
The list of identified and alleged victims of the phone hacking con-
tained more than 4000 names (Christopher 2012, p.  114) including a 
murdered school girl, 13-year-old Amanda Jane “Milly” Dowler; victims 
of the July 7 (2005) London bombings and relatives of deceased British 
soldiers (Davies 2014; Marsh and Melville 2014, p.  147). The case of 
hacking into the phone of the murdered school girl, in particular, resulted 
in public outcry against the News of the World possibly because this sig-
nalled extension of the use of subterfuge by the media to members of the 
public who were not public figures. News on the phone hacking scandal 
flooded front pages and headlines of the media worldwide; advertisers 
withdrew patronage from the newspaper and on 7 July 2011, the com-
pany announced the closure of the News of the World. The newspaper 
published its last edition on 10 July 2011 with the caption “Thank You 
and Good Bye”, bringing to an end its 168 years of publication (Keeble 
and Mair 2012, p. 12; Davies 2014).
The controversy did not end with the closure of the News of the World 
(also referred to as NoTW in this study). By 2014, there had been more 
than 100 arrests linked to the scandal; 63 of them journalists, including 
Rebekah Brooks, the former chief executive of News International and 
Andy Coulson, a former NoTW editor who became the then Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s spokesperson after his resignation from the 
newspaper during the first phase of investigations into the scandal 
(Ponsford 2014). Andy Coulson resigned from his position as David 
Cameron’s spokesperson in the heat of the second phase of the contro-
versy. He was among those who received jail sentences for their role in the 
scandal, while Rebekah Brooks and a few others were found not guilty 
(Davies 2014). Other casualties of the scandal include a number of 
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3high-profile resignations. Among them were two top police officers: Sir 
Paul Stephenson who was the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police 
and John Yates, the then Assistant Commissioner in charge of specialist 
operations. Both resigned from their duties because of their role, or lack 
of it, in the investigation of the scandal (Christopher 2012, pp. 112–144).
News International (now News UK as part of a rebranding after the 
scandal—BBC News 2013), a subsidiary of News Corporation and parent 
company to the News of the World, spent over £400 million for civil litiga-
tion settlement of claims from victims of the phone hacking, with the 
likelihood of more settlement claims ahead (Simon 2019). In the midst of 
the scandal, News Corporation (as then constituted) had to withdraw its 
bid for the complete takeover of BskyB (Keeble and Mair 2012, p. 12). 
However, the bid was relaunched in 2016, through Rupert Murdoch’s 
21st Century Fox company but it was lost to Comcast in 2018 (King 
2016; Waterson 2018).
There were further allegations as well as confirmations that journalists 
from other newspapers (including papers in the Trinity Mirror group 
which rebranded as Reach in 2018) were involved in phone hacking and 
other unwholesome journalistic practices (BBC News 2018). It became 
clear early in the controversy that this was not just about the News of the 
World but about the press industry. Very importantly, this scandal led to 
the setting up of the Leveson Inquiry. The Leveson Inquiry (2012f) was 
arguably one of the most significant events in British newspaper history 
because it cast a much-needed critical eye over the ethical practices and 
culture of the press. This book examines the ways in which sections of the 
mainstream British press represented the ongoing debate about press eth-
ics and the strategies they undertook to protect themselves from the threat 
of tighter regulation. A flurry of media coverage presented the ensuing 
press reform debate from different perspectives. Thus, the News of the 
World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry provided a verita-
ble opportunity for an investigation into how the media cover debates 
about their policy.
The study of how the media cover debates about their policy is impor-
tant because of the susceptibility of the media to abuse their power to 
control information when covering issues in which they have interests and 
the adverse effect this could have on the quality of media policies. Other 
institutions in society have little or no say on what or how much about 
them is published by the press. The situation is different for the press 
because since they have the power to receive and disseminate information, 
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4they can choose what information about themselves is made public. This 
gatekeeping power of journalism gives the institution enormous powers 
which are prone to abuse when they cover debates about their policies. 
The media can use their gatekeeping and agenda-setting powers to influ-
ence decisions and opinion in favour of their position in a debate. They 
can also limit the information available in the public sphere by keeping 
silent on issues they do not wish discussed in such debates. When this 
occurs during the coverage of debates about media policy, it reduces the 
quality of information available to policymakers and members of the pub-
lic on how to reform the press (see Chap. 2). This book shows how this 
was done during the coverage of the media policy debate that arose from 
the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. This debate is 
also referred to in this book as the press reform or media policy debate.
One way to sustain democracy is to hold the powerful in society to 
account. The media are powerful and as such should be held to account 
through regular analyses of how they cover issues in which they have inter-
ests. The study of media self-coverage serves as a media accountability 
system by stimulating the media to cover themselves based on democratic 
principles. Such studies can identify when the media are taking advantage 
of their power to control information and make recommendations accord-
ingly. It can equip the public with knowledge of how to consume journal-
istic metadiscourse so that can they make informed decisions about media 
policy. The study of news self-coverage also helps to highlight the impor-
tance of press coverage of media issues and the consequences the manner 
of coverage could have for democracy. Such consequences could range 
from limiting the access of other stakeholders to public debates on media 
reform to the emergence of weak media policies that cannot guarantee an 
accountable press as was the case with the coverage of the media reform 
debate. Chaps. 8, 9 and 10 will expand on this.
With regard to weak media policies, a number of incidents have taken 
place after the media reform efforts that followed the NoTW phone hack-
ing scandal that raise questions about the strength of the reforms that 
followed the scandal. When the Leveson Inquiry was set up, it was hoped 
that it will make up for decades of unsuccessful efforts at taming the press 
(ensuring it does not abuse its powers) but several happenings after 
Leveson that raise doubts about the quality of the reforms made, making 
an investigation into how to avert weak press reforms essential.
For instance, in an article entitled “Sam Allardyce, the Telegraph and 
Another IPSO Failure” Cathcart’s (2018) criticised both the Daily 
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5Telegraph and IPSO (Independent Press Standards Organisation) for their 
poor handling of complaints of inaccuracies and misleading information in 
the Daily Telegraph’s publication of an article on the then England foot-
ball manager, Sam Allardyce. Cathcart’s criticism relates to the Daily 
Telegraph’s publication headlined “Exclusive investigation: England man-
ager Sam Allardyce for sale” (Daily Telegraph 2016). The news story 
reported that “Sam Allardyce used his position as England manager to 
negotiate a £400,000 deal and offered advice to businessmen on how to 
“get around” FA rules on player transfers” (Daily Telegraph 2016). The 
video recordings which led to Allardyce’s resignation of his job as the 
England football manager was later found to have been distorted by the 
newspaper to give the impression that Allardyce was corrupt and that this 
was a scandal. The fact that the story was sourced through covert record-
ing of reporters posing as businessmen raises questions about how much 
the press has changed after the media reform efforts that followed the 
phone hacking scandal.
Many of the arguments in the media reform debate were based on lay 
and specialist normative theories of the press because the debate was about 
press standards and normative theory relates to expectations on how the 
media ought to behave in order to be useful to society (McQuail 2010, 
p.  14). Since Britain like most Western nations functions as a liberal 
democracy, my analysis of the debate is based on liberal ideologies of 
democracy, specifically the neoliberal variant of the libertarian theory 
(Siebert et al. 1956; McQuail 2010) and the ideology of social democracy 
(Pickard 2015; Schlosberg 2017). These theories are relevant to this study 
on two levels: firstly, media coverage in Western democracies are often 
guided by these ideologies; secondly, previous studies show that argu-
ments in media policy debates have drawn from these two ideologies.
Several scholars agree that journalism plays a vital role in the sustenance 
of democracy (Herman and Chomsky 2008; Lee-Wright et al. 2012, p. 3). 
Did the press fulfil its democratic function in its coverage of the press 
reform debate? Did it provide a space for public debate where citizens can 
participate in governance by deliberating on issues that concern them 
without any form of marginalisation? To what extent did it do this, if at all? 
To effectively answer these questions, this book engages with the public 
sphere concept (Habermas 1989; Fraser 1992). The public sphere con-
cept, as used in this book, relates to the normative expectation that the 
media ought to function as a space where all stakeholders of a debate can 
contribute to the discussion, irrespective of their status (Habermas 1989). 
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various stakeholders in a debate; bring alternative views to the public 
sphere for discussion and encourage deliberations including constructive 
criticism, amongst others. The question is, “do the media do these when 
they cover debates about their policies?” Many scholars say that has not 
been the case (Carlson and Berkowitz 2014; Thomas and Finneman 2014).
Previous studies on metajournalistic discourse pointed out that media 
coverage of the press is often characterised by certain paradigm repair 
strategies (Carlson and Berkowitz 2014). The term “paradigm repair” was 
used by Bennett et al. (1985) to describe “how journalistic self-criticism 
protects existing paradigms rather than confronts entrenched deficiencies 
and contradictions” (cited in Carlson 2015, p. 4). The notion of paradigm 
repair has been employed by previous scholars to examine how the press 
cover themselves in relation to objectivity (Reese 1990, 1997); fabrica-
tions (Hindman 2005; Carlson 2009); reporting errors (Cecil 2002); 
paparazzi (Berkowitz 2000; Bishop 1999), scapegoating (Berger 2008); 
media scandal (Carlson and Berkowitz 2014) and press standards (Thomas 
and Finneman 2014). Studies on journalistic metadiscourse identified four 
strategies employed by the media to protect an existing paradigm. They 
include the paradigm strategies of “threat to the paradigm” or “catastro-
phisation”, self-assertion also known as self-affirmation, minimisation and 
individualisation or localisation (Berkowitz 2000; Cecil 2002; Thomas 
and Finneman 2014). My investigation into how the press covered the 
debate that arose from the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson 
Inquiry revealed that these strategies were employed in the coverage of 
the press reform debate.
Content analysis and some principles from Norman Fairclough’s criti-
cal discourse analysis were used to examine the coverage of the debate in 
six of the top ten British national newspapers (based on combined print 
and online readership figures for April 2011 to March 2012—Source: 
NRS PADD 2012). The papers are Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Daily 
Mail, Daily Express, Daily Mirror and The Sun. I decided to examine 
national newspapers because of their nationwide reach. Though an exami-
nation of other media platforms’ coverage of the debate would be benefi-
cial, I consider the newspaper a good starting point because of its place of 
significance in the debate (the scandal involved a national newspaper and 
the inquiry’s focus was on the printed press). This research can be built 
upon in future studies in the form of a comparison between the printed 
press’ coverage versus the broadcast or Web news coverage of this debate. 
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NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry to make clear the 
contribution of this book to the broad literature.
The Broad LiTeraTure on The Phone hacking 
ScandaL and The LeveSon inquiry
At the time of my investigation, the body of literature on the media cover-
age of the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry was still 
in its early stages. Much of what had been written was on the debate itself, 
and not on how it was covered by the press. There was need for detailed 
scholarly literature on how this debate, which had the potential to change 
the future of British journalism, was covered by the press. The body of 
literature on the phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry com-
prised of debates on how to regulate the press (e.g. see Bloy 2012; Carney 
2012); how journalism ethics is and ought to be taught in the UK’s higher 
institutions of learning (Petley 2012; Harding 2012b); and narratives of 
the scandal and the Leveson Inquiry (Davies 2014). Analysts in related 
fields of practice had also written about the phone hacking scandal and the 
Leveson Inquiry but mostly as a small part of a wider discussion (Curtis 
et al. 2013). Only few empirical studies had been done on the coverage of 
the media policy debate that arose from the phone hacking scandal and/
or the Leveson Inquiry (Ramsay 2013, 2014; Carlson and Berkowitz 
2014; Thomas and Finneman 2014), and not many of the studies went 
beyond the stage of the Leveson Inquiry.
While studies that covered the debate up to that point have been very 
useful, so much has happened after the inquiry that is worth examining—
Sir Brian Leveson has presented his report; the press presented their own 
Royal Charter which was rejected; the government has set up the Royal 
Charter on press regulation which much of the press rejected and they 
have set up their own IPSO (Independent Press Standards Organisation); 
and IMPRESS, the first press regulator recognised by the Press Recognition 
Panel of the Royal Charter on Press Self-Regulation, has been set up 
(IMPRESS 2016; Mayhew 2016). This book fills the gap in the body of 
literature by providing in-depth analysis of the coverage of the debate 
beyond the stage of the Leveson Inquiry. As stated earlier, the aim is to 
present and analyse how the debate was covered; hoping that by so doing, 
I will enlighten readers on how the coverage of media policy contributes 
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media policy; and some of the steps that can result in the creation of effec-
tive media policies. In the following paragraphs, I take a closer look at the 
existing literature on the phone hacking scandal, the Leveson Inquiry and 
the press standards debate that followed. By examining how similar or dif-
ferent they are to the content of this book, I intend to highlight this 
book’s contribution to the broad literature.
The literature on how ethics are and ought to be taught on journalism 
courses across universities in the UK, which was often tagged “Teaching 
after Leveson” (Cathcart 2011; Harding 2012b), disclosed that ethics was 
only a minor part of the accredited courses in the National Council for the 
Training of Journalists (NCTJ) curriculum. It demonstrated that journal-
ism students in UK were taught to know their boundaries in terms of press 
regulations and media law but were not necessarily taught ethics in detail. 
The concern of this aspect of the phone hacking scandal and Leveson 
Inquiry literature is to examine whether teachers of journalism in the 
nation’s universities played a role in encouraging or averting such press 
misconducts as exemplified in the phone hacking scandal. The literature 
proffered changes to how journalism is taught in Universities across 
Britain “after Leveson”.
For instance, after the seating of the Leveson Inquiry, Harding (2012b) 
carried out an empirical study on the teaching of journalism studies in the 
UK. The study which was done under the auspices of the NCTJ was aimed 
at finding out the views of stakeholders (including academics and media 
executives) in the industry on the teaching of journalism prior to the 
phone hacking scandal. Most of those interviewed were dissatisfied with 
how it had been done in the past and agreed that there is need for a 
change (ibid.). This, they argue, would require placing premium on the 
teaching of ethics in journalism courses across the UK. The study also 
showed that there was a wide consensus among stakeholders that revela-
tions at the Leveson Inquiry on how ethics had been taught in journalism 
courses across the nation’s Universities dented the integrity of the teachers 
in particular, and the profession in general. Though a few academics 
expressed fears that the debate on ethics would lead to the stifling of good 
journalism, majority posited that “ethics do matter and matter a lot” 
(Greenslade and Harding 2013, n.p.). Harding’s (2012b) recommenda-
tions included a mid-career ethical training for all journalists. Though how 
ethics are taught on journalism courses has implications for democracy, 
the literature differs from the focus of this book in the sense that their 
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journalists.
Some practising journalists authored works on the scandal and the 
Leveson Inquiry but their focus was mostly on the narrative of the scandal 
or on the debate, not its media coverage (Dacre 2011; Keeble and Mair 
2012, pp. 6–15; Davies 2014). In line with Thompson’s (2000, p. 36) 
observation that journalists and participants of scandals who have some 
form of insider knowledge write books and articles that “retell the stories 
of particular scandals” from different points of view, the Guardian’s Nick 
Davies (2014) wrote Hack Attack: How the Truth Caught Up with Rupert 
Murdoch, a book which gives an insider account of how the scandal at 
News of the World unfolded. Using the first-person narrative, Davies tells 
how he got wind of the unlawful activities that went on at News of the 
World and how along with some lawyers, MPs and celebrities, he was able 
to hold News of the World and its owner, Rupert Murdoch, to account 
(ibid.).
His work, which drew from exclusive interviews with private investiga-
tors, journalists, politicians, police officers and staff of the newspaper, tells 
of the unlawful activities that went on in the newsroom of News of the 
World (ibid.). Davies (2014, p. 76) described in detail how private inves-
tigators hacked phones for journalists; how they listened to live calls and 
bribed the police for information. The work also tells of how News 
International (now News UK) attempted to cover up the extent of its 
involvement in phone hacking with lies and money, how press regulators 
shirked their responsibility and failed to call the newspaper’s erring staff to 
account and how corrupt police officers broke official secrecy rules for 
money (Davies 2014). The author also narrates how politicians in power 
gave Rupert Murdoch privileged access to government, allowing him and 
his staff to intimidate anyone who stood up to them (ibid.). Davies’ (2014) 
publication differs from this book in the sense that it is only a narrative of 
the controversy and does not show how the media covered it. This study 
acknowledges the relevance of this narrative to the body of literature on 
the scandal and does not attempt to replicate this effort. So, unlike Davies 
(2014), my work does not deal directly with the scandal but with the press 
reform debate that arose from it and how this debate was covered by the 
media. However, basic knowledge of the scandal story will help the reader 
grasp the essence of the debate; that is why a brief narrative on the phone 
hacking scandal was provided earlier in this chapter.
1 INTRODUCTION 
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An example of works in related fields of practice that have discussed the 
phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry as a small part of a wider 
conversation is (Marsh and Melville 2014). In their book Crime, Justice 
and the Media, the authors gave the phone hacking scandal as an example 
of secondary victimisation. This is a brief explanation of media involve-
ment in secondary victimisation using the phone hacking as an example 
(Marsh and Melville 2014, p.  147). It explained how victims of phone 
hacking such as the murdered school girl Milly Dowler, victims of the July 
7 (2005) London bombings and celebrities were all sufferers of secondary 
victimisation. Here, the scandal literature served as a tool for studies on the 
criminal justice system. In the field of law in particular, the phone hacking 
scandal and the Leveson Inquiry have formed parts of larger discussions on 
human rights, privacy and defamation (Smartt 2014, pp. 110–111).
There have been a few works written on how the media covered the 
debate that followed the phone hacking scandal. Very relevant among 
them are Thomas and Finneman’s (2014) “Who watches the watchdogs? 
British newspaper meta-discourse on the Leveson Inquiry”; Carlson and 
Berkowitz’s (2014) “  ‘The emperor lost his clothes’: Rupert Murdoch, 
News of the World and journalistic boundary work in the UK and USA”; 
and Ramsay’s (2014) study on “How newspapers covered regulation after 
Leveson”. Similar to my analysis in this book, Carlson and Berkowitz 
(2014) employed the notion of paradigm repair to analyse journalistic 
metadiscourse. By comparing the US press coverage of the phone hacking 
scandal with that of the UK, Carlson and Berkowitz (2014) were able to 
show the differences in how the two countries used boundary work to 
articulate appropriate practices through their definition of deviant behav-
iour. Thomas and Finneman (2014) skipped the phone hacking scandal to 
focus on the press coverage of the Leveson Inquiry. Also using the notion 
of paradigm repair, their study revealed that the British press has “an insti-
tutional ideology that is quick to assert rights but largely resistant to 
notions of attendant responsibilities” (ibid., p. 172).
One way in which my work differs from those of Thomas and Finneman 
(2014) and Carlson and Berkowitz (2014) is that their investigations did 
not go beyond the Leveson Inquiry. While their studies are useful contri-
butions to the body of literature on the media coverage of the phone 
hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry, they did not examine, for exam-
ple, reactions to Lord Justice Leveson’s report and the setting up of the 
Royal Charter on press regulation. Reactions to the coverage of these and 
other events that followed revealed trends in the coverage of media policy 
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that are beneficial to study. In addition to exploring news coverage of the 
media policy debate beyond the Leveson Inquiry, this book added one 
more paradigm repair strategy, historicisation, to Thomas and Finneman’s 
(2014) four paradigmatic strategies (catastrophisation, self-affirmation, 
minimisation and localisation) to make allowance for the use of durational 
modes of analysis in the study of journalistic metadiscourse (see Chap. 5). 
It is one thing to say something is paradigmatic but the extent to which it 
is paradigmatic also matters. For example, Carlson and Berkowitz (2014) 
and Thomas and Finneman (2014) pointed out that the press asserted its 
usefulness (the strategy of self-affirmation); this book goes beyond that to 
show the extent to which the press asserted its usefulness, by providing 
statistical data (see Chap. 7), thus providing more details in the form of 
data on the level of application of some paradigmatic strategies.
This book contributes to the body of literature on the phone hacking 
scandal; the Leveson Inquiry; the coverage of media policy and journalis-
tic metadiscourse by providing an in-depth analysis of the coverage of the 
media policy debate that arose from the NoTW phone hacking scandal and 
the Leveson Inquiry. It posits that the way the media cover debates about 
their policy is partly responsible for the emergence of weak media reforms. 
Using statistical data and remarkable examples from news articles, this 
book shows how the media failed to serve as a democratic public sphere 
during the debate on press standards that followed the phone hacking 
scandal. It also expands on existing knowledge on metajournalistic dis-
course (discourse about discourse on journalism) and provides statistical 
data to back up arguments on how the media cover debates about their 
policy. The scope and organisation of this book is summarised in the next 
subsection.
organiSaTion of ThiS Book
This book is made up of 11 chapters. Chapter 2 presents key subjects of 
the media reform debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking scandal 
and the Leveson Inquiry. They include arguments relating press freedom, 
the public interest, privacy and media ownership. On press freedom, the 
chapter discusses its definition, the history of press freedom in the UK and 
its relationship with freedom of expression as spelt out in Article 10 of the 
Human Rights Act of 1998. The debate about press freedom is often 
linked to the “public’s right to know”. The press is endowed with the 
privilege of breaking some laws in order to let the public know, if the news 
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is in the public interest but what is the “public interest”? A brief back-
ground on the controversy about the meaning of the public interest is 
provided in this section. Many instances where the media were criticised 
for misusing “the public interest” clause have been on issues relating to 
the invasion of privacy. Therefore, this chapter discusses the tensions 
between the “public interest” and the right of citizens to have a private life.
My analysis of the debate about privacy draws from Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Some studies have 
argued that the media’s abuse of the public interest clause by invading the 
privacy of members of the public is the reason for the reduction of public 
trust in the press (Petley 2013). Scholars like McChesney (2008) attribute 
the blame for lack of trust in the media to media owners who exploit the 
press’ privileged position for selfish gains. This chapter highlights key 
debates on concentration of media ownership, comparing neoliberal per-
spectives with the political economy critique on media ownership. These 
perspectives on concentration of media ownership feature prominently in 
debates about media policy as such knowledge of these views is essential 
for effective analysis and comprehension of how the press cover debates 
about media ownership.
Chapter 3 extends the discussion of key debates on media policy to 
press regulation. It provides a brief background information on press reg-
ulation in the UK. It does this through a historical analysis of press regula-
tion in the UK from the 1949 press commission to the Leveson Inquiry 
(2012). Efforts to regulate the press are critically analysed. Chapter 4 
explores normative theories and ideologies of the press in relation to the 
coverage of media policy debates. The normative theories and ideologies 
examined are the neoliberal variant of the libertarian theory, the ideology 
of social democracy and the concept of the public sphere. Reviewing these 
ideologies and theories in relation to the coverage of media policy gives us 
insight into the logic behind the different styles of coverage of debates on 
media policy. To establish the role of the media in the coverage of media 
reform debates within a democratic society, the chapter examines the 
meaning and importance of democracy, the role of the press in a demo-
cratic society and various conceptions of the public sphere (Habermas 
1989; Fraser 1992; Ornebring and Jonsson 2004). The chapter employs 
the public sphere concept both as “platform” (a space for citizens’ partici-
pation in public debates) and as “discourse” (demonstrating that multiple 
discursive publics can emerge from journalism’s interpretive community) 
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especially when the media attempt to maintain their boundaries in journal-
istic metadiscourse.
Chapter 5 attempts to make clear the difference between metajournal-
istic discourse and journalistic metadiscourse while arguing for a new defi-
nition of metacoverage. Clear definitions of these terms will promote 
understanding of their use in the book and will contribute to the academic 
literature on metacoverage. From clarification of terms, I move on to 
introduce the term “paradigm repair” and explain the paradigm repair 
strategies explored in my analysis of the media reform debate. Previous 
academic literature identified four paradigm repair strategies used in the 
coverage of debates about journalism. They are “threat to the paradigm”, 
self-assertion, minimisation and individualisation (Reese 1990; Cecil 
2002; Thomas and Finneman 2014). I add to these the strategy of histori-
cisation. These strategies will be used in Chaps. 6, 7 and 8 to explain how 
the press covered the debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking scan-
dal. Chapter 5 also gives insight into the research on which discussions in 
this book are based. It explains the method used for the study. Content 
analysis was supplemented by critical discourse analysis to show how six 
British national newspapers covered the media policy debate. Two news-
papers from each classification of British newspapers (broadsheet, mid- 
markets and tabloids) were examined. This leads to analysis of the findings 
in the following chapters.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 show how various paradigm repair strategies were 
used in the coverage of the media reform debate and discuss the implica-
tion of the type of coverage for efforts at reforming the press and for 
democracy. Chapter 6 discusses how the strategies of “historicisation” and 
“threat to the paradigm” were used in the debate. The chapter shows how 
the “threat to the paradigm” strategy emerged as the dominant theme in 
the coverage. Chapter 7 discusses how the strategies of individualisation 
and self-assertion were utilised in the coverage of the media policy debate. 
Using the concept of political economy, it shows how blame was attrib-
uted for press bad behaviour in the journalistic metadiscourse. Chapter 8 
shows how the strategy of minimisation was employed in an effort to 
downplay the phone hacking scandal and the institution set up to investi-
gate the culture, ethics and practice of the press. These chapters aspire to 
enlighten readers on how the media cover debates about their policies so 
that they can separate the wheat from the chaff when they consume jour-
nalistic metadiscourse on media policy. In order words, they can discern 
when an article or argument on press reform is predicated on self-interest 
1 INTRODUCTION 
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and when it is for the public good. The chapter aspires to contribute to the 
development of an informed citizenry who can actively and intelligently 
participate in debates about media policy.
Using statistical data from my content analysis of 870 news articles, 
Chaps. 9 and 10 evaluate how the media served as a democratic sphere in 
their coverage of the press reform debate. In Chap. 9, I show how sources 
were used in news articles on the debate. The sources were categorised 
into press-related sources, policymakers, press-abuse-victims-related 
sources, Leveson and Royal Charter, judiciary, police and ordinary mem-
bers of the public. Attempts at regulating the press are often enmeshed in 
both adversarial and reciprocal relationships between the press and policy-
makers. This chapter also examines this relationship. The goal is to bring 
to the fore behaviours (conscious or subconscious) of journalists and poli-
cymakers that have impacted on the creation of media policies. Chapter 10 
expands on how the media represent debates about their policy focusing 
on the hierarchy of importance accorded to different arguments and issues 
of concern in the debate. Hierarchy of importance was measured using the 
inverted pyramid structure of news writing where the most important 
details in the news appear at the top of the narrative structure. By assessing 
the use of sources and the hierarchy of importance accorded to issues in 
the debate, the chapter reveals the extent to which the media served as a 
democratic public sphere in these areas.
Chapter 10 also reveals and analyses alternative views that emerged in 
the journalistic metadiscourse on the press reform debate. The alternative 
views identified include “strengthen checks on media ownership concen-
tration”, “enforce existing laws on crimes such as phone hacking”, “avoid 
all forms of Royal Charter”, “a cultural revolution of journalists and pro-
prietors is key to press reform”, “some level of privacy invasion is a neces-
sary hazard of a free press” and “do not expect too much from the press”. 
Possible reasons for the lack of engagement with some of these views are 
offered along with their potential for media reform. Chapter 11, which is 
the final chapter, highlights key arguments in this book; it makes recom-
mendations on how the media can serve as a democratic public sphere, a 
space where robust debates on media reform can take place. This book 
posits that such debates can give birth to ideas for effective media reform. 
As part of recommendations in Chap. 10, I make a case for non- 
governmental public reformism. This concept can be further developed in 
future academic literature.
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CHAPTER 2
The Press Reform Debate
Issues relating to press freedom, the public interest, privacy and media 
ownership feature regularly in debates about press standards. That is 
because these issues can be linked to laws and policies that have been put 
in place to promote peaceful co-existence, prevent anarchy in society, 
uphold human rights and sustain democracy. For instance, privacy and 
press freedom relate to Articles 8 and 10, respectively, of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Where they are violated, the structures that hold a dem-
ocratic society together are weakened and the impact can be disastrous 
ranging from the press losing its ability to hold power to account to citi-
zens committing suicides because of the pressures emanating from inva-
sion into their private lives by journalists. Poor handling of any of the 
issues mentioned can result in the demise of democracy and peaceful co- 
existence. It is, therefore, not surprising that these themes are recurrent in 
debates about media standards. Because they were significant in the media 
policy debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking scandal, this chapter 
provides background knowledge on these key issues. The concept of polit-
ical economy is used to explain the debate on the issue of concentration of 
media ownership. All these will equip the reader with the information 
needed to understand my analysis of how journalists covered the media 
policy debate that arose from the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the 
Leveson Inquiry. I will begin with the issue of press freedom.
Press freedom refers to “that degree of freedom from restraint which is 
essential to enable proprietors, editors and journalists to advance the 
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public interest” (Royal Commission of the Press 1977, cited in Frost 
2007, p. 43). It is essentially the creation of an enabling environment for 
the media to express opinion or publish articles without censorship. The 
history of press freedom in the UK is largely linked to the struggle against 
state suppression (Curran and Seaton 2010, p. 1). Significant among the 
steps to press freedom in the UK were the abolition of the Court of Star 
Chamber in 1641, the end of press licensing in 1694, the Fox’s Libel Act 
of 1792 and the repeal of the “taxes on knowledge” (tax on advertising, 
stamp duty, tax on paper) in the period 1853–1861. Some analysts claim 
that the press became free only at the tail end of these reforms (ibid.). 
However, there are still debates about whether the British press is truly 
free from both state and corporate influence. At the time of writing, press 
freedom in the UK was based on the human right to free expression. The 
right to free expression in the UK as spelt out in the Human Rights Act of 
1998 was derived from the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). Article 10 of the ECHR states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. The right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and respon-
sibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or pen-
alties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interest of national security, territorial integrity or public safety.
This Article protects the right to express as well as receive opinions and 
information. Freedom of expression is the foundation of a good number 
of democratic rights. For instance, it empowers the public to express their 
views in debates that could influence policy decisions. Freedom of expres-
sion, and by extension freedom of the press, also enables journalists to 
investigate and expose corrupt practices by the powerful in society. 
Examples are the BBC’s Panorama exposure of abuse of patients at 
Winterbourne View in Bristol, UK (BBC News 2011), and the role played 
by Guardian newspaper in exposing the extent of phone hacking at the 
News of the World (Davies 2014). Thus, freedom of expression is integral 
to the sustenance of democracy and good governance.
As shown in Article 10 (2) of the Human Rights Acts 1998, freedom of 
expression comes with responsibilities for all concerned. For democracy to 
thrive, each beneficiary must not overstep his or her bounds in freedom of 
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expression. The state must not censor the press needlessly and must pro-
tect the right to freedom of expression by the media. This is very impor-
tant if the media is to fulfil its role as the watchdog of society (checking on 
the powerful to ensure they are accountable to society). The media must 
be free to access relevant information from public office holders, private 
organisations and other people in positions of authority, and should dis-
seminate the news gathered to members of the public (Frost 2007, p. 40). 
The right of members of the public to express their views on this matter 
should also be protected. Protection of press freedom by the state must be 
accompanied by a commensurate protection of the right to freedom of 
expression by individuals. The press, for its part, must respect the citizens’ 
right to privacy.
However, as mentioned earlier in this book, the press has often been 
accused of abusing its freedom by way of invasion of privacy and defama-
tion of character. Many have asked whether “the media have gone too far, 
too often” especially since the death of Princess Diana in August 1997 
(Sartore 2000, p. 49) and, more recently, with the hacking of the phones 
of some members of the public by the News of the World. There are laws in 
place for the protection of the freedom of others. For example, the law on 
defamation allows the award of compensation if a person’s reputation has 
been dented (e.g. Lachaux v Independent Print [2019] UKSC 27). The 
law on defamation was reformed, resulting in the creation of the 
Defamation Act 2013. There is also a law against the interception of pri-
vate communication through covert means such as hidden cameras and 
computer hacking (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000). These 
laws, though not solely for the press, are being used to ensure that the 
media do not overstep their bounds in the exercise of their freedom. 
However, the media can be exempted from obeying these laws when their 
actions are in “the public interest” (Editors’ Code of Practice 2016, Clause 
10). This is where the controversy lies: what constitutes the “public 
interest”?
In democratic societies, the duty of the press is often articulated in 
terms of “the public’s right to know” (ibid.). For instance, if government 
officials are misappropriating funds under their control or a business outfit 
is defrauding its customers, the press has an obligation to let the public 
know about it. If the only means of getting this information is through 
covert means, then the media would not be considered as having broken 
the law by using such means. That is because the news gathered was in the 
public interest (for the benefit of the public). Journalists are, by the 
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Editors’ Code of Practice and by law, allowed to indulge in some other-
wise unlawful acts when they are being done in the public interest. 
However, this “public interest” clause that journalists fall back on has 
often been “used and abused” (Leveson Inquiry 2012). Over the years, 
the public interest has come to mean things that are of interest to the 
public; in other words, things that satisfy the public’s prurient interests 
and thereby boost the sales, viewership or readership of the news product 
(Frost 2007, p. 37). The debate is on where to draw the line in the public 
interest defence. So, what is the public interest? The meaning of the term 
has been the focus of a good number of journalistic debates. Some attempts 
have been made towards making the term clearer in order to prevent 
its abuse.
The Guardian updated its editorial code in the aftermath of the phone 
hacking scandal and came up with a list of principles on what can be clas-
sified as being in the public interest. The list which was drawn up by Sir 
David Omand, the former head of security and intelligence at the Cabinet 
Office, states thus:
There must be sufficient cause—the intrusion needs to be justified by the 
scale of potential harm that might result from it.
There must be integrity of motive—the intrusion must be justified in 
terms of the public good that would follow from publication.
The methods used must be in proportion to the seriousness of story and 
its public interest, using the minimum possible intrusion.
There must be proper authority—any intrusion must be authorised at a 
sufficiently senior level and with appropriate oversight.
There must be a reasonable prospect of success; fishing expeditions are 
not justified. (Guardian Media Group 2011, p. 4)
The guideline acknowledges that much of journalism is essentially 
intrusive and urged its staff to avoid invading people’s privacy unless there 
is a clear public interest in doing so. The newspaper stressed that “propor-
tionality is essential, as is proper prior consideration where privacy issues 
may be involved” (Guardian news and media editorial Code, August 
2011, p. 4). The lists of guidelines on the public interest by the press, 
though helpful in checking the abuse of the public interest, still leave a lot 
of room for controversy. It is not in all cases that a journalist can correctly 
ascertain “the seriousness of story”. For example, while the use of long 
focal lenses to take shots of a topless princess in a private holiday 
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environment is obviously not a serious story (and not in the public inter-
est), it is not that clear to ascertain whether a journalist ought to be pros-
ecuted for hacking the phone of a Member of Parliament, if he claims that 
he had strong reasons to suspect that the MP was involved in a criminal 
offence but only found out his suspicions were wrong after intercepting 
his phone messages? Similarly, while hacking telephone messages is a crim-
inal offense, the public interest defence would have protected a journalist 
if, for example, Milly Dowler was found alive through information received 
from hacking into her voicemail.
Although it would be reckless to suggest that all covert investigations 
carried out by journalists should be excused based on claims that they are 
in the public interest, it is worthy of note that some stories of major public 
interest have been exposed by means of long focal lenses, deceit, bugging 
devices, false identities, trickery and even computer hacking. An example 
is the exposure of patterns of serious abuse at the Winterbourne View care 
facility which was revealed through secret filming by BBC Panorama 
(Panorama 2011). The public interest clause exists to make room for such 
coverage.
The version of the Editors’ Codebook that was in operation at the time 
of the phone hacking scandal stated, “the public interest is impossible to 
define (Beales 2012, p. 86). So, the code does not attempt to do so”. 
What it did instead was to list out what it described as “a non-exhaustive 
list” of what is in the public interest. A later version of the Editors’ Code 
of Practice (2016) which came into effect in July 2019 also pointed out 
that there may be exceptions to specified clauses in the Editors’ Code of 
Practice, where it can be demonstrated that they are in the public interest. 
It stated:
 1. The public interest includes, but is not confined to:
• Detecting or exposing crime, or the threat of crime, or serious 
impropriety.
• Protecting public health or safety.
• Protecting the public from being misled by an action or statement 
of an individual or organisation.
• Disclosing a person or organisation’s failure or likely failure to 
comply with any obligation to which they are subject.
• Disclosing a miscarriage of justice.
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• Raising or contributing to a matter of public debate, including 
serious cases of impropriety, unethical conduct or incompetence 
concerning the public.
• Disclosing concealment, or likely concealment, of any of the above.
 2. There is a public interest in freedom of expression itself.
The public interest clause also states that “the regulator will consider 
the extent to which material is already in the public domain … or will 
become so” and that “editors invoking the public interest will need to 
demonstrate that they reasonably believed publication … would both 
serve, and be proportionate to, the public interest and explain how they 
reached that decision at the time”. To give the Editors’ Code of Practice 
the benefit of the doubt, these are measures aimed at ensuring that the 
press does not abuse the “public interest” defence. However, the inex-
haustible list as well as the scope of “reasonable belief” makes the meaning 
assigned to the term very broad such that the term remains fluid. The 
statement that “the regulator will consider the extent to which material is 
already in the public domain” has proven to be problematic, especially as 
the internet can make materials available across geographical locations 
even when such materials are restricted by law in other locations. For 
instance, if a story on the private life of an individual has been published 
in another country’s media, does that make it acceptable for the same 
material to be published in UK’s mainstream media since it is already in 
the public domain?
An example is the 2019 case of the English cricketer Ben Stokes and 
The Sun, which belongs to News Group Newspapers (NGN), where Ben 
Stokes and his mother sued the paper for publishing in England and Wales 
what the newspaper described as Ben Stokes’ family tragedy. NGN 
anchored its argument on the fact that the information had been widely 
published in New Zealand 31 years earlier—before the birth of the player. 
Nonetheless, UK’s Supreme Court ruled in favour of Ben Stokes on the 
grounds of damages caused by further intrusion into the English cricket-
er’s family’s privacy, thus stirring up a debate about the “availability in the 
public domain” aspect of the code’s public interest guideline. The case of 
PJS v NGN [2016] UKSC 26 is similar to Ben Stokes’ where information 
in the public domain (published in the USA and internet sites) was insuf-
ficient reasons to publish in the UK, and The Sun lost the case. The focus 
of this chapter is not to analyse the impact of internet on the “public inter-
est” defence but to show how definitions of the “public interest” have 
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been ambiguous in the practice of journalism and this ambiguity has made 
room for its use to defend kiss and tell stories. Scholars have queried the 
fluidity of the press’ definitions of the public interest, arguing that it is 
designed to make room for the use of this privilege for self-interested pur-
poses such as intruding into the lives of members of the public (Petley 
2013; Harding 2012). Many references to the “the public interest” were 
made in the journalistic metadiscourse on the media policy debate (see 
Chaps. 9 and 10).
Much of the debate on the public interest relates to invasions of privacy. 
How to strike a balance between protection of privacy and journalism in 
the public interest is one of the controversial issues in debates about media 
policy. Since the death of Princess Diana in 1997, there have been argu-
ments in the UK about the extent to which the press report on the private 
lives of people (Petley 2013, p. 59). Aggravated by the News of the World 
phone hacking scandal, these arguments sought to answer the question, 
“how far can the press go in publishing private information about indi-
viduals and how far can the individual go in claiming the right to privacy”? 
Privacy is recognised both legally and philosophically as a basic human 
need (Barendt 2002). In the words of Barendt, privacy is important 
because:
It provides a space for individuals to think for themselves and to engage in 
creative activity, free from observation and supervision … personal relation-
ships could not develop if the participants felt that every move was watched 
and reported … Privacy is an aspect of human dignity and autonomy. It 
enables individuals to exercise a degree of independence or control over 
their lives. Privacy therefore entails rights to be alone and to keep confiden-
tial correspondence and other documents, and to ensure that intimate activ-
ity is not filmed or reported. (Barendt 2002, pp. 14–15)
Human dignity requires the ability of people to control information 
about themselves (Frost 2015, p. 93). If individuals are to have a right to 
dignity, then they will need a right to respect for privacy. Respect to pri-
vacy is a fundamental human right that is guaranteed by Article 8 of the 
Human Rights Act (1998). The Article states:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. There shall be no interference by public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public 
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safety or economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the 
rights and freedom of others. (Human Rights Act 1998, Chapter 42, 
Schedule 1, Article 8)
This means that a person whose privacy is invaded has the legal right to 
sue the culprit for invasion of privacy. Invasion of privacy refers to an 
intrusion into the private life of another person, without a justifiable rea-
son (Human Rights Act 1998). Invasion of privacy can be applied to dif-
ferent forms of private information dissemination including internet 
privacy, data collection and workplace monitoring. Although there is no 
clear-cut privacy law in the UK, there are ways in which privacy is pro-
tected (Fenwick et al. 2007, p. 171; Hoffman 2011, p. 148). The most 
popular is the law of breach of confidence, which allows for the protection 
of confidential information (Kenyon and Richardson 2006, p. 154). Other 
laws used to protect privacy include laws on defamation, malicious false-
hood, trespass and nuisance.
There are also statutes that protect privacy in certain situations. These 
include the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Data Protection 
Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Joint 
Committee on Privacy and Injunctions 2012, p. 10). Many scholars have 
argued that there may be a need for an outright privacy law in the UK but 
the courts appear to be reluctant to create one based on the argument that 
existing laws would suffice (Hoffman 2011, p. 137). Supporting this view, 
the report of the 2012 Joint Committee of the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords on Privacy and Injunctions states:
A privacy statute would not clarify the law. The concepts of privacy and the 
public interest are not set in stone, and evolve over time. We conclude that 
the current approach, where judges balance the evidence and make a judg-
ment on a case-by-case basis, provides the best mechanism for balancing 
article 8 and article 10 rights. (Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions 
2012, p. 5)
Celebrities are not often granted privacy protection because they are 
considered to have voluntarily placed themselves within the public eye 
(Frost 2007, p. 91). For instance, in the case of Ferdinand v. Mirror Group 
Newspapers, Rio Ferdinand, a one-time captain of the England national 
football team, took legal action against the Sunday Mirror for infringing 
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his right to a private life and misusing his personal information. In this 
case, Ferdinand’s public image and role model status meant there was a 
public interest in the newspaper’s disclosure, sufficient to justify the pub-
lication, and Ferdinand lost the case. However, between 2017 and 2020 a 
good number of celebrities won their claims for privacy (e.g. Ben Stokes v 
The Sun [2019]; PJS v NGN [2016]). Much earlier in 2004, Naomi 
Campbell won her privacy case against Mirror Group Newspapers 
(MGN).1 The judgement left the Mirror facing a total legal bill of more 
than one million pounds (BBC News 2004; Gibson 2004). The European 
Court of Human Rights later ruled that the legal cost Daily Mirror had to 
pay was too high and that a balance be struck between privacy and press 
freedom (Halliday 2011).
One of the contentions on the issue of privacy is that high legal costs of 
privacy cases are an impediment to freedom of expression. The argument 
is that it could impede investigative journalism and restrain the press from 
fulfilling its watchdog role in society (Joint Committee on Privacy and 
Injunctions 2012b, p. 5). The Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions 
stated, “excessive costs limit the ability of newspapers and broadcasters to 
respond to threatened legal action and can result in them not challenging 
an injunction on the ground of cost” (Joint Committee on Privacy and 
Injunctions 2012, p. 36, para. 138). In relation to members of the public 
who need to claim their right to privacy, the argument is that only the rich, 
including celebrities and political office holders, have access to privacy 
protection because of the high legal costs involved (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission 2012, p.  332). The question is, “what is the best 
action for the government or other relevant authorities to take (or not 
take) to protect both the individual’s right to privacy and freedom of the 
press?” The Leveson Inquiry discussed high legal costs on the part of both 
journalists and citizens. Its proposals on these costs formed part of the 
issues of contention in the press reform debate. The press reform debate 
1 Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers: Miss Campbell sued MGN for a breach of her 
privacy after it published a report about her drug addiction with a photograph of her leaving 
a Narcotics Anonymous meeting in King’s Road, Chelsea. In March 2002 (a year from the 
month of publication), the model successfully claimed breach of privacy and the High Court 
ordered £3500 damages from the Mirror. Though an Appeal Court judgement overturned 
the High Court ruling in October 2002, ordering her to pay the paper’s £350,000 legal 
costs, in May 2004 the House of Lords overturned the Appeal Court’s decision, reinstating 
the High Court judgement and damages, based on breach of confidentiality and breach of 
duty under the 1998 Data Protection Act.
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also featured arguments on the impact of media ownership on press stan-
dards, particularly its effect on the press’ ability to fulfil its role in a democ-
racy. The following section x-rays key arguments on the relationship 
between media ownership and the sustenance of democracy. Media own-
ership is one of the issues discussed during the media policy debate. Its 
impact on the coverage also makes it one of the key issues examined in 
this book.
ConCentration of Media ownership
Concentration of media ownership refers to a situation in which the bulk 
of the mass media is increasingly being controlled (in terms of shares) by 
a small number of persons or organisations (Curran and Seaton 2010, 
p. 75). There are increasing levels of concentration of media ownership in 
most Western democracies (Baker 2007, p. 3; Media Reform Coalition 
2019). This is the result of big media industries buying up smaller and 
weaker ones who are unable to survive the economic downturn in the 
media industry (Bagdikian 2004). The aim was often to take over their 
resources and thereby increase financial gains, readership/viewership and, 
invariably, power. From about the twentieth century most Western democ-
racies began to identify the growing media concentration as a threat to 
democracy and a number of them adopted policies to check the trend 
(Baker 2007, p. 3). These policies, which were aimed at supporting press 
diversity, took the form of competition laws or subsidy arrangements for 
weaker/potentially viable media (ibid.). This was, however, insufficient to 
stop the trend in concentration of media ownership. A look at the owner-
ship of the newspapers examined in this book will give us a picture of the 
level of media ownership concentration in the UK.
The Sun newspaper is owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News UK which 
also owns The Times, The Sunday Times and The Sun on Sunday newspa-
pers (News UK 2015). The Daily Mail is owned by Viscount Rothermere, 
owner of DMG Media (formerly Associated Newspapers), a subsidiary of 
DMGT (DMG Media 2017). DMG Media also owns the Mail on Sunday, 
Metro, Wowcher, Jobsite and Jobrapido (DMG Media 2017). Though the 
owner of Daily Mail delegates substantial management of the paper, 
including the management of its content, to an editor in chief, who at the 
time of my research was Paul Dacre, the paper has not functioned much 
differently from newspapers without that level of apparent detachment in 
terms of commercialisation (Cole and Harcup 2009, p. 85). The Daily 
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Telegraph belongs to the Telegraph Media Group (formerly, the Telegraph) 
which is owned by the Barclay Brothers (Telegraph Media Group 2017). 
The Barclay Brothers—David and Fredrick Barclay—also own the Sunday 
Telegraph (Telegraph Media Group 2017).
At the time of the debate that followed the phone hacking scandal, the 
Daily Mirror was owned by Trinity Mirror. As of 2017, Trinity Mirror was 
Britain’s largest newspaper group with more than 150 newspaper titles 
across the UK and Ireland. Its portfolio of newspapers included the 
Sunday Mirror, Daily Record, Sunday People and Sunday Mail (Trinity 
Mirror 2013). During the period covered in my investigation 
(2011–2013—the peak of the debate), the Daily Express belonged to 
Richard Desmond’s Northern and Shell company which also owned 
Sunday Express, Daily Star and Daily Star Sunday alongside three maga-
zines: OK!, New! and Star (Northern and Shell 2017). It is important to 
note that by 2018, Trinity Mirror had bought Richard Desmond’s Express 
titles demonstrating that the issue of media ownership concentration 
heightened even after the Leveson Inquiry. The purchase of the Express 
titles led to Trinity Mirror’s change of name to Reach PLC. As of 2019, 
Reach plc was “the largest commercial national and regional news pub-
lisher in the UK”. Reach owned the Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror, Sunday 
People, Daily Express, Sunday Express, Daily Star, Daily Star Sunday, Daily 
Record, Sunday Mail, OK! and New!, amongst others. However, in this 
book, my analysis will be based on how Trinity Mirror and the Express 
newspapers were constituted at the time of my research.
The Guardian is funded by the Scott Trust Ltd, owners of Guardian 
Media Group (GMG). During the period covered by my study, they 
owned Guardian newspaper and its Sunday title, the Observer. Though 
Guardian Media Group sold its regional media business to Trinity Mirror 
in 2010 (Davoudi 2010), it still has “a diverse portfolio of business invest-
ments” (Guardian Media Group 2015). The Media Reform Coalition 
summarised media ownership figures in the UK:
Just three companies (News UK, Daily Mail Group and Reach) dominate 
83% of the national newspaper market (up from 71% in 2015). When online 
readers are included, just five companies (News UK, Daily Mail Group, 
Reach, Guardian and Telegraph) dominate nearly 80% of the market, slightly 
up from our last report. In the area of local news, just five companies 
(Gannett, Johnston Press, Trinity Mirror, Tindle and Archant) account for 
80% of titles (in 2015, six companies had the same share). Two companies 
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have 46% of all commercial local analogue radio stations and two-thirds of 
all commercial digital stations. (Media Reform Coalition 2019)
Surprisingly, despite the increasing rate of concentration of media own-
ership, it did not take a prime position in the debate at the Leveson 
Inquiry, leading to it being described by the Media Reform Coalition as 
“the elephant in the room” (Media Reform Coalition 2014). It is widely 
acknowledged that concentration of media ownership is dangerous to the 
health of democracy because it can result in “abuse of political power by 
media owners or the under-representation of some significant viewpoints” 
(Doyle 2002, p.  6). The impact of media ownership concentration on 
democracy can be understood through the political economy of the press. 
The following section provides a synopsis of key arguments on media 
ownership advanced by proponents of political economy and neoliberal 
theories of the press. By comparing the two perspectives on media owner-
ship, the section seeks to acquaint the reader with the major ideological 
divides that featured in the media reform debate that followed the NoTW 
phone hacking scandal.
Media ownership: neoliberal and politiCal 
eConoMy perspeCtives
In media studies, political economy refers to a critical approach to media 
analysis that investigates “how media and communication systems and 
content are shaped by ownership, market structures, commercial support, 
technologies, labour practices, and government policies” (McChesney 
2008, p. 12). The key focus of the political economy analysis is to ascer-
tain whether media structures serve to promote or undermine democracy, 
and to explore and recommend ways of ensuring a media structure that 
enhances democracy (Hardy 2014). Lazarsfeld and Merton ([1948] 2004, 
p. 236, cited in Freedman 2014, p. 50) emphasised the importance of 
investigating the media through the lenses of their economic structures. 
The authors were of the view that the “the social effect of the media will 
vary as the system of ownership and control varies” (ibid.). The political 
economy critique theorises that democracy is threatened where there is 
concentration of media ownership (Freedman 2014, p. 50). It argues that 
when only a few people own much of the media, it could result in the 
dominance of a few voices in debates in the media’s public sphere 
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(Freedman 2014, p. 51). The media content could be tailored to suit the 
ideology of the owner and where the owner has a high percentage of the 
media, his or her views become the most heard, giving his or her perspec-
tive undue advantage over others (McChesney 2004, p. 224).
An example is the case of Italy’s former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
(Baker 2007, p. 18). Without any connection to organised political parties 
in Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, one of Italy’s richest individuals at the time, 
formed his own party—Forza Italia—and used his massive media power 
(his media at the time controlled about 45 per cent of national TV along 
with important print media) to propel himself into the position of Prime 
Minister in the 1994 and 2001 elections, heading what was, at the time of 
writing, Italy’s longest-lasting government since World War II (Ginsborg 
2004; Baker 2007, p. 18). In terms of debates on media policy, the politi-
cal economy critique would argue that concentration of ownership could 
limit the chances of having a democratic public sphere because the per-
spectives of the few owners may dominate the news.
On the other hand, neoliberal analysts argue that though media owner-
ship is oligopolistic, the quest for profit will compel media owners to tar-
get diverse consumers and, as such, one owner may not necessarily transmit 
the same perspective via all his media outlets (Doyle 2002, pp. 12–14). 
Neoliberal analysts contend that diversity of ownership will not axiomati-
cally translate into diversity of media content (ibid.). This is because where 
different media organisations depend on the same source for their news 
content, the perspectives may be from a narrow spectrum of sources. For 
example, where many media organisations depend on copy from news 
agencies, press releases and public relations material for news, they end up 
churning out the same messages, making news content from diverse media 
very similar (Davies 2009, pp. 58–60; Harcup 2014, p. 53). Their argu-
ment here is that emphasis should be placed on ensuring diversity of media 
content, not ownership.
The political economy analysis sees as anti-democratic the increasing 
media ownership mergers and convergence in most liberal democracies, 
such as in the USA and the UK. Media convergence refers to a situation in 
which one media group operates different forms of mass media, for exam-
ple, broadcast and print, through either cross-media ownership acquisi-
tions or other forms of expansion (Doyle 2002, p.  3). The political 
economy critical tradition argues that these mergers could result in con-
flicts of interest because some news organisations may find it difficult to 
give a comprehensive and fair report about a media outfit that it is 
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affiliated to (Allan and Zelizer 2010). For instance, my investigation 
revealed that The Sun newspaper found it hard to report freely about the 
News of the World phone hacking scandal because Rupert Murdoch owned 
both titles.
Conflict of interest resulting from concentration of ownership can also 
result in large sections of the press using their gatekeeping powers to limit 
or exclude from journalistic metadiscourse issues that they consider to be 
against their owner or his interest. As we shall see in Chap. 7, the issue of 
concentration of media ownership receive minimal attention from debates 
on media policy because it is often perceived as being against the corporate 
interest of media owners (McChesney 2008). This agrees with Mill’s 
(1959, p.  18, cited in Freedman 2014, p.  33) argument that [media] 
power can be exhibited not only in action, but also in failure to act. The 
issue of concentration of media ownership has remained off limits in jour-
nalistic metadiscourse (McChesney 2008; Freedman 2014, p. 73). This 
may be a ploy to maintain the status quo in the concentration of media 
ownership.
As part of efforts to gain public trust and prevent further checks on 
concentration of media ownership, media magnates often advance the 
neoliberal argument that media owners are not involved in daily supervi-
sion of the content of their papers. For instance, Daily Mail’s owner claims 
that he “delegates substantial management of the paper, including the 
management of its content, to an editor in chief ” (Cole and Harcup 2009, 
p. 85). However, studies have shown that newspaper proprietors do inter-
fere with news content either directly or by employing staff they believe 
will toe their line of argument (Cole and Harcup 2009, pp. 27–28) or 
even by nominating their children as chair and members of the board. The 
level of treatment or lack of treatment of the issue of media ownership in 
journalistic metadiscourse may differ from media outfit to media outfit 
depending on their structure—their revenue or ownership model (see 
Chap. 7).
For instance, commercially owned press may respond to issues of own-
ership differently to non-commercial media. This calls for attention to be 
placed not only on the plurality of ownership but also on diversity in own-
ership structure. Media organisations who feel threatened by bigger media 
conglomerates could call for more robust policies to guarantee plurality in 
ownership. From a neoliberal perspective, the aim would be for govern-
ment to intervene by ensuring fair competition among media owners. 
While this could be classed under social democracy because it attempts to 
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enhance democracy by ensuring plurality of media ownership, Freedman 
(2014, p. 72) argues that it can also be described as neoliberal when the 
aim is to protect business not democracy. This argument will be further 
developed in my discussion of the political economy of the Guardian’s 
coverage of the press reform debate that followed the phone hacking scan-
dal in Chap. 7.
From the neoliberal perspective, the “lack of plurality” critique of 
media ownership has become obsolete with the coming of the internet 
(Compaine 2005; Benkler 2006, cited in Hardy 2014). Scholars with this 
perspective claim that “objectionable concentration” no longer exists 
because digital technology has made it easier for citizens to set up news 
websites, blogs, Twitter and other online platforms from which the public 
can source information (Compaine 2005; Jarvis 2009, cited in Freedman 
2014, p. 6). In their view, regulation of ownership beyond what is cur-
rently provided is not necessary (Baker 2007, pp. 87–88). Those with this 
perspective reject worries about concentration of media ownership, con-
tending that the internet will break it up and eliminate any need for regu-
lation aimed at ensuring diversity in ownership (Compaine and 
Gomery 2000).
But political economy critics contend that even though the internet 
(social media, Twitter, Facebook, blogs, etc.) plays a role in promoting 
diversity in general media content, when it comes to news, people still rely 
more on mainstream media (Lee-Wright et al. 2012, p. 151). This argu-
ment supports data from empirical studies which reveal that readership of 
news on the internet is much higher on the mainstream media websites 
than on other websites (Ofcom Online Nation Report 2019, p. 27). For 
instance, Mail Online was the most visited website in the world in 2012, 
and its readership has continued to increase since then (Turvill 2016). It 
can, therefore, be argued that the “old” media owners are also very pow-
erful in the “new” media. According to Baker (2007, p. 99), the contribu-
tions of the internet “are different from or are complementary to, and may 
often be in part dependent on the more traditional performance of the 
mass media”. There is a growing concentration in the ownership of corpo-
rate online websites, such as Google, Amazon and Facebook which gives 
credence to the fears that concentration of media ownership is being 
reproduced on internet platforms (McChesney 2008, pp.  18–19; 
Schlosberg 2017, p. 4). Freedman puts it this way:
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Far from diminishing the importance of media moguls and tech giants, 
announcing the death of gatekeepers or lauding the autonomy of the public, 
we should be investigating the way the [media ownership] power is being 
reconstituted inside digital landscape. (Freedman 2014, p. 107)
Political economists contend that the internet does not eliminate wor-
ries concerning concentration of media ownership and that media-specific 
laws and regulatory policies are still needed to check ownership concentra-
tion (Baker 2007, pp. 99–101). Currently, in most Western democracies 
there are policies designed to promote plurality of media ownership but in 
some countries, such as the UK, critics argue that the anti-monopoly mea-
sures on media ownership are too weak to guarantee plurality of media 
ownership (Curran and Seaton 2010, pp.  328–338). They argue that 
British anti-monopoly rules would need to be further strengthened to 
enable plurality of media ownership (O’Carroll 2012a; Freedman 2013).
Neoliberals counter these arguments by insisting that an active audi-
ence plus press self-regulatory bodies would suffice to ensure that the 
media serve the public interest and are accountable to their readers. But as 
the Leveson Inquiry demonstrated, the then-existing press regulatory 
body, the Press Complaints Commission (PCC), was not living up to 
expectations in its role as regulator of press misconduct. Understanding 
both the neoliberal and political economy arguments on media ownership 
is essential for effective analysis of its representation in media reform 
debates. Contributing to the debate on how to better regulate the press, 
Freedman (2013) argues that changing the culture of the UK press 
requires much more than “better codes and a more forceful means of per-
suading newspapers to play by the rules … but will involve a challenge to 
an ownership structure that has placed the press in the hands of a tiny 
group of oligarchs and moguls”. Alan Rusbridger, the then editor-in-chief 
of Guardian newspaper, warned of the danger of not giving adequate 
attention to media ownership (O’Carroll 2012b). He advised the inquiry 
to consider the “significant dangers to democracy” of media power being 
concentrated in too few hands (ibid.).
This book takes the position that the structure of media ownership can 
impact on news content. The structure of ownership can determine what 
concerns are allowed in through the gates of the public sphere and what is 
denied access; who gets to speak and whose voice is marginalised; and how 
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issues are represented in debates about journalism. This argument will be 
backed up with empirical data in my analysis of how the debate on media 
ownership was covered by the press (see Chap. 7). I argue that debates 
about how to achieve plurality of news content ought to go beyond advo-
cating plurality of owners and one pattern of ownership to diversity of 
ownership structure (e.g. diversity of revenue generation models). My 
investigation of how the media policy debate was covered by the press 
explored the impact of the structure of ownership on the way the debate 
was represented. Another major issue of concern in the press reform 
debate was the issue of how the press should be regulated. In the follow-
ing chapter, I provide background information on what can be described 
as the foremost issue in the media policy debate that followed the phone 
hacking scandal—press regulation in the UK. This will provide informa-
tion needed to understand arguments relating to press regulation in media 
reform debates.
ConClusion
This chapter explored key issues in media reform debates in order to high-
light the recurrent issues in the journalistic metadiscourse on press reform. 
The issues examined include press freedom, the public interest, privacy 
and media ownership. Press freedom was defined as “that degree of free-
dom from restraint which is essential to enable proprietors, editors and 
journalists to advance the public interest” (Royal Commission of the Press 
1977, cited in Frost 2007, p. 43). Journalists are, by the Editors’ Code of 
Practice, and by law, allowed to indulge in some otherwise unlawful acts 
when the acts are being done in the public interest. The problem is that 
this public interest defence has often been used to defend media coverage 
of kiss and tell stories, a situation which has led to calls for stricter defini-
tions of the public interest than that currently provided by the Editors’ 
Code of Practice (Petley 2013).
Tensions between privacy and press freedom are also recurrent in 
debates about media reform. Privacy is recognised both legally and philo-
sophically as a basic human need (Barendt 2002, pp. 14–15; Frost 2015, 
p. 93). This means that a person whose privacy is invaded has the legal 
right to sue the culprit for invasion of privacy. As explained in this chapter, 
invasion of privacy refers to an intrusion into the private life and family life 
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of another person, without a justifiable reason (Human Rights Act 1998). 
Most discussions on privacy in the journalistic metadiscourse on media 
policy relate to whether a media coverage that exposed the private life of 
an individual was in the public interest. Calls demanding for a fair balance 
between the freedoms of the press and those of individuals in society are 
on the rise. Such calls have been extended to privacy protection for celeb-
rities who were once regarded as underserving of privacy protection 
because they willingly placed their lives in the public view.
Another issue that frequently shows up in debates about media 
reform is the subject of concentration of media ownership. I defined 
concentration of media ownership as a situation in which few individu-
als or organisations own the bulk of the mass media (Fourie 2001, 
p. 112). I pointed out that there are increasing levels of concentration 
of media ownership in most Western democracies (Baker 2007, p. 3; 
Media Reform Coalition 2019). It is widely believed that concentration 
of media ownership is dangerous to democracy because of its potential 
to result in the abuse of power by media owners (Doyle 2002, p. 6). 
The key arguments related to media ownership in the journalistic meta-
discourse on media policy can be classified under two major perspec-
tives: the political economy critique versus neoliberal perspectives, a 
variant of the libertarian theory of the press.
In media studies, political economy refers to a critical approach to 
media analysis that investigates “how media and communication systems 
and content are shaped by ownership, market structures, commercial sup-
port, technologies, labour practices, and government policies” (McChesney 
2008, p. 12). The political economy critique posits that concentration of 
media ownership is detrimental to democracy because the owners’ views 
can dominate the news agenda. On the other hand, proponents of neolib-
eral perspectives on media ownership argue that diversity of ownership will 
not necessarily result in diversity of news content. This book takes the 
position that media ownership can impact on news content and that efforts 
to democratise news content should go beyond diversity of ownership to 
diversity of revenue or ownership model. Having provided insight into 
some of the key issues in the journalistic metadiscourse on media reform, 
the following chapter provides background information on the British 
press system and the debate on press regulation.
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CHAPTER 3
British Press System: Press Regulation 
and Accountability
How to regulate the press is arguably the foremost issue in media reform 
debates. Therefore, this chapter examines the history of press regulation in 
the UK as a way of highlighting recurrent trends in efforts at reforming 
press regulation and the outcomes of such attempts. To this end, this 
chapter discusses the history of press regulation in Britain, the British press 
system and relevant aspects of the Leveson Inquiry. The setting up of an 
inquiry to investigate press standards did not begin with the Leveson 
Inquiry. For approximately 70 years (at the time of writing), a number of 
commissions have been set up with a mandate to make the press account-
able. These include the Royal Commissions on the press (RCP) 1949, 
1962 and 1977 along with two Calcutt Committees (RCP 1949, 1962; 
Curran and Seaton 2010; Harcup 2014, p.  46). The 1949 Royal 
Commission on the press was set up by the British government to investi-
gate the increasing concentration of ownership of newspaper and periodi-
cals, and to promote free expression of opinion through the press (Frost 
2007; Curran and Seaton 2010). Ironically, the 1949 Royal commission 
took for granted the power of media proprietors to determine editorial 
policy (ibid.).
The Press Commission declared that media proprietors should be free 
to run their publications the way they please on the basis that “proprietors 
had the right to safeguard their financial investment in a high-risk indus-
try” like the press (Curran and Seaton 2010, p.  328). As Curran and 
Seaton (2010, p. 328) pointed out, “this hands-off approach assumed that 
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chain ownership will not develop into a major problem”. The position of 
the 1949 Royal Commission of the press was condemned by the 1962 
Press Commission. By that time, the share circulation controlled by media 
magnates had increased dramatically in all parts of the press. The three 
leading proprietors’ share of the national daily press had risen to 89 per 
cent. The Commission acknowledged that these were obvious signs of 
concentration of media ownership; but after much deliberation, the 
Commission concluded that “there was no acceptable legislative or fiscal 
method of controlling the economic forces to ensure diversification of 
newspapers” (Frost 2007, p. 215). The 1977 Press Commission was very 
vocal in its condemnation of the growing trend of media concentration 
(Curran and Seaton 2010). It declared that the acceleration of media 
chain ownership since 1962 was unparalleled; “new acquisitions had also 
resulted in the same three proprietors dominating both the national daily 
and the Sunday markets” (Curran and Seaton 2010, p. 319). The 1977 
Press Commission was critical of this development. For this Commission, 
“free press” was not synonymous with newspaper publishers running their 
papers the way they pleased without due regard for the good of society.
Despite these condemnations, the concentration of press ownership in 
the UK has remained high in comparison with other European countries. 
All three commissions on the British press (1949, 1962 and 1977) exam-
ined the issue of concentration of media ownership and its potential to 
cripple press accountability, but the closest they got to tackling the prob-
lem was to advocate anti-monopoly measures which did not work (Curran 
and Seaton 2010, p. 338). This failure has been attributed to policymak-
ers’ “fear of the press” because recurrently, when proposals are made on 
how to regulate the press and control media ownership, they are either not 
adopted or not implemented. The opposition of publishers to any form of 
statutory regulation is another recurrent trend during attempts to regulate 
the press.
The British press operates a system of self-regulation. Self-regulation 
refers to a system where an industry sets up a body to “control standards 
in the industry” (Frost 2007, p. 214). Such a body serves as a way of prov-
ing to their consumers that they are maintaining high standards. However, 
this does not appear to have worked well for the British press. Many peo-
ple have condemned the ethical standards of the press in Britain (Frost 
2007; Petley 2013). There has been a barrage of accusations on invasion 
of privacy, inaccurate reporting and other forms of malpractice (Spark and 
Harris 2010, p.  193; Cathcart 2018). Some have called for statutory 
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regulation of the British Press (O’Malley and Soley 2000, p. 178; Frost 
2007, p. 236). Statutory regulation is a system of regulation that is set up 
by law and supported by government (Frost 2007, p. 250). The British 
press has continued to oppose statutory regulation of the press. The 
Council (which became the Press Council from 1963) was reluctantly set 
up in 1953 following threats of statutory regulation resulting from harm-
ful journalism practices (Curran and Seaton 2010, p. 334).
Further threats led to the setting up of the Code of Conduct for jour-
nalists and after fresh threats the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) 
was set up in 1991 (ibid.). The PCC was described by many as “lacking 
teeth” (effectiveness) and ambition (Leveson Inquiry 2012a, p. 555, para. 
3.34). Lord Justice Leveson, in his inquiry into the practices, culture and 
ethics of the media, declared that the PCC had failed in its responsibility 
as a self-regulatory organ of the press (Leveson 2012b, p.  12, paras. 
41–46). Several commentators agree that the PCC failed as a regulator 
(Bloy 2012, pp. 19–20; Carney 2012, p. 323). The PCC’s investigation of 
the phone hacking scandal at the News of the World is a case in point. When 
Clive Goodman, the News of the World Royal correspondent, and Glen 
Mulcaire, a private detective employed by the newspaper, were jailed for 
phone hacking, the PCC investigated the use of subterfuge, phone tap-
ping and compliance with the Editors’ Code of Practice but its report was 
widely criticised as a “whitewash” (Bloy 2012, p.  18). Andy Coulson 
resigned as Editor of the News of the World, and on that basis, the PCC 
concluded that he was no longer answerable to the regulatory body 
because its jurisdiction covered only journalists working for publications 
that subscribed to the self-regulatory system. The courts later cross- 
examined Andy Coulson and found him guilty of plotting to intercept 
voicemails between 2000 and 2006. He was sentenced to 18 months in 
prison (BBC News 2014).
Having had three major commissions and a PCC that could not ensure 
an accountable press, the Leveson Inquiry, which followed the News of the 
World phone hacking scandal, was embraced as a perceived opportunity to 
correct about 70 years of an ineffective press regulatory system in Britain 
(Leveson 2012b, p. 3, para. 1). The Leveson Inquiry was set up by the 
British government on 13 July 2011 to investigate the role of the press 
and the police in the News of the World phone hacking scandal (National 
Archive, Leveson Inquiry 2012a). The scope of the inquiry went beyond 
the scandal to include broader issues of press and police accountability. 
The inquiry was triggered by public outrage against the News of the World 
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for its involvement in wide-scale phone hacking, particularly the hacking 
of the mobile phone of the murdered school girl known as Milly Dowler 
(Leveson 2012b, p. 3, para. 1). The inquiry which began on 14 November 
2011 had as its mandate an inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of 
the British press, particularly its relationship with the public, the police 
and politicians.
The Leveson Inquiry has been described as “the most concentrated 
look at the press” the UK has ever known (Leveson 2012b, p. 3, para. 3). 
In a space of about nine months, 337 witnesses gave evidence in person in 
addition to about 300 whose statements were read into the record (ibid.). 
Among them were victims of press abuse, newspaper reporters, manage-
ment and proprietors as well as police officers and politicians. The Inquiry’s 
report, which was released on 29 November 2012, contained proposals 
for future press regulation of the UK. I do not attempt to capture all infor-
mation in the 2000-page report but will highlight those aspects that are 
relevant to discussions in this book. In the Inquiry’s report, Lord Justice 
Leveson recommended a system of press regulation referred to as inde-
pendent self-regulation. This system requires the establishment of an inde-
pendent regulatory body which should promote high standards of 
journalism and protect the rights of individuals. In the words of Lord 
Justice Leveson, the independent self-regulatory body should:
Set standards, both through a code and in relation to governance and com-
pliance … hear individual complaints against its members about breach of its 
standards and order appropriate redress while encouraging individual news-
papers to embrace a more rigorous process for dealing with complaints 
internally; take an active role in promoting high standards, including having 
the power to investigate serious or systemic breaches and impose appropri-
ate sanctions; and provide a fair, quick and inexpensive arbitration service to 
deal with any civil law claims based upon its members’ publications. (Leveson 
2012b, pp. 14–15, paras. 56–57)
The appointment of the chairman and members of the independent 
regulatory body should be independent (Leveson 2012b, p. 15, para. 58). 
This, he said, can be achieved through the establishment of an indepen-
dent appointments panel which can include one current editor but should 
have a majority of persons who are independent of both press and govern-
ment (ibid.). The board of the regulatory body should include sufficient 
number of people with experience of the industry, such as former editors 
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and senior or academic journalists (Leveson 2012b, p.  15, para. 59). 
Those who cannot serve on the board are serving editors or members of 
the House of Commons or the government. The appointment process 
should be fair and open (ibid.). The idea here was to make the board inde-
pendent of the industry while ensuring that it does not lack knowledge 
about its operations.
According to the Leveson Report, funding for the new regulatory body 
should “be agreed between the regulatory body and the industry with 
security of funding over a reasonable planning period” (ibid.). This ought 
to take into account “the cost of fulfilling the obligations of the regulator 
as well as the commercial pressures on the industry” (ibid.). This system 
would also require the setting up of a Code Committee whose role would 
be to advise the new regulator on the promulgation of a code of practice 
for the industry. This committee, according to the Inquiry’s report, should 
include serving editors and engage with the public to review the code. The 
report also suggested that the new regulatory body be encouraged to deal 
with complaints even where there is an option of legal action. It is also to 
issue warning notifications to the press on behalf of persons who become 
“subjects of unwanted press intrusion and ensure that newspapers are held 
accountable for all material they print” no matter from where it is sourced.
Lord Justice Leveson recommended that the new independent self- 
regulatory body provide guidance on interpretation of “the public inter-
est” (Leveson 2012b, p. 15, para. 62). This service will include offering 
“voluntary pre-publication advice to editors” in need of guidance on how 
to interpret “the public interest” in a particular case, before they take a 
decision on whether to publish the story. This service is to be carried out 
without notifying the subject of the story. The independent self- regulatory 
body is also expected to create a whistle-blowing hotline as well as ensure 
that member organisations include a “conscience clause” in their employ-
ment contracts with journalists. The “conscience clause” is meant to pro-
tect journalists who feel that they are being compelled to do things that 
are “unethical or against the code”.
To encourage publishers to sign up to an acceptable self-regulatory 
establishment based on the Inquiry’s guidelines, Lord Justice Leveson 
recommended that the independent regulatory body be given the power 
to provide an arbitration service that would be recognised by the courts 
(Leveson 2012b, p. 16, paras. 66–67). Members of this arbitration body, 
he suggested, should be retired judges or senior lawyers who are experts 
in media law and whose charges would be paid by the media outfit 
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concerned (ibid.). They are to resolve disputes through cross- examination, 
striking out frivolous claims while resolving those with merit. The aim is 
to provide an incentive through the costs of civil litigation (ibid.). The 
Inquiry also recommended that if a publisher denies a claimant the oppor-
tunity of a cheap and fast arbitration because of his refusal to belong to the 
regulatory system, then the Civil Procedure Rules could give the court 
permission to deny that publisher its costs of litigation even if he wins the 
case, because resolving the issue could have been cheaper for all parties 
involved if the publisher had signed up with the regulator. On the other 
hand, if a newspaper that refused to subscribe to the new regulatory body 
is found guilty of infringing the rights of a claimant, such a newspaper 
would be subjected to payment of exemplary damages (Leveson 2012b, 
p. 16, para. 68).
Similarly, if a claimant takes advantage of his or her financial power and 
compels a newspaper who is a member of the self-regulatory body into a 
litigation, that newspaper would have the right to argue that “having pro-
vided a recognised low cost arbitral route, that claimant, even if successful, 
should be deprived of costs”, because they refused the cheap route to 
justice offered by the proposed regulatory body (Leveson 2012b, p. 17, 
para. 69). Of all the recommendations made by the Inquiry, what emerged 
as the most controversial was its suggestion that the proposed indepen-
dent self-regulatory system be underpinned by legislation (Leveson Report 
2012b, p. 17, para. 70). This became the nucleus of a number of argu-
ments that followed the release of the Leveson Report.
Following Lord Justice Leveson’s proposal that the PCC be replaced by 
a new independent regulatory body underpinned by statute, the PCC was 
closed on 8 September 2014. The Independent Press Standards 
Organisation (IPSO), which describes itself as “the independent regulator 
for the newspaper and magazine industry in the UK”, began on the same 
day (PCC 2017; IPSO 2016). The PCC website described IPSO as a 
replacement of the PCC (PCC 2017). By 2015, over 1500 newspapers 
and magazines had registered with IPSO. However, some scholars argue 
that IPSO is not much different from the PCC with regard to ensuring 
press accountability (Cathcart 2018, 2019). Lord Justice Leveson’s rec-
ommendation led to the setting up of the Royal Charter on self-regulation 
of the press in 2013, following negotiations and heated debates involving 
the three main political parties in the country at the time (the Conservatives 
who were in a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, and the 
Labour Party), Hacked Off (a campaign organisation representing victims 
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of press abuse) and representatives of the press. A final version of the gov-
ernment’s Royal Charter was published on 11 October 2013 and approved 
by the Privy Council on 30 October 2013 (DCMS and Miller 2013, n.p.). 
IPSO refused to sign up to the Royal Charter on Press Regulation because 
it was underpinned by statute. It posits that a press regulatory body with 
any form of statutory backing is a slippery slope to licensing of the press 
(IPSO 2016). On 25 October 2016, the Independent Monitor for the 
Press (IMPRESS) became the first press regulator to be recognised by the 
Press Recognition Panel of the Royal Charter on Press Regulation 
(IMPRESS 2016). By 2019, 129 publications had signed up to the regu-
lator (IMPRESS 2019).
In 2018, despite several calls from media reform campaigners not to do 
so, the Conservative government rescinded on its decision to go ahead 
with the second part of the Leveson Inquiry which was to scrutinise the 
relationship between the press and the police. The government’s reason 
for doing so was that the “the media landscape had changed and justice 
had been served through the criminal trials of many of those involved” 
(Waterson 2018). The Leveson Inquiry was designed to be in two parts; 
the first part focused on the press’ relationship with the public and politi-
cians. The second part of the inquiry, which is expected to examine the 
relationship between the press and the police, was put on hold because of 
the court cases that were in progress at the time. Cathcart (2018) argues 
that the second part of the Inquiry should not be shelved because the 
press refused to act on the findings of the first part of the Leveson Inquiry; 
the press failed to reform themselves; only Leveson 2 can reveal whether 
lawbreaking has ceased in the industry; cancellation would be a breach of 
political trust (government’s promise to press victims); more needs to be 
revealed in order to build public trust in journalism; the cancellation of 
Leveson 2 ought to have been a cross-party action, not the action of only 
one party; and that without Leveson 2 “history will repeat itself” in the 
form of press abuse of power. Concerning the cancellation of Leveson 2, 
the Chairman of the Leveson Inquiry, Lord Justice Brian Leveson, said 
revelations after the Inquiry that phone hacking was widespread in other 
newspapers meant that the editors lied at the Inquiry and “that would 
have been an interesting part of Part 2” (Leveson 2019 cited by Evans and 
Johnson 2019, n.p.).
Not only was Leveson 2 cancelled, the government also announced 
that it would repeal section 40 of the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 
(Mayhew 2018) which was the “carrot” meant to lure publishers to sign 
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up to a Royal Charter–approved regulatory body such as IMPRESS 
(Leveson 2012a, pp. 16–17, para. 68–69). Section 40 of the Crimes and 
Courts Act 2013 compels newspapers to pay the costs of legal action 
against them even if they win, if they have failed to sign up to a cross-party 
Royal Charter–recognised regulator (Parliamentary Communications 
Committee on the Crimes and Courts Act 2013). As of 2019, none of the 
mainstream newspapers, not even the Guardian newspaper which sup-
ported the establishment of the Royal Charter on press regulation, signed 
up to IMPRESS, which was at the time the only Royal Charter–approved 
regulator (IMPRESS 2019). Though it can be argued that some grounds 
were achieved in the fight for press reform, the government’s decision to 
shelve Leveson 2 and to revoke section 40 of the Crimes and Courts Act 
2013 demonstrates the difficulty in achieving effective media reforms 
through government intervention.
The government and the press are self-interested parties in media 
reform. Reneging on or rejection of stringent proposals towards reform-
ing the media is another recurrent outcome of efforts at effective press 
regulation. It can be argued that this is one of the results of the reciprocal 
relationship between the media and policymakers, a situation in which 
favours are rendered in return for good press coverage. This shall be elab-
orated on in Chap. 9. Tensions relating to press regulation remained at the 
time of writing. Some of the key tensions relate to the effectiveness of 
post-Leveson press regulation in the UK. There have been criticisms on 
IPSO’s operations relating to accuracy, misleading information, placement 
of corrections, inaction, omission, lack of independence and the powers 
conferred on IPSO’s Regulatory Funding Company (RFC—IPSO’s ver-
sion of PressBoF). As this book’s focus in relation to press regulation is 
how arguments relating to the subject were covered by the press, I will not 
expand on these key tensions. Future literature can take this further by 
critically analysing the key tensions of press regulation after the Leveson 
Inquiry. The knowledge on press regulation provided in this chapter will 
facilitate an understanding of my analysis later in this book, of how the 
press covered the debate on press regulation and the implication of their 
manner of coverage for strong media reforms and democracy.
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ConClusion
Arguments related to press regulation in media policy debates often bor-
der around whether to create more stringent regulations in order to make 
the press accountable or to steer clear of any further regulation in the 
interest of a free press that can hold power to account. Arguments relating 
to more stringent regulation often include discussions about whether to 
introduce some level of statutory regulation. This chapter pointed out 
that the British press is averse to statutory regulation. Its resistance to 
statutory regulation has been recurrent in debates about media policy 
from the 1949 Royal Commission on the Press to the Leveson Inquiry 
(2011–2012). The press’ response to such threats from the government 
has been to set up new self-regulatory bodies that promise to be better 
than the previous and capable of ensuring that the press is accountable. 
However, from 1949 to the time of writing, complaints have been that 
such bodies have not succeeded in this role.
For instance, the PCC which was created as an improved regulator fol-
lowing threats of statutory regulation was declared incompetent by the 
Leveson Inquiry. IPSO which replaced the PCC now receives similar criti-
cism from media reform campaigners. The questions this raises are as fol-
lows: Does self-regulation of the press work? Should the paradigm of 
self-regulation as a prerequisite for a free press be re-examined? Can some 
level of statutory regulation of the press enhance democracy? These ques-
tions will continue to produce opposing views. This book argues that how 
these views are covered by the press matters. Equal attention should be 
given to the various arguments relating to press regulation so that neither 
the press nor the public is unduly advantaged in the representations of 
debates about press regulation.
Currently, the debate about how to make the press accountable is very 
narrow. Much of the talk focuses on statutory regulation. While some level 
of statutory regulation can be an option, the press needs to provide an 
environment that can allow debates to be more robust so that other 
options can emerge. There is need for more creativity with regard to how 
to make the press more accountable. This book argues that such creativity 
can emerge if the media serve as a democratic public sphere in debates 
about press how to make the press more accountable. The attitude of the 
press should not be to fight to protect the status quo but an open mind to 
find out the best way to achieve press accountability, a way that ensures 
that the freedoms of both the public and the press are protected. The 
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following chapter expands on the role of the media as a democratic public 
sphere during debates on media policy. It will also introduce some of the 
theories and ideologies that formed the basis of some of the arguments 
that are analysed in this book.
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CHAPTER 4
Media Policy, Democracy and Theories 
of the Press
In Western democracies, most arguments about media policy are premised 
on normative theories of the press (Christians et al. 2009, p. 5). These 
arguments are inspired by the idea that the media are entrusted with infor-
mation power and how this power is used has consequences for democracy 
(Stromback 2005, p. 335). This chapter discusses some of the theories and 
ideologies on which arguments about media policy reform are predicated. 
An understanding of these theories is essential for the comprehension of 
these arguments. The normative theories discussed in this chapter include 
the neoliberal variant of the libertarian theory and the ideology of social 
democracy. The concepts of libertarianism and social responsibility are 
examined to provide background information on the neoliberal theory of 
the press. To emphasise the important role the media play in sustaining 
self-governance through citizens participation in public debates, I explore 
relevant conceptualisations of the public sphere. Specifically, Habermas’ 
(1989) concept of a central public sphere; Fraser’s (1992) conceptualisa-
tion of multiple publics and Ornebring and Jonsson’s (2004) application 
of Fraser’s concept of multiple publics are critically analysed. ‘Journalism 
as an interpretive community’, a concept put forward by Zelizer (1993), 
is expounded to show that in debates about their profession, the press can 
function as an interpretive community, multiple homogeneous publics and 
individual unique voices.
The media have become a very important part of contemporary human 
affairs (McQuail 2010, p. 162). Information on a wide variety of subjects 
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ranging from lifestyle to political issues can be accessed through the media. 
Top of the scale of the media’s relevance to society is its role in the suste-
nance of democracy (Christians et al. 2009, p. 55). It has been argued that 
democracy cannot survive in contemporary society without the news 
media (Lee-Wright et al. 2012, p. 3). There is a wide consensus that the 
media ought to carry out certain functions in a democratic society 
(Schudson 2008). Though the views of scholars on the extent to which 
they do and ought to do this vary, many agree that one of the media’s 
roles is to check on government to see that they are accountable to society 
(Lee-Wright et al. 2012, p. 3). The media are also expected to serve as the 
communication link between the public and political leaders, often acting 
as the voice of the people as well as advocate of the oppressed and less 
privileged. That is why any threat to responsible journalism is viewed by 
many as a threat to democracy.
It is widely accepted that what legitimates the media is their role in the 
sustenance of democracy (Franklin 2004; Herman and Chomsky 2008). 
This view is, however, not without contestation. Some analysts have 
described the claim as both a “stereotype and a myth” (Merrill 2000; 
Graber 2003). The latter argument may hold water when viewed against 
the background that the media and indeed journalism exist in nations that 
do not practice democracy. In such nations, the media serve as an instru-
ment of propaganda (Scammell 2000) and not as an agent of democracy. 
However, in today’s liberal democracies, the media play a vital role in the 
growth and sustenance of democracy. Since “democracy” is a broad term, 
it is important to clarify the type of democracy this book is concerned 
with. There are diverse definitions of democracy yet two major divides: the 
minimalist and maximalist definitions (Lipset and Lakin 2004, pp. 19–22). 
While the minimalist definition focuses on democracy as a system in which 
adult citizens of a community have the right to vote in a leader of their 
choice (Schumpeter 1943, cited in Saxer 2013, p.  5), the maximalist 
approach to democracy goes beyond the political sphere to include social 
and economic values, such as freedom to receive and give information, 
freedom of association, equal opportunities and press freedom (Ewald 
2013, p. 52). The maximalist approach is based on the idea that all aspects 
of society should be run democratically. In other words, democracy can be 
practiced in different domains of life, such as in the media, business, non- 
governmental organisations, meetings, families and schools.
Unlike the minimalist approach to democracy, which is based on the 
elitist view of Schumpeter (1943) where democracy is confined to an elite 
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group voted into power by the people, maximalists see democracy as a 
system of government in which power rests with the populace, not only 
their right to vote in a leader of their choice but also their right to equal 
participation in public debates through which they could influence deci-
sions that affect them (Cheema 2005, p. 4). As stated earlier, this book is 
concerned with the maximalist approach to democracy. Therefore, the 
definition of democracy as “governance by the people, for the people and 
of the people” (Lincoln 1863/2009) is interpreted in this book as the 
ability of “the people” (citizens) to take part in governance, not only by 
voting in the right leader, but also by taking part in public debates that can 
influence policy decisions (Gunther and Mughan, cited in Christians et al. 
2009, p. 25). This book engages with the maximalist approach to democ-
racy. Did the media play its role of sustaining democracy through its facili-
tation of citizens’ participation in the media policy that followed the News 
of the World phone hacking scandal? This book provides answers to this 
question. It takes the position that creative and effective ideas for media 
reform can emerge from the press if it serves as a democratic space for 
public debates.
It is widely acknowledged that democracy is the best form of govern-
ment (Dahl et al. 2003, p. 29). However, this view is not without contes-
tation. Some philosophers like Plato (cited in Dahl et  al. 2003) and 
Aristotle in his The Politics (2010, 335–323 BC) have questioned the 
endorsement of democracy as the ideal form of government. Towing this 
line, scholars like Merrill (2000), Graber (2003) and Barry (2011) argue 
that democracy is not necessarily the ideal type of government but that 
each country should be allowed to develop the style of government that 
best suits their culture (Merrill 2000, pp.  197–199). However, several 
empirical studies have identified democracy as a popular form of govern-
ment (Norris 1999; Dahl et al. 2003). Though Dahl et al. (2003, p. 29) 
admit that “democracy is not an unmitigated blessing”, they contend that 
its advantages far outweigh its shortfalls. The latter argument is the posi-
tion of this book. Democracy is important because it promotes human 
rights including freedom of expression (Dahl et al., ibid.). In an age where 
freedom of the individual to speak, be informed and publish is recognised 
as universal human rights, democracy promotes freedom as no feasible 
alternative can (Dahl 1989, pp. 88–89).
As the former UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill said, “Democracy 
is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have 
been tried from time to time” (Mishler and Rose 1999, cited in Richard 
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et al. 2009, p. 23). It is worthy of note that despite arguments for and 
against democracy, it has emerged as the choice system of government in 
the twenty-first century (Held 2006, p. 1). Countries with strikingly dif-
ferent political systems have all claimed to be democratic (Held 1996, 
p. 1; Manza and Uggen 2006, pp. 17–18) but there is a great difference 
between actual and ideal democracy (Sartori 1987, pp.  7–8). Actual 
democracy refers to the definite way the concept is practiced in a specific 
group while ideal democracy is normative. Some scholars have argued that 
going by the definitions of democracy, ideal democracy is impracticable 
(Wolff 2013, p. 11). Does this imply that evaluating media coverage based 
on normative theories of the press in a democracy is asking too much of 
the media? The following section attempts to answer this question by 
reviewing relevant literature on normative theories of the press in a demo-
cratic society.
Normative theories aNd media Policy
Normative theories relate to expectations from citizens on how the media 
ought to operate in order to achieve or maintain prevailing social values 
(McQuail 2010. p. 14). The media have been entrusted with the task of 
controlling information, a role which is integral to the success of any 
democracy. Scholars argue that since the public has entrusted this power 
to the media, with which it can hold power to account, set the agenda of 
public discourse and perhaps shape public opinion, the public has the right 
to make some demands of the media—a kind of implicit contractual agree-
ment (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2003, pp. 51–52). Normative theories make 
allowances for journalism to be analysed based on moral obligations. Many 
scholars accept that the overarching moral obligation of the press is to 
protect democracy (Carey 1997, p. 332, cited in Schudson 2008, p. 11). 
Consequently, normative theories of the press provide foundations for 
arguments on how the media can sustain democracy. Some analysts con-
tend that normative theories promote ideals that are not achievable and as 
such ought to be abandoned (Hallin and Mancini 2004).
This book takes the position that though normative theories may not 
be 100 per cent achievable, they serve as ideal models for people to aspire 
to, in order to achieve acceptable press standards (Wolff 2013, p.  11). 
Siebert et al.’s (1956) four theories of the press are largely accepted as the 
maiden academic attempt at providing normative theories of the press. 
Siebert et al. (1956) advanced four theories, namely the authoritarian, the 
 B. OGBEBOR
57
Soviet communist, the libertarian and the social responsibility theories. 
These “theories” have come under heavy criticism due to their inconsis-
tent conceptual framework, inability to provide acceptable universal press 
theories and failure to contain the diversity of media forms (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004). Despite these shortcomings, Siebert et al.’s (1956) nor-
mative models, particularly their libertarian theory, are still very applicable 
to the study of the coverage of media policy in Western nations like Britain 
(McQuail 2010, p. 176).
In Western democracies, such as Britain, participants in media policy 
debates propagate ideas based on the libertarian theory. Though the liber-
tarian theory has been modified over the years, exploring it in its original 
form will help us understand its variants during debates about press 
reform. Much of the commercial press in Britain propagate ideas about 
media policy that draw from the libertarian theory. The libertarian theory 
advocates that the press should be a marketplace of ideas where diverse 
views can be aired without fear of suppression or oppression (Siebert et al. 
1956, p. 70). It posits that the press should be a medium through which 
arguments, opinions and evidences are presented to the public on the basis 
of which they can check on the powerful and make informed decisions 
(Siebert et al. 1956, p. 3). Proponents of this theory argue that the press 
should be autonomous and free from every form of state regulation 
because a state-regulated press cannot call the government to account 
(Scammell 2000). They contend that a state-regulated press will hamper 
efforts to expose corrupt politicians; that it will serve as a clog in the wheel 
of journalists’ efforts to equip the public with the information they need 
to contribute intelligently to public debates and make informed decisions 
on other areas of life.
Libertarian theory warns that journalism cannot function as the watch-
dog of society without press autonomy. The theory claims that press 
accountability will be provided for by the media market. It argues that 
competition to gain readership will motivate the press to represent a wide 
range of views and perspectives in society (Siebert et  al. 1956, p.  71; 
McQuail 2010, p.  176). This perspective assumes an active audience 
whose patronage or withdrawal of patronage will compel publishers to 
serve the interest of the public (Biagi 2014, p. 348). Though the libertar-
ian theory claims to protect democracy through its watchdog and infor-
mation roles, the theory has been criticised by several scholars for having 
negative implications for democracy (Glasser 1986, p. 93, cited in McQuail 
2010, p. 176). Christened “negative freedom” because of its resistance to 
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state intervention (Berlin 1969, cited in Pickard 2013, p. 343), the liber-
tarian concept of press freedom has often been described as freedom for 
publishers to publish whatsoever they wish without any form of responsi-
bility (Curran and Seaton 2010). It can be argued that the libertarian 
concept of press freedom serves the business interests of media owners and 
makes it easier for the press to encroach on the liberty of others 
(Pickard 2015).
The libertarian claim that accountability will be provided for by com-
petitiveness in the media market is questionable because history has shown 
that rather than ensure accountability, competitive media markets have 
instead triggered anti-democratic practices (Fenton 2011; Dawes 2013). 
Fenton (2011, n.p.) asserts that “markets do not have democratic intent 
at their core” because when markets come under pressure, ethics are 
brushed aside in pursuit of commercial profit. In defence of the libertarian 
“market accountability” claim, Bettig and Hall (2012, pp. 16–17) argue 
that the role the media have played over the years in exposing journalistic 
scandals is proof that “the media market place is free and competitive 
enough to ensure that the truth generally prevails”. Bettig and Hall, how-
ever, agree that such self-policing leaves serious gaps in press coverage of 
media issues (ibid.). Similar criticisms of the press gave rise to the notion 
of social responsibility (McQuail 2010).
The notion of “social responsibility” was initiated by the 1947 Hutchins 
Commission on freedom of the press in the USA (McQuail 2010, 
pp.  170–171). The Commission was set up in response to widespread 
criticism of the American press, and particularly its sensationalism, com-
mercialism, ownership concentration, the alleged abuse of its powers and 
the consequent need to ensure press accountability (Hartley 2011). In 
tandem with the philosophy of the social contract, the social responsibility 
model of the liberal theory argues that freedom to receive and disseminate 
information should be accompanied by some form of responsibility to the 
public: what scholars refer to as “positive freedom” (Berlin 1969; Pickard 
2015, p.  40). This responsibility, it states, should include not only the 
representation of comprehensive, factual and accurate reports but also the 
promotion of public debates (Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947, 
pp. 21–27).
Unlike the libertarian theory, the notion of social responsibility sees a 
place for government intervention in media accountability systems (Biagi 
2014, p.  348). It posits that where the news media fall short in their 
responsibility to society, a public agency or government should be allowed 
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to intervene to ensure press accountability. The Hutchins Commission 
(Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947) puts it this way:
The media has an obligation to be socially responsible; to see that all sides 
are represented and that the public has enough information to decide; and 
that if the media do not take on themselves such responsibility, it may be 
necessary for some other agency of the public to enforce it. (cited in Siebert 
et al. 1956, p. 5)
So, unlike the libertarian theory which sees no place for government 
intervention in ensuring press accountability, the notion of social respon-
sibility welcomes external participation in matters of the press, if the press 
falls short of its responsibility to society. Though it agrees with the liber-
tarian theory that press self-regulation and press freedom are integral to 
the fulfilment of the media’s informational and watchdog role, its concept 
of press freedom differed from the libertarian perspective. Though many 
of the proposals of the Hutchins Commission (Commission on Freedom 
of the Press 1947) were criticised and rejected by the commercial press, 
the Commission can be credited for an improved consciousness of the 
need for responsible journalism in the commercial press in several coun-
tries including the UK (Pickard 2015, p. 187). The report of the Hutchins 
Commission served as exhibit or information for national and interna-
tional debates on media policy, particularly, on the role of the press in a 
democracy. For instance, Britain’s first Royal Commission on the press is 
recorded to have used documents from the Hutchins Commission as 
exhibits (Pickard 2015, p. 188).
One perspective views the notion of social responsibility as an improve-
ment on the libertarian press theory (Nerone et al. 1995). For those with 
this view, the notion of social responsibility is a more public service–ori-
ented model of the liberal theory: one that makes room not only for the 
press but also for the public (McQuail 2010, p. 184). A different perspec-
tive contends that the social responsibility model only led to weak reforms 
(Curran and Seaton 2010, p. 338). Those with this view argue that rather 
than replace the libertarian theory, as claimed by some scholars, the social 
responsibility concept “essentially enabled a slightly tweaked libertarian 
model to continue to prevail unabated” (Pickard 2015, p. 195). By the 
1970s, a variant of libertarianism known as neoliberalism had become the 
hegemonic ideology in debates on media policy (Plehwe et al. 2006, p. 39; 
Phelan 2014). The neoliberal ideology remains rife in contemporary 
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debates about press policy; as such it will form part of the framework for 
my analysis of how the press covered the media policy debate that fol-
lowed the NoTW phone hacking scandal, especially the debate on freedom 
of the press.
The neoliberal theory of the press took its origins from the broad con-
cept of neoliberalism. The term “neoliberalism” was formed by partici-
pants at the Walter Lippman Colloquium in Paris in 1938, in a bid to 
describe their desire to reconstruct classical laissez-faire liberalism (Jones 
2012, p. 6, cited in Davis 2016, p. 29). It was defined by the colloquium 
as “the priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the system of 
competition, and a strong and impartial state” (Livingstone 2013, p. 436). 
Key proponents of the ideology include Milton Friedman and Austrian 
School economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek (Plehwe et al. 
2006, p.  18). In later years, it became associated with the free trade, 
deregulation and privatisation moves of former UK Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher and former US President Ronald Reagan (Springer 
et al. 2016, p. 144). The ideology has gone through several modifications 
and cultural transformations since then (Hayek 1944; Friedman 1962; 
Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism in its contemporary form is “a theory of 
political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best 
be advanced by liberating entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free mar-
ket and free trade” (Harvey 2005, p. 2). Freedom is a major feature of the 
neoliberal theory. Neoliberalism, which is a variant of libertarianism, advo-
cates what has been described as the “negative” view of freedom where, as 
explained earlier, press freedom is interpreted as freedom from state inter-
ference. This contrasts with the positive liberty advanced by left-wing ide-
ologists (Phelan 2014).
According to the neoliberal ideology, the role of the state is to create a 
conducive environment for the private sector to thrive in businesses and 
that includes intervening to prevent market failure (Harvey 2005, p. 2). In 
relation to media self-coverage, an example of a neoliberal argument 
would be that the government should intervene in media regulation only 
to ensure fair play in media ownership. Proponents of the neoliberal the-
ory believe that by intervening to save private businesses, the state indi-
rectly caters for the needs of individuals in society because entrepreneurs 
are then able to offer jobs and other deliverables to society (Harvey 2005). 
The neoliberal ideology posits that government involvement in business 
poses a threat to freedom, and that “the market, as a self-organising 
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system in which individuals freely choose to participate, is best suited to 
guarantee freedom” (Mayes 2015, p. 35). So, while the pure libertarian 
theory refuses any role for the state, its neoliberal variant, just like the 
social responsibility model, approves of a small role for the state but in its 
case, that role should be to prevent market failure (Harvey 2005, p. 2).
The neoliberal theory of the press refers to a situation in which the 
media is viewed primarily as a business enterprise. From the neoliberal 
press perspective, the press should be commercially or privately owned; 
the press must be self-regulated so as to have the autonomy it needs to call 
the powerful to account and fulfil its informational role in a democracy; it 
should serve the public interest (though what this means is contested; see 
Chap. 2); a small role for the state is acceptable, for example, in the mak-
ing and implementation of laws that guarantee fair competition in the 
media business (McChesney 2001). Other aspects such as service and 
accountability, it contends, should be left in the hands of the media’s self- 
regulatory bodies and the market (ibid.). Neoliberal conceptualisation of 
press freedom is hegemonic (commonsensical) in discourses about media 
policy (Lichtenberg 1990; Phelan 2014). Alternative interpretations of 
press freedom are often marginalised or presented as illogical in the light 
of hegemonic neoliberal interpretations of what guarantees a free press 
(Putnis 2000; Curran and Seaton 2010).
However, counter-hegemonic discourses labelling the neoliberal the-
ory of the press as anti-democratic and calling for more public interest 
journalism appear to be on the rise (Schlosberg 2017). For instance, the 
theory of social democracy has emerged as a major challenger of the neo-
liberal hegemony in debates about media policy (Pickard 2015). Social 
democracy as an ideology emerged in the mid-twentieth century follow-
ing decisions by Western socialists to revise their goals. One way they did 
this was to reform rather than abolish capitalism (Heywood 2017, p. 123). 
Social democracy aims to correct the fundamental defects of capitalism 
and “pursue goals that reduce the inequalities that exist within the sys-
tem” (Lightfoot 2005, p. 17). It posits that capitalism is “a morally defec-
tive means of distributing resources, because of its tendency towards 
poverty and inequality” (Heywood 2017, p. 123). The social democratic 
ideology contends that the defects of the capitalist system can be corrected 
through both economic and social interventions (Miller 1998, cited in 
Craig 2000, p.  836). The theory of social democracy is based on this 
ideology.
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Proponents of the social democratic theory are critical of the “negative 
liberty” advanced by the neoliberal variant of the libertarian theory where 
press freedom is interpreted as freedom from state interference (Meyer 
and Hinchman 2007). The theory sees the state as the custodian of public 
interest journalism, and as such, it accepts state intervention in press regu-
lation to guarantee press accountability (Meyer and Hinchman 2007). 
Cushion (2012, p. 198) and Lichtenberg (1990, p. 105) agree that some 
level of statutory regulation can enhance rather than impede democracy. 
Critics of social democracy argue that the theory is idealistic, vague and 
sounds like a socialist compromise to capitalism or “capitalism-lite” (Keane 
2016). One of the major criticisms against the theory of social democracy 
is that it underestimates the possibility of state intervention to impact neg-
atively on press freedom. Though these concerns are not inconsequential, 
studies have demonstrated that a mechanism can be put in place to ensure 
that statutory regulation does not impede the media from fulfilling their 
watchdog role in a democracy (Humphreys 1996, p. 107). There is, how-
ever, no denying the fact that measures to check the abuse of government 
intervention in press regulation have not always been successful (Badsey 
2013, p. 67). The bottom line is that both theories have pros and cons. 
The focus of this discussion is not to advocate one theory over another but 
to acquaint the reader with the two major theories on which debates on 
media policy are based and to argue that both theories have strengths and 
weaknesses and none of these two should be hegemonic in debates about 
media policy. In a democracy, the media ought to be a democratic public 
sphere (Habermas 1989; Fraser 1992). The following section explores the 
concept of the media as a democratic public sphere during debates about 
media policy.
the media as a democratic Public sPhere
Habermas conceptualises the public sphere as an arena where people meet 
to discuss societal concerns and through their arguments influence politi-
cal decisions (Habermas 1989; Garcia-Blanco et al. 2009). According to 
Habermas, equality was brought about by a complete disregard for status 
because decisions were not based on societal standing but on the best 
rational argument (Habermas 1989, p. 4). The author observed that in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, coffee houses, salons 
and clubs were meeting points for these public deliberations. In modern 
democracies, discussions in salons (coffee shops and bars) rarely carry the 
 B. OGBEBOR
63
same weight due to the large numbers of people that make up most politi-
cal communities today. This places a premium on the role of the media as 
a democratic public sphere: a public space where citizens can debate issues 
that concern them. According to Habermas’ (1989, p. 83) account of the 
“golden age of the liberal public sphere”, discussions were centred on 
issues of common concern and citizens were able to set aside individual 
preferences and arrive at a consensus based on “the common good”.
However, from the late nineteenth century, the public sphere began to 
degenerate, and the quest for profit began to override public interest jour-
nalism (Habermas 1989). Facilitators of debates in the media’s public 
sphere became more concerned about “what interests the public” rather 
than what was “in the public interest” with the goal being to increase 
readership and attract advertisers. This degeneration of the public sphere 
manifested itself in the trivialisation of news content. The result was that 
citizens became a consumer audience, mainly interested in being enter-
tained and consuming dumbed down information (Habermas 1989, 
p. 164; Franklin 1997). The media assuaged this appetite by inundating 
this space with infotainment (information plus entertainment). A degener-
ated public sphere in relation to the coverage of media policy can mean 
shifting focus from in-depth analysis of key issues of concern in press stan-
dards to infotainment and other trivial news relating to media policy. 
Infotainment can be detrimental to media policy debates because it can 
promote ignorance on the subject by presenting to readers sensational 
news rather than in-depth analysis of key issues of concern. As Barber 
(1999, p. 582) points out, public ignorance is detrimental to democracy 
because a citizenry without sufficient information may not be able to ade-
quately evaluate the alternatives before them and could, as a result, advo-
cate policies that are harmful to society.
This book argues that the degeneration of the public sphere is more 
complex than previous studies have shown. Most studies on the media as 
a public sphere have focused on the media representation of others and 
not of themselves. As such, scholars did not take into consideration the 
commodification of a public sphere in which the deliberation relates to the 
facilitator of the sphere. The result was that commercialism was limited to 
prioritisation of gains made from advertising (“selling customers to adver-
tisers”), adopting paywalls and direct product sales (McQuail 2010, 
pp. 222–224), whereas in the media coverage of debates on journalism, 
commodification of the public sphere can go beyond the aforementioned 
to the prioritisation of the media’s personal interests (giving priority to the 
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promotion of the newspaper’s argument in the debate). In this case, the 
media’s personal interests can override “what interests the public”. One 
feature of Habermas’ (1989, pp.  189–193) degenerated public sphere 
that can be seen in the coverage of media policy is that commercial interest 
(the interest of media owners) merges with the interests of policymakers, 
to turn the public sphere from a democratic forum for public debate into 
a capitalist haven where prioritisation of profit becomes the order of the 
day (Habermas 1989, pp. 189–193). Profit goes beyond financial gains to 
successful advancement of one’s ideology in an argument, good press cov-
erage for policymakers and high readership for newspapers which can earn 
their owners power of influence and the patronage of advertisers. Habermas 
sees advertising as one of the causes of the degeneration of the public 
sphere (Habermas 1989, pp. 189–193).
It can be argued that job constraints have also led to the degeneration 
of the public sphere. The pressures brought on journalists by the con-
straints of their job have been blamed for some of the press’ bad behaviour 
(Shoemaker and Reese 2013, pp. 140–142). Examples of such constraints 
include limited time of production made worse with the introduction of 
the 24/7 news routine, financial constraints and, more remarkably, the 
emergence of digital journalism (ibid.). The coming of the internet has 
transformed journalism and poses a threat to the continued existence of 
print journalism (Allan 2006, pp. 2–4). The move of Independent newspa-
per from print to online intensifies that argument (Independent 2016). 
While the extinction of the printed press was at the time of writing a con-
tested view (Pavlik 2001; Franklin 2008), there is no doubt that the com-
ing of digital journalism has led to the drop in the readership of print 
newspapers and the exodus of both readers and advertisers to online plat-
forms (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019). The 
competition resulting from these has increased the lure of subterfuge as a 
means of news gathering, the aim being to get scoops that sell. Though 
the online news had not surfaced at the time Habermas wrote The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society (1989), it can be argued that in the twenty-first cen-
tury, pressure brought on the printed press by the emergence of digital 
journalism facilitated the degeneration of the public sphere. The conse-
quence of this for democracy is that providing a democratic platform for 
public debate is no longer its primary concern. The questions this discus-
sion on degeneration of the public sphere raises are, “in the coverage of 
the media policy debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking scandal, 
 B. OGBEBOR
65
did the media serve as a degenerated public sphere? If so, what impact did 
this have on efforts at reforming media policy”? Discussions in Chaps. 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 will provide answers to these questions.
It is important to point out that there are a number of issues with 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere. One of the problems is that it is 
not clear whether Habermas was referring to a historical situation or a 
normative ideal (Dahlgren 1995). Several scholars have argued that there 
never existed a public sphere with Habermas’ ideal (Schudson 1992; 
Dahlgren 1995). Those with this view contend that right from the period 
of Habermas’ ideal public sphere, there had always been in the public 
space trivial and dumbed-down discussions with commercial interest over-
riding the public interest. This book sides with the argument that 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is better employed as normative. 
The public sphere concept is useful for the analysis of the representation 
of media policy both in its original form, as used to discuss the degenera-
tion of the public sphere earlier in this chapter, and in modified forms. For 
example, Fraser’s (1992) modification of the concept. However, more 
modifications are needed before the concept can be effectively used for the 
analysis of discourse on media policy.
Several scholars have critiqued and modified Habermas’ concept of the 
public sphere. Examples of such modifications are Fraser’s (1992) alterna-
tive publics and “subaltern counterpublics”, where equality is hinged on 
multiple rather than a single comprehensive public sphere; Chantal 
Mouffe’s (2005a, b) agonistic public sphere, which argues for contesta-
tions (‘radical’ discourse) in place of “consensus building through rational 
discourse”; and Bennett and Entman’s (2001) policy sphere, which refers 
to the aspect of the public sphere that relates to media representations of 
governmental policies and decision making. The above list is not exhaus-
tive, and this book does not attempt to examine all criticisms of the public 
sphere. It will only concern itself with arguments that are relevant to my 
analysis in this book. One of such relevant modifications is Fraser’s (1992) 
discussion on multiple publics.
Fraser (1992, pp.  117–118) queries four assumptions of Habermas’ 
concept of the public sphere. They are the assumption that it is possible 
for participants in “a public sphere to bracket status differentials and to 
deliberate as if they were social equals”; that “a single, comprehensive 
public sphere” is more democratic than multiple and competing publics; 
“that discourse in the public sphere should be restricted to deliberation 
about the common good” and that “a functioning democratic public 
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sphere requires a sharp separation” from the state. Fraser (1992) argues 
that while Habermas lays claims to universality in his ideal public space, his 
focus on a single public—the bourgeois—excludes some sections of the 
public such as women who were at the time excluded from public debates 
(Fraser 1990, pp. 58–60).
Fraser contends that rather than eliminate inequality, bracketing a sin-
gle public endorses inequality by denying diverse groups and interests, a 
voice within the public sphere; the result being that the interests of the 
marginalised groups or persons are overlooked (ibid, p. 77). Fraser’s argu-
ment is that democracy is enhanced not with a single comprehensive pub-
lic sphere but with “arrangements that accommodate contestation among 
a plurality of competing publics” (Fraser 1992, p. 122, cited in Butsch 
2007, p. 5). She referred to these competing publics as alternative publics 
and “subaltern counterpublics”. They are alternative in the sense that each 
sphere is a “homogenous group rather than a diverse deliberative body” 
(Warner 2002, cited in Butsch 2007, p. 18) and “subaltern counterpub-
lics” because they are discursive spaces where members of subordinate 
social groups can introduce counter discourses (Fraser 1992, pp. 123–125).
Her use of the word “contestation” to describe debates between mul-
tiple publics links to another critique against Habermas’ concept which is 
that discourse in the public sphere should not be restricted to “delibera-
tion about the common good”. Along with scholars like Benhabib (2002) 
and Mouffe (2005a, b), Fraser (1992) says the common good is difficult 
to determine; the interest of publics may vary and the demand for consen-
sus may only keep out of debates issues that may later be recognised as 
being of public interest. As an example, Fraser (1992, p. 129) points to 
the fact that the issue of violence against women was in the past regarded 
as a private interest and not “for the common good”. It was an issue to be 
discussed in family settings and not in the public sphere, but feminists 
forming a “subaltern counterpublic” kept up debate about domestic vio-
lence which led to its eventual acceptance as a matter of common concern.
In line with my argument that no theory should be hegemonic in the 
representation of arguments on media policy, Fraser (1992, pp. 129–131) 
contends that there should be no limits to the issues and arguments that 
gain access to the public sphere. According to her, “what will count as a 
matter of concern will be decided precisely through discursive contesta-
tions” (ibid, p.  129). For Fraser, contestations (arguments, alternative 
views, etc.), rather than a consensus, remain closer to the democratic ideal 
(ibid.). This shifts the focus from Habermas’ deliberative model of 
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democracy (where deliberation leads to a consensus within the public 
sphere) to a participatory model where the focus is access of all concerned 
to the debate within the public sphere. Consensus can then be reached by 
policymakers based on the knowledge gathered from informed contesta-
tions in the media’s public sphere.
Taking a cue from Fraser (1992), Ornebring and Jonsson (2004) 
applied the concept of multiple public spheres to the press. In their appli-
cation of the concept, the tabloid press can serve as an alternative public 
sphere to mainstream media (by mainstream media, they refer to major 
media outlets such as major newspapers, radio stations and television sta-
tions). According to the authors, social media, specialised journals and 
other media outlets outside the mainstream news can serve as counterpub-
lics from which non-elitist groups can counter dominant elite discourses. 
I refer to this group as “public sphere as platform”. This book argues that 
the public sphere as platform may or may not be a counterpublic.
In Ornebring and Jonsson’s (2004, p.  286), view, participants in a 
media discourse can also be an alternative public sphere if the participants 
differ from those who normally dominate the media discourse. I will call 
this “public sphere as people”. The authors also argued that a public 
sphere can be alternative when “other issues than those commonly debated 
in the mainstream are discussed—or that issues not even debated at all in 
the mainstream are discussed in the alternative sphere” (ibid.). I will call 
that “public sphere as issues”. Their fourth mediated alternative sphere 
model is somewhat duplicitous; it comprises of “ways or forms of debating 
and discussing common issues than those commonly used in the main-
stream media” (ibid.). I will call that “alternative methods as public 
sphere”.
This book adds to this portfolio: the public sphere as discourse. This 
agrees with Warner’s (2002, pp. 413–415) argument that the meaning of 
“public” cannot be limited to Habermas’ elucidation of “the public as 
people”—the discussants. Warner (2002, p. 414) established that public 
can also refer to the discourse. In this case, the sphere can be “a public”; a 
body of discourse, a perspective in a debate, common interest on an issue 
and such like. This book engages with the concept of the public sphere 
both as platform and as discourse. It examines “public sphere as platform” 
in the sense that it explores how the media as platform (mainstream press 
in this case) serve as a democratic public sphere. It examines “public 
sphere as discourse” by investigating publics within discourse. Having dis-
cussed the importance of the media platform as a democratic public sphere 
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earlier in this chapter, I now move on to explore concepts that can facili-
tate our understanding of the public sphere as discourse. Based on Fraser’s 
(1992) conceptualisation of multiple public spheres, I argue that there can 
be several discursive publics within journalism’s interpretive community.
Zelizer (2004, pp. 12–15) conceptualises journalism as an interpretive 
community, a notion she borrowed from Stanley Fish’s explanation of 
interpretive communities in relation to literary text (Fish 1980, cited in 
Zelizer 2004, p.  13). An interpretive community consists of “people 
engaged in common activities and common purposes who employ a com-
mon frame of reference for interpreting their social setting” (Berkowitz 
and Terkeurst 1999, p.  127, cited in Carlson 2015, p.  3). Interpretive 
communities affect how a phenomenon is interpreted (Zelizer 2004, 
pp. 13–14). Applying this to journalism, Zelizer (2004) argues that a per-
son’s view of journalism will be affected by the person’s background, per-
spectives or the field in which he or she works. To explicate further, Zelizer 
(2004, pp. 30–32) compared interpretations of journalism by journalists 
with that of academics. As an example, she used five metaphors to show 
that the way each group talks about journalism is influenced by their field 
of work (ibid.).
Zelizer pointed out that while journalists use metaphors like “sixth 
sense” (nose for news), container (space, news hole), mirror (that reflects 
reality—though contested), child (as in “put the news to bed”, meaning 
complete the circle of news production or cast the news) and service (cru-
sader role of journalism), to talk about journalism, a journalism scholar is 
more likely to discuss journalism in terms of it being a text, a profession 
and an institution, and as people and as a set of practices (ibid.). She 
observed that neither account is comprehensive because each of them only 
tells part of the story of what journalism represents. Zelizer (1993, 2004) 
posits that their interpretations were influenced by their background, in 
this case their field of work (ibid.). This concept presents journalists as a 
united front—one interpretive community in the way they perceive and 
describe their profession (Berkowitz 2000, cited in Carlson 2015, p. 3).
Viewing Zelizer’s explanation of interpretive communities from the 
lenses of Fraser’s (1992) conceptualisation of multiple public spheres, and 
Ornebring and Jonsson’s (2004) extension of that concept to the press, I 
argue that though journalists have a shared understanding of their prac-
tice, which can make them function as one interpretive community, jour-
nalists can also function as multiple interpretive communities in discourses 
about journalism. Newspaper classification, ownership patterns and 
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business model are examples of factors that can give birth to multiple pub-
lics within journalism’s interpretive community. I argue that in debates 
about journalism, there can be multiple homogeneous public spheres with 
each homogeneous sphere standing as a united front on an issue of com-
mon concern. I refer to such multiple spheres of homogeneous discourses 
as sub-interpretive spheres. Multiple sub-interpretive spheres can arise 
from differences and similarities in the press’ interpretations of journalistic 
paradigms such as press freedom and objectivity. The demarcation may or 
may not be along the lines of media outfits because they are spheres of 
discourses. The homogeneity of a sub-interpretive sphere does not pre-
clude disagreements on certain issues within each homogeneous public. 
For example, though feminism features as a homogeneous public sphere, 
there are still different schools of thought among feminists (Tong 2014, 
pp. 1–6). Their uniting factor would, therefore, be a high degree of simi-
larity in their expressions on an issue or argument.
In studies where homogeneous publics emerge within an interpretive 
community, a confederation pattern of analysis can be employed to fish 
out both collective and individual patterns in the coverage. Confederations 
are “loose governing arrangement[s] in which separate republics or 
nations join to coordinate foreign policy and defense but retain full con-
trol over their domestic affairs” (Jillson 2013, p.  63). Applying this to 
media studies, I define “confederation pattern of analysis” as a pattern of 
critique that allows analysis of media content both in groups (e.g. a group 
of newspapers) and individually (individual newspapers). This allows room 
for the identification of unique trends and styles within discourse. Using a 
confederation pattern of analysis, this book analyses newspapers in groups 
of discourse (sub-interpretive spheres) when they were united for certain 
causes and individually in areas where they had unique differences. That is 
because in the coverage of media policy, democracy is achieved when the 
press makes room for contestations among diverse competing discursive 
publics (Fraser 1992, p. 122, cited in Butsch 2007, p. 5).
coNclusioN
The media are expected to carry out certain functions that are integral to 
the sustenance of democracy. One of such functions is to operate as a pub-
lic sphere where citizens can participate in debates that can affect policy 
decisions. How the media facilitate debates in this space can affect the 
outcome of debates on policy. With regard to debates on media policy, a 
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degenerated public sphere would produce a shallow and dumbed down 
debate with narrow perspectives that are shaped by self-interest. Such a 
public sphere would lack the creativity and robustness needed to generate 
discussions that can result in the establishment of an accountable press. 
The normative expectation is that the media should serve as a democratic 
public sphere, one that gives voice to all parties involved in a debate irre-
spective of their argument or their status in society. The exclusion or mar-
ginalisation of any of the parties involved from a debate on media policy 
will run contrary to “democracy’s claim of universalism” (Dahlgren 1995; 
p. 36). The type of space or amount of coverage given ought not to be 
based on the media’s self-interest. The media ought to function as a mar-
ketplace of ideas during debates on media policy (Milton 1644/1961; 
Mill 1859/1978).
The neoliberal press theory argues that for the press to function as a mar-
ketplace of ideas where diverse views can be aired without fear of suppres-
sion or oppression, it must be autonomous of the state (ibid.). In democratic 
societies, it is widely accepted that the press should be given the freedom it 
requires to check the powerful so that they do not abuse their powers. What 
is often contested is the level of autonomy necessary to fulfil this role. Should 
all types of state intervention in press regulation be viewed as a slippery 
slope to licensing of the press? Is this perspective a paradigm that needs to 
be reconsidered? Can some levels of state intervention help to check press 
bad behaviour? The theory of social democracy argues that a little bit of 
state intervention in press regulation may not necessarily result in the loss of 
press freedom. It posits that measures can be put in place to ensure that 
government does not overstep its bounds. This book argues that no side of 
the argument should be suppressed or marginalised in debates about media 
policy. A public sphere that gives proportionate access to arguments based 
on diverse ideologies would feature more robust debates and is more likely 
to generate more creative and effective ideas for media reform.
This chapter applies the public sphere concept to discourse. In agree-
ment with Fraser’s (1992) argument that multiple publics rather than a 
single central public sphere are closer to the democratic ideal, this chapter 
argues that debates on media policy should make room for multiple dis-
cursive publics. It points out that in debates about media policy, journal-
ism would not necessarily function as one interpretive community. I am of 
the view that this is a good thing because it reflects plurality of views in the 
debate. As Fraser (1992) argues, within the public sphere, contestation 
rather than a consensus is closer to the democratic ideal. Problems may 
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arise from a situation where one discursive public dominates the discus-
sion. Such a situation is akin to Habermas’ central public where consensus 
rather than contestation within the public sphere was depicted as the dem-
ocratic ideal. This book posits that democracy is enhanced not with a sin-
gle comprehensive discursive public sphere, but with a situation that makes 
room for contestations among diverse competing discursive publics.
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CHAPTER 5
Investigating the Press Reform Debate
Discussions in this book draw significantly from a research I carried out on 
the media coverage of the press reform debate that followed the News of 
the World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. Therefore, this 
chapter explains the methods used for that research. The study was 
designed to produce empirical data on the way the debate that arose from 
the News of the World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry was 
covered by the British press. As stated earlier, I posit that the way the 
media cover debates on media policy can impact on the outcomes of 
efforts at media policy reform. A combination of content and discourse 
analyses was used to provide statistical data and in-depth analysis on how 
the media policy debate was covered. This chapter also defines and elabo-
rates on some of the key terms and paradigm repair strategies engaged 
with in the study. The terms “metacoverage”, “metajournalistic discourse” 
and “journalistic metadiscourse” are defined and critically analysed to clar-
ify their usage in this book and other academic literature. The paradigm 
repair strategies of threat to the paradigm, self-assertion, minimisation, 
individualisation and historicisation are explored to throw light on how 
critical discourse on the press has been represented over the years. I begin 
by exploring definitions of metacoverage. This will help the reader under-
stand my working definition of metacoverage and serve as a springboard 
for my discussion of relevant terms such as “metajournalistic discourse” 
and “journalistic metadiscourse”.
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Metacoverage can simply be described as self-referential coverage (Esser 
et al. 2001). The term, popularised by Gitlin (1991, p. 122 cited Carlson 
2015, p. 10) and D’Angelo and Esser (2014), is often used to refer to the 
increasing trend of journalists covering themselves during political cam-
paigns. (Gitlin 1991; D’Angelo 1999; Esser et  al. 2001). Esser et  al. 
(2001, pp.  16–17) defined metacoverage as the news “media’s self- 
referential reflections on the nature of the interplay between political pub-
lic relations and political journalism” (cited in Young 2010, p. 14). I argue 
that limiting metacoverage to self-referential coverage of the media during 
political campaigns is constrictive. The word “meta” is a Greek preposi-
tion meaning “with, after” (Liddell et  al. 1883/2015; Dixon 2014, 
p. 165). In the nineteenth century, it came to be used as a prefix in English 
and can be seen in words like “meta-thorax”, “metaphor” and “meta-
bolic” (2014, pp. 165–166). It also metamorphosed into the term “self- 
referential”. As Dixon elucidates, “one current use is that a meta-X is an 
“X” describing an “X” (ibid.). Examples are meta-data which means data 
about data (Baca 2008, p.  1) and meta-cognition meaning cognition 
about cognition (Beran et al. 2012, p. 98). Considering the composition 
of the word “metacoverage” (“meta” and “[media] coverage”) plus the 
fact that self-referential media coverage is diverse, I contend that “meta-
coverage” can adequately serve as an umbrella term for all forms of self- 
referential coverage by the media. Therefore, my working definition for 
metacoverage is that it refers to all forms of self-referential coverage by 
the media.
Based on my working definition, metacoverage can focus on diverse 
themes and take place on various media platforms. For example, metacov-
erage can be on politics, the environment, media scandals, media adver-
tisements and media critique programmes such as Newswatch. It can take 
place on different platforms, such as on television programmes, news web-
sites, news broadcasts, magazines or on the pages of newspapers. This 
book is concerned with metacoverage on news or journalistic platforms: 
what Deuze (cited in Brin and Drolet 2009, p. 271) referred to as journal-
ism about journalism. The textual content of such coverage is known as 
journalistic metadiscourse (Brin and Drolet 2009, p. 271; Thomas and 
Finneman 2014). This should not be confused with what Carlson refers to 
as metajournalistic discourse.
In the term “journalistic metadiscourse”, the “meta” or “self- 
referential” status is conferred on “journalism”, that is, journalism about 
journalism, but in Carlson’s conceptualisation of metajournalistic 
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discourse, the “meta” status is placed on discourse, that is, discourse about 
discourse on journalism or, simply put, discourse about news (Carlson 
2015). Carlson (2015, p. 2) defines metajournalistic discourse as “public 
expressions evaluating news text, the practices that produce them or the 
conditions of their reception”. According to Carlson (2015), metajour-
nalistic discourse can take place on journalistic (internal) and non- 
journalistic (external) sites. By this definition, metajournalistic discourse 
will include debates or discussions on journalism in public fora, journalism 
journals, the news, TV shows and so on. As Carlson pointed out, meta-
journalistic discourse can include comments by both journalists (insiders) 
and non-journalists (external actors). For example, journalistic work on 
journalism can also include comments by government functionaries, vic-
tims of press abuse and ordinary members of the public who are not jour-
nalists. Going by Carlson’s definition of metajournalistic discourse, Brin 
and Drolet’s (2009, p. 271) “journalistic metadiscourse” would form an 
aspect of Carlson’s (2015) conceptualisation of metajournalistic discourse. 
Since this book deals with journalists’ coverage of journalism, I will pro-
vide more discussion on this aspect of metajournalistic discourse.
The term “journalistic metadiscourse” will, henceforth, be used to refer 
to the discursive field of metacoverage on journalistic sites. This field of 
metadiscourse includes journalists’ self-referential coverage of diverse sorts 
including press controversies, scandals, performance, practices, debates on 
journalism, government policies on journalism and press promotions. 
According to Carlson (2012b, pp. 268–269), journalistic metadiscourse 
“reveals attempts by journalists to articulate, negotiate, defend, and even 
obscure their cultural, social and political significance”. Through journal-
istic metadiscourse, journalists make attempts to define and defend the 
boundaries of journalistic practice, assert the legitimacy of the profession 
and shape its reception (ibid.). Previous studies argue that journalistic 
metadiscourse is highly defensive and characterised by a lack of self- critique 
(Eason 1988; Alexander et  al. 2016). A number of reasons have been 
given for this trend of journalistic metadiscourse. Notable among them is 
commercialism, particularly the fear of losing profit due to a reduction in 
advertising revenue, readership, sales, views and/or patronage (Haas 
2006; McQuail 2010, pp. 222–224). The press has been accused of vehe-
mently opposing anything that it perceives poses a threat to its commercial 
viability. Journalistic metadiscourse that is averse to self-critique limits the 
information available to the public to contribute knowledgeably to debates 
on journalism.
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A key function of journalism in a democratic society is the provision of 
sufficient information that will enable the public to make informed deci-
sions. A public sphere that lacks self-critique would portend some risks to 
the health of democracy. Ironically, journalism’s defence against external 
criticism is often hinged on its democratic role in society. However, 
Dahlgren (1995) points out that this claim does not always translate into 
journalistic text. Previous studies on journalistic metadiscourse identified 
certain recurring strategies used by the press to cover themselves when the 
boundaries of their profession are called into question due to acts of devi-
ance by members of the profession. These recurring patterns of press cov-
erage are referred to as paradigm repair strategies (Bennett et al. 1985; 
Thomas and Finneman 2014).
InvestIgatIng the Press reform Debate: ParaDIgm 
rePaIr strategIes
The term “paradigm repair” was used by Bennett et al. (1985) to describe 
“how journalistic self-criticism protects existing paradigms rather than 
confronts entrenched deficiencies and contradictions” (cited in Carlson 
2015, p. 4). It refers to a situation in which metajournalistic discourse is 
used to protect press standards and values from scrutiny (Carlson 2012b, 
p. 267). The concept of paradigm repair was drawn from Kuhn’s (1962, 
cited in Reese 1990) work which linked creation with paradigmatic alle-
giances. Kuhn (1962, cited in Reese 1990, p. 392) stated that “paradigms 
provide examples rather than explicit rules” such that the paradigm is 
learnt “by engaging in the discipline”. As stated in Chap. 1, the notion of 
paradigm repair has been employed by previous scholars to examine jour-
nalistic metadiscourse on press “deviancy” in relation to objectivity (Reese 
1990), fabrications (Hindman 2005; Carlson 2009), reporting errors 
(Cecil 2002), paparazzi (Bishop 1999; Berkowitz 2000), scapegoating 
(Berger 2008), media scandal (Carlson and Berkowitz 2014) and press 
standards (Thomas and Finneman 2014).
One news paradigm that is of importance to this book is the perception 
of the journalist as a crusader; one who uses the weapon of “the pen” to 
fight for justice for the less privileged; the voice of the voiceless and the 
provider of information to the public that enables them to hold the pow-
erful to account—the watchdog of society. Franklin (1997, cited in Frost 
2007) breaks this self-perception (and to some extent public perception) 
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down into six norms which are journalism is a quest for truth, journalism 
is independent of government, newspapers are pluralistic organisations, 
journalists are independent of economic pressures, journalists are watch-
dogs and journalism creates a public sphere with the bottom line being 
that journalism is central to democracy. Closely linked to the “crusader 
image paradigm” is the “press freedom” or “press autonomy” paradigm. 
Press freedom is critical to journalism’s fulfilment of its crusader or watch-
dog role, particularly freedom from state interference. As stated earlier, 
from neoliberal perspectives, if journalists must call politicians to order 
and expose corruption, they must be independent of government (Deuze 
2005). They are also allowed to use clandestine means to obtain informa-
tion if that information is in the “public interest” (see Chap. 2 for more 
on public interest). This freedom enables the press to carry out investiga-
tive journalism as well as fulfil other watchdog and informative roles that 
will help enhance democracy (Waisbord 2013). The British press would 
frown at any effort or perceived effort to rob it of its autonomy and would 
likely use its power to control information to protect the freedom of the 
press and repair its image as a crusader.
This view of the journalist as a crusader is not without contestation. 
There are several instances where journalists have been accused of abusing 
their freedom (McQuail 2003, p. 81; Squire et al. 2005, p. 254). Scholars 
have contested the image of the journalist as a crusader based on these 
lines: journalists do not always tell the truth; their relationship with gov-
ernment is collusive; they are not independent of economic pressures 
because competitive markets cause them to throw ethics to the wind; they 
are not watchdogs but lapdogs; they are not pluralistic and do not serve as 
a democratic public sphere (Franklin 1997). Previous studies show that 
oftentimes when public outrage against press “deviancy” leads to the set-
ting up of a press commission, steps taken by such commissions to check 
the abuse of press freedom have been interpreted in journalistic metadis-
course as a “threat to press freedom” and, by extension, a threat to democ-
racy (Putnis 2000). Reese (1990), Cecil (2002), Carlson and Berkowitz 
(2014) and Thomas and Finneman (2014) examined how journalists’ 
metadiscourse followed certain patterns when they perceived threats to 
their paradigm. In line with Eason’s (1988, cited in Carlson 2015, p. 4) 
argument, these studies showed that the journalistic metadiscourses were 
defensive rather than self-critical.
In his study about how journalists in the USA responded to perceived 
threats to the objectivity paradigm, Reese (1990) examined three types of 
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paradigm repair: “(a) disengaging and distancing the threatening values 
from the reporter’s work; (b) re-asserting the ability of journalistic rou-
tines to prevent threatening values from ‘distorting’ the news, and (c) 
marginalising the man and his message; making both appear ineffective” 
(Reese 1990, p. 390). Cecil (2002, p. 46) talks about a type of paradigm 
repair “in which the logic of journalism is reasserted in response to an 
outside challenge”. Referring to it as paradigm overhaul, Cecil (2002) 
found that while criticising challenges to the “objective news paradigm”, 
journalistic metadiscourse overhauled that paradigm, “reasserting objec-
tive news without altering or even questioning its underlying assump-
tions” (Cecil 2002, p. 47). He pointed out that “no changes were deemed 
necessary” (ibid.). The journalist(s) who were accused of deviant behav-
iour were described as a few “bad apples” and “the problem was “solved” 
by simply purging the reporters from the ranks” of good journalism 
(ibid.).
In this way, the journalistic metadiscourse sought to repair its paradigm 
by localising the bad behaviour and asserting the profession’s importance 
and achievements without considering making amendments to the para-
digm. Alternatives to the paradigm were labelled deviant (ibid.). The pro-
cess by which journalists strive to build walls to isolate deviant journalists 
from the “noble profession” have been described as boundary mainte-
nance (ibid, p.  50). In addition to maintaining its boundaries through 
journalistic metadiscourse, the news organisation responds by either cor-
recting or eliminating the bad apple(s) responsible for the mistake (Reese 
1990, cited in Cecil 2002, p. 50). Cecil (2002, p. 50) emphasised that 
“the individual reporter, editor, and producers; not news organisations or 
the news paradigm itself, tend to receive the blame for breaks in the 
paradigm”.
While individualisation (also, ostracisation, localisation or bad apple) 
strategy has proved useful in the analysis of paradigm repair, limiting para-
digmatic markers to individualisation of deviancy restricts the tools for 
analysis of paradigm repair. As Carlson and Berkowitz (2014) observed, 
paradigm repair interpretive strategies can also include extensions of devi-
ancy from the individual to the general. The general can include a news 
organisation; a class of newspaper, for example, the tabloid; a media plat-
form or even the whole media. Using as an example, the media coverage 
of the demise of two US regional newspapers, Rocky Mountain News and 
printed Seattle Post Intelligencer, Carlson (2012b, p. 267) demonstrated 
that paradigm repair can include situations where the perceived problem 
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of an individual newspaper is interpreted by the press as a reflection of the 
challenges faced by all newspapers. Here, the perceived threat to the 
printed press paradigm was “repaired” by re-asserting the “importance 
and superiority” of the printed press over other forms, especially online 
news forms. Carlson referred to this extension from the individual to the 
general as “second—order paradigm repair” (ibid.).
Another case for expansion of paradigm repair to include generalisable 
interpretive strategies can be found in Carlson and Berkowitz (2014) 
where the deviancy (phone hacking) of an individual newspaper, the News 
of the World, was interpreted by both journalistic and non-journalistic 
actors as a manifestation of the deviancy of all printed press in the UK; and 
the Valerie Plame’s case where the misconduct of Miller was translated as 
the deviance of the press (Carlson 2012a, pp.  111–137). Carlson and 
Berkowitz (2014, p. 392) described this extension of deviancy from the 
individual to the general as “synecdoche deviancy”, a term he borrowed 
from the figure of speech; synecdoche, which means using part to repre-
sent the whole. He says, “with journalism, this may refer to efforts to 
extend a scandal from its immediate context to incorporate a broader set 
of news practices—such as using a scandal at one tabloid newspaper to 
extend to the whole of tabloid newspapers” (ibid.). I argue that both indi-
vidualised (ostracisation, localisation) and generalisable (synecdoche) 
deviancy can emerge from the same incident and could occur at different 
stages of, for example, a scandal.
Synecdoche deviancy in journalistic metadiscourse is often triggered by 
scandals in which the press is the culprit. Examples of such scandals are the 
Valerie Plame’s case of 2003; the Pulitzer Prize–winning “news” story in 
the Washington Post, written by Janet Cooke about a non-existent eight- 
year- old heroin addict, published in 1980; the Time magazine cover 
“photo illustration” of O.J.  Simpson at the time of his murder trial in 
1994, with darkened skin tone; the “Rathergate”—a scandal in which the 
CBS anchor-man Dan Rather was accused of using fake documents in a 
report on George W. Bush dodging National Guard duty (Bettig and Hall 
2012, p. 16); and more recently, the News of the World phone hacking 
scandal. Scandals can encourage public discussions on sensitive and con-
troversial issues (Lull and Hinerman 1997, p. 1). According to Lull and 
Hinerman, contemporary media scandals provide “a clear and compelling 
entry point for criticisms of the media in society” (ibid.). In the case of the 
News of the World phone hacking scandal, the controversy generated 
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important questions relating to how the media cover themselves and the 
implication of their manner of coverage for democracy.
In line with Carlson’s argument for the use of the notion of paradigm 
repair to study synecdoche deviancy in journalistic metadiscourse, Thomas 
and Finneman (2014) used paradigm repair to study the media coverage 
of the Leveson Inquiry, an offshoot of the phone hacking scandal (see 
Chap. 3 for more on the Leveson Inquiry). Their study sample consisted 
of “editorial comment in mainstream national daily and Sunday newspa-
pers on the Leveson Inquiry from its inception to the conclusion of its 
hearing phase”. Using the media coverage of the hearing stages of the 
Leveson Inquiry as its study sample, Thomas and Finneman (2014, 
p.  172) summarised interpretive patterns used in previous analysis of 
metadiscourse into four main strategies:
 1. Catastrophisation—[also “threats to the paradigm”].
 2. Self-affirmation (affirming journalism’s value to a democratic soci-
ety)—[also known as self-justification, self-assertion or 
re-assertion].
 3. Minimisation (downplaying the significance of the phone hacking 
scandal and therefore questioning the legitimacy of the inquiry and 
other measures aimed at checking press irresponsibility).
 4. Localisation (localising the damage to the community to acts com-
mitted by a handful of members).
Localisation, which is also known as ostracisation, individualisation and 
the bad apple interpretive strategy, is a type of deflection strategy. The 
press can use different strategies of deflection to exonerate themselves of 
blame by deflecting it to others. Deflection strategies are also referred to 
in this book as self-exoneration strategies. From their findings, Thomas 
and Finneman (2014, p.  172) concluded that the journalistic metadis-
course during the hearing stages of the Leveson Inquiry revealed “an insti-
tutional ideology that is quick to assert rights but largely resistant to 
notions of attendant responsibilities”. Though the authors’ categorisation 
is very relevant to the study of journalistic metadiscourse, their categories 
do not make room for durational modes of interpretation (ibid.).
According to Zelizer (1994, cited in Cecil 2002, p. 51), journalistic 
metadiscourse takes place on two planes: the local and the durational 
modes of interpretation. While the local mode of interpretation is con-
cerned with the immediate occurrence and how it is made meaning of in 
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journalism’s interpretive community, the durational mode of interpreta-
tion “offers a historical perspective, a discussion of past occurrences, which 
is often reinterpreted to fit into a more localized frame” (ibid.). Journalists 
discuss past stories such as Princess Diana’s death and paparazzi (1997), 
the topless princess photo (2012) and the Watergate scandal (1970), and 
talk about how this fits in with the present occurrence and what that means 
for journalism and democracy. Such discussions are often used to reinforce 
the boundaries of journalistic practice. This is what I refer to, in paradigm 
repair studies, as the strategy of historicisation (White 2004, p.  98; 
Mumford 2009, p. 72).
“Historicisation” is a term I borrowed from dramatic theory where 
German playwright Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956) used it to describe the 
following theatre scenarios:
Distancing (contemporary) phenomenon by placing them in the past
Presenting events as the product of historically specific conditions 
and choices
Showing differences between the past and the present and evi-
dencing change
Showing similarities between the past and the present and urging change
Revealing received versions of history as the views of the ruling class
Giving air to suppressed and interventionist histories
Presenting all versions of history as serving vested interests (Brecht, cited 
in Mumford 2009, p. 72)
Historicisation becomes a paradigm repair strategy when similar tech-
niques as those outlined by Brecht are employed by the press in an attempt 
to repair its paradigm (ibid.). The concept of paradigm repair strategy 
assumes that the press would only protect its paradigm(s); but the press 
can also challenge journalistic paradigms (Carlson 2012a). Interestingly, 
the strategy of historicisation can also be used to challenge an existing 
paradigm. In such a case, it is not a paradigm repair but a paradigm chal-
lenging strategy. The strategy of historicisation can, therefore, be defined 
as an interpretive approach in which history is used to strengthen or expli-
cate contemporary meaning-making in journalistic metadiscourse, in an 
attempt to protect or challenge a journalistic paradigm.
In journalistic metadiscourse, historicisation is mostly (though not 
exclusively) located in the opinion sections of newspapers where it is used 
to strengthen diverse arguments. Historicisation would most often express 
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the newspaper’s position in an argument. For instance, newspapers that 
propagate the neoliberal ideology can use the strategy of historicisation to 
warn against state intervention in press regulation while those advancing 
social democratic perspectives can use the strategy to stress the need for 
state intervention. Historicisation can be used to either call for or oppose 
press reform. It can also be used as an element of drama; to assert the 
media’s importance; or to affirm that the press has gone too far too often. 
Historicisation is a broad paradigmatic approach that can embrace other 
paradigm strategies such as self-assertion and individualisation. Adding 
the strategy of historicisation to the four paradigm repair strategies—the 
strategies of threat to the paradigm (catastrophisation), self-assertion 
(affirmation), minimisation and individualisation (localisation; bad 
apples)—enabled me to investigate both historical and local modes of 
interpretation in the press coverage of the debate that arose from the 
NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. Having discussed 
the terms and strategies that I engaged with in my analysis of the coverage 
of the debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking scandal, the follow-
ing section explains the model of content and discourse analyses used for 
my investigation.
InvestIgatIng the Press reform Debate: Content 
anD DIsCourse analyses
Content analysis is the systematic and objective analysis of texts such as can 
be found in newspaper articles, television clips, books, adverts and so on 
(Holsti 1969, p. 14, cited in Stemler 2001, p. 17). In content analysis, 
textual components (words, phrases, images, etc.) relevant to the findings 
of one’s research are counted, recorded and then calculated with the use 
of statistical methods (Riffe et al. 2005, p. 3). The understanding is that 
the results when analysed can provide answers to the question(s) posed by 
the study. Content analysis is suitable for analysing huge volumes of texts 
(Mosdell and Davies 2006, p. 98). This made it the most suitable research 
method for my investigation which examined more than 800 newspaper 
articles. In my research, content analysis was used to measure the use of 
sources, the hierarchy of importance accorded to different issues of con-
cern, the range of alternative views, the dominant themes and the extent 
to which paradigm repair strategies were used in the coverage of the media 
policy debate.
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Measuring sources enabled me to evaluate the sources used and ones 
most frequently quoted. This provides empirical data on how the media 
used sources of information in their coverage of the press reform debate. 
In a democracy, the normative expectation is that all stakeholders in a 
debate would have proportionate access to the public sphere. My decision 
to investigate sources in the media policy debate is in response to this 
expectation and the claim that ordinary citizens and sources critical of the 
press are allotted a weak position of access to the media (Galtung and 
Ruge 1965, cited in Harcup and O’Neill 2010, p. 270). Using content 
analysis, I was able to identify the dominant theme in each newspaper and 
the whole coverage; ascertain whether the press gave limited coverage to 
views that were critical of them; measure attributions of blame and alter-
native views; and gauge the degree of manifestation of different paradigm 
repair strategies in the journalistic metadiscourse. In sum, content analysis 
helped to provide statistical data on how the British press covered the 
media policy debate that arose from the News of the World phone hacking 
scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. A coding scheme was designed to enable 
me to input the data for my content analysis.
My study sample comprised all news articles on the press reform debate 
in six of the top ten British national newspapers (based on combined print 
and online readership figures for April 2011 to March 2012—Source: 
NRS PADD 2012): two newspapers from each category of the main news-
paper classification in the UK. My decision to do only two from each cat-
egory is for the purpose of manageability, considering the depth of analysis 
and available period of study. As mentioned in Chap. 1, I chose to look at 
national papers because of their nationwide reach. The national newspa-
pers in Britain are categorised in terms of social class, although this classi-
fication does not always reflect reality (McNAir 2000, p.  14). The 
categories are the broadsheets, mid-market and the tabloids (Williams 
2009, pp.  9–10). These categories have different target audiences and 
diverse manners of coverage. This was taken into consideration during the 
analysis of the coverage. However, these categories were bypassed where a 
phenomenon cuts across paper classifications.
The broadsheets, also known as quality newspapers, deliver hard or 
“serious-minded” news content. They are regarded as “the most informa-
tion dense of the print media” (McNair 2000, p. 16). Their target audi-
ence consists of the upper- and middle-class people “with higher levels of 
income, educational attainment and social status” (Williams 2009, p. 9). 
They are often referred to as the elite titles (McNair 2000, p. 16). At the 
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time of my research, the broadsheet newspapers included The Times, The 
Sunday Times, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Guardian, Observer, 
Independent, Independent on Sunday and Financial Times. The broad-
sheet newspapers examined are the Daily Telegraph and Guardian. The 
choice of these two quality newspapers was based on their wide reach and 
consequent potential to impact society. The Guardian had the biggest 
combined (print and digital data) monthly readership for broadsheet 
newspapers in the year to March 2012 with a total of 8.95 million readers, 
followed by Daily Telegraph with 8.82 million readers (NRS PADD 2012; 
Halliday 2012). Both papers were, thus, the most read British national 
quality newspapers within the period of the debate that followed the 
phone hacking scandal. The role Guardian newspaper played in exposing 
the extent of the scandal adds to its importance in the sample.
Next in line are the mid-market titles which at the time comprised 
Daily Express, Sunday Express, Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday. Their tar-
get audience is believed to be middle and upper working-class people. 
There is some confusion with this classification because papers in this 
group were former broadsheet newspapers (The Mail and Express newspa-
pers) which changed from the broadsheet to tabloid print format (McNair 
2000, p. 14). Some scholars use the term “red-top tabloids” to refer to 
the group commonly known as the tabloids, in order to differentiate them 
from the “broadsheets” in tabloid format. Representing the mid-markets 
in the study are Daily Mail and Daily Express. Their Sunday editions, as 
well as the Sunday publications of all other newspapers studied, were 
excluded from my research to reduce it to a manageable size. The Daily 
Mail also has great potential to impact society; it came next to the Sun as 
the paper with the second largest combined monthly readership across all 
classes of UK newspaper in the year to March 2012 with a total of 16.4 mil-
lion readers (NRS PADD 2012; Halliday 2012). Though the Daily Express 
was far behind in readership figures (4.6 million readers), it serves as the 
only other mid-market newspaper, and examining it evens up the number 
of newspapers being studied to two newspapers per category of British 
national newspapers (ibid.). Providing an alternative newspaper per cate-
gory of newspaper examined makes available opportunities to investigate 
whether a phenomenon was characteristic (or not) of a newspaper category.
The “popular” press, red-top tabloid or tabloid titles are at the end of 
the spectrum in terms of social status. They are known to have a high level 
of readership despite the fact that they publish less “serious” and more 
celebrity, sensational and entertainment-style news. At the time of this 
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study, the tabloid newspapers were The Sun, Sun on Sunday, Daily Mirror, 
Sunday Mirror, Daily Star, Daily Star Sunday and People. My study exam-
ined The Sun and Daily Mirror. The Sun’s reach is significant being that it 
had the highest combined monthly readership across all categories of UK 
newspapers in the year to March 2012 with a total of 17.8 million readers 
(ibid.). The fact that The Sun newspaper belongs to the owner of the 
defunct News of the World strengthens its relevance to the study sample. It 
afforded me an opportunity to examine how one of Rupert Murdoch’s 
papers covered the misdemeanour of one of their own. The Daily Mirror’s 
10.6  million monthly combined readership also made it a paper to be 
reckoned with; the figure makes it third in the ranking of overall UK 
national newspaper monthly combined readership in the year to March 
2012 (ibid.). As previously stated, all six newspapers examined are among 
the top ten in terms of combined readership of national newspapers in the 
UK (ibid.). It is important to note that with the current trend of “tabloid-
isation” (the “dumbing down” or “going down market” of the more 
rational press to the sensational in order to attract a numerically larger 
audience), the lines are blurring among these three categories of newspa-
per (Williams 2009, pp. 9–10).
All news articles on the media reform debate in the six national daily 
newspapers were examined. The period of coverage was from 14 November 
2011 (when the hearing began at the Leveson Inquiry) to 14 November 
2013 (the aftermath of the Privy Council’s approval of a Royal Charter on 
press regulation). This two-year period falls within the time frame when 
media coverage of the press reform debate was at its peak in the UK 
(Macfarlane and Torpey 2012, n.p; Independent 2013). Although editori-
als are where the newspaper’s opinions are often heard (Hindman 2003, 
p. 671), I decided against limiting my research to editorials because as 
Wahl-Jorgensen (2008, p.  67) pointed out, “in the British context … 
expression of judgements and opinions is frequently not limited to the 
op-ed and editorial pages, but increasingly pervades every section of the 
newspaper”. Therefore, limiting the study to editorials risks leaving out 
interpretations of the debate that featured in the news section of the news-
papers. My data, thus, included both opinion and news articles that cap-
tured the media policy debate which followed the NoTW phone hacking 
scandal.
The news articles were obtained from Nexis UK, an electronic archive 
service with full text access to all UK national newspapers. Using the 
search terms “press regulation” or “press laws” or “public trust” or “media 
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ownership” or “public interest” or “privacy” (anywhere in the text) and 
“Leveson” or “News of the World” or “phone hacking” (anywhere in the 
text), my search produced a total of 1485 news articles. A broad range of 
issues on the press reform debate including articles relating to the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), the Press Standards 
Board of Finance (PressBoF), Hacked Off, the Royal Charter and the 
Privy Council were represented in the result. After cleaning the sample by 
deleting repeats and unrelated stories, the sample was reduced to 870; 323 
from Guardian, 199 from Daily Telegraph, 173 from Daily Mail, 28 from 
Daily Express, 96 from the Sun and 51 from Daily Mirror. The large 
reduction in the number of articles from 1485 to 870 was largely due to 
the high number of duplicate articles in Nexis UK, especially with articles 
from Guardian newspaper where the results, at the time of study, con-
tained articles from both their online and print versions, despite excluding 
websites through the search preferences. My research examined written 
content only. Although a study on the visuals would also be interesting, 
that is outside the scope of this study. This study is quite broad and exclud-
ing visuals helped to make it a manageable project. Visual analysis of the 
coverage would be an interesting focus for future study.
Berelson (1952, p. 18, cited in Richardson 2007, p. 15) emphasised 
the characteristic of content analysis as an objective research procedure, 
free from the researcher’s interference. This “objectivity” requirement of 
content analysis also requires that the research be done in such a way that 
it can be replicated by anyone who chooses to do so (Krippendorff 2004, 
pp. 18–19). To take care of this requirement, a coding sheet was drawn up 
along with guidelines that helped to make the study replicable. The cod-
ing sheet was tested and re-tested by two trained postgraduate student 
coders. Thirty stories randomly selected from the study sample were tested 
until the overall percentage agreement reached an average of 95.9 per 
cent, with the lowest variable reaching 80 per cent agreement. The high 
level of percentage agreement across all variables helps to guarantee that 
this research can be replicated. The calculations were made using ReCal2 
0.1 Alpha (dfreelon.org). ReCal2 is an online reliability calculator for two 
coders which calculates intercoder reliability coefficients for nominal data 
and produces results for percentage agreements. The result of my inter-
coder reliability test was Krippendorff’s Alpha 0.822. A codebook that 
explains each variable was designed to enhance comprehension of the cod-
ing sheet. Though content analysis has huge benefits, among which are its 
cost effectiveness, unobtrusiveness and replicability (Berelson 1971, p. 18; 
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Krippendorff 2012), the results it produces can be problematic because 
statistics from quantitative measurements can be interpreted out of con-
text (Richardson 2007, pp. 15–18). To take care of such shortcomings, 
discourse analysis was used as a supplementary method to content analysis
Discourse analysis is multifarious and so are its definitions (Wodak and 
Meyer 2009, p. 24). van Dijk (1988, p. x; 1998 cited in Devereux 2007, 
p. 174) explains that discourse analysis allows the analyst to investigate the 
underlying meaning of words. Gee and Handford (2012, p. 1) advanced 
this understanding by defining discourse analysis as “the study of language 
in use”. Discourse analysis (DA) is “the study of the meanings we give 
language” and what that does within a particular context (ibid.). This is 
based on the “understanding that language does not passively reflect our 
experiences” but can be manipulated (consciously or unconsciously) by 
the powerful to advance their interests (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002, 
p. 63). “Powerful” within the context of this study includes those with 
access to the media’s public sphere and those upon whom the public has 
conferred the authority to both introduce and coordinate discourses 
within this public space (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002, pp. 2–3; Hall 1997). 
Some approaches to discourse analysis are largely linguistic, some are more 
focused on the construction of “themes or images” in texts while others 
are interested in linking language to social and cultural issues of conten-
tion with the aim of locating the resultant social consequences (Gee and 
Handford 2012, p.  1). The latter, which is known as critical discourse 
analysis, is the approach used for my research. Though discourse analysis 
was not the main method for the research, some of its principles were used 
to explicate my findings. Hence, the need to briefly discuss critical dis-
course analysis.
Critical discourse analysis, hereafter referred to as CDA, is diverse 
(Wodak and Meyer 2009, p. 5). Forms of CDA include the Foucauldian 
CDA and dispositive analysis (Jager and Maier 2009); the social cognitive 
approach (van Dijk 2009); the social psychological approach (Wetherell 
and Potter 1992); the discourse-historic approach of the Vienna School 
(Wodak and Meyer 2009) and Norman Fairclough’s approach to CDA 
(Fairclough 1992a, b, 1995a, b, 2005). I used principles from Norman 
Fairclough’s approach to CDA because unlike some models of CDA that 
focus primarily on linguistic analysis, Fairclough’s CDA makes room for 
the analysis of power relationships in communicative discourse in relation 
to wider social and cultural structures (Leifeld 2016, p. 39). Fairclough’s 
approach to CDA is beneficial for this study because an investigation into 
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how the press covers debates about their policy and the implication of 
their manner of coverage for media accountability and the sustenance of 
democracy involves investigating the distribution of communicative power 
between the press and other stakeholders in the media policy debates. 
Fairclough expects that by using his approach to CDA, people can con-
tribute to social change along the lines of more equal power relations in 
communicative discourse (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, p.  258). One 
normative expectation of CDA is to promote democracy by pointing out 
non-egalitarian discourses so that steps can be taken to make them demo-
cratic (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). Though some aspects of van Dijk’s 
(1988, 1998, 2009) approach to CDA can be useful in this study (e.g. its 
investigation into communicative power and ideology analysis), the sys-
tematic and well-developed analytical construct of Norman Fairclough’s 
CDA and its emphasis on social issues as against van Dijk’s (1988, 1998, 
2009) focus on the political gave it an edge in this study. Fairclough’s 
three-dimensional analytical model (discursive, linguistic and social prac-
tice) makes his CDA a good supplement to my content analysis.
As stated earlier, CDA was a supplementary method of analysis in my 
research; it was used to elucidate the results of my content analysis and for 
the analysis of how paradigm repair strategies were used in the coverage. 
News articles on the debate were scrutinised in search of words, linguistic 
devices and discursive patterns that could reveal underlying meanings. 
Fairclough’s (1995a, b, 2005) style of linking language-use to social prac-
tice was also employed in my analysis. For example, results from the cover-
age of the debate on media ownership were linked to the structure of 
media ownership in a democratic society. One unique feature in this style 
of mixed methodology is that there is no specific number of articles set 
aside as the sample for discourse analysis. Feltham-King and Macleod 
(2016, pp. 1–9) used a similar pattern of mixed methods when they used 
content analysis to supplement discourse analysis. The flexibility with 
which I could use principles drawn from CDA to analyse the data from 
content analysis at various points of my analysis is a feature that attracted 
me to this method. Supplementing content analysis with critical discourse 
analysis allowed me to interpret statistics based on the context within 
which they appeared, enabling in-depth analysis of the results of my inves-
tigation. It also enabled me to examine the construction and extent of 
usage of different paradigm repair strategies.
Following the lines of Fairclough’s three-dimensional analytical model 
(linguistic [grammar], discursive and social practice), I analysed linguistic 
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devices such as “you-centeredness”, metaphors, hyperboles and adjectives 
to unearth their underlying meanings as suggested by Fairclough (1992b, 
pp. 158–194). This helped to affirm the use of some paradigm repair strat-
egies in the coverage of the press reform debate. For example, my analysis 
of doom-laden adjectives in the media’s description of measures aimed at 
reforming their policy helped to affirm the use of “threat to the paradigm” 
strategy. On the discursive level, I identified the “us” and “them” pattern 
of discourse which attempted to portray the “us” (the press) as good and 
the “them” (campaigners for stringent press reform) as bad. I scrutinised 
discourses to see if arguments were based on the neoliberal or social dem-
ocratic theory. I also investigated discursive patterns including silences in 
media texts and their implication. In terms of social practice, I analysed 
texts in my study sample based on the social, economic and political con-
ditions under which they were produced. For instance, I linked the jour-
nalistic metadiscourse on media ownership to issue of media ownership 
concentration in the UK.
In this study, Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of analysis was not 
used chronologically but at various points of my analysis. Despite its rich-
ness, CDA does have some weaknesses. Scholars have argued that the fact 
that there is no specific way of selecting the study sample for CDA makes 
studies done with CDA subjective and prone to researchers’ interference 
(Blommaert 2005). This weakness is addressed in this study because CDA 
was used only to complement my content analysis. Consequently, all dis-
courses analysed were drawn from the study sample for my content analy-
sis which was chosen through a relatively objective method. Complementing 
content analysis with critical discourse analysis enabled me to provide 
comprehensive and comprehendible analysis of the coverage of the media 
policy debate.
ConClusIon
This chapter presented the method used for my investigation into how the 
media represented the debate that arose from the News of the World phone 
hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. Content analysis was supple-
mented by critical discourse analysis to provide comprehensive data on 
how the media cover debates about their policy. The chapter clarified the 
meanings of the terms “metacoverage”, “metajournalistic discourse” and 
“journalistic metadiscourse”. I called for a review of the definition that 
limits metacoverage to the increasing trend of journalists covering 
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themselves during political campaigns (Esser et al. 2001). I argued that 
based on the composition of the word, it should refer to all forms of self- 
coverage by the media. Going by my definition of metacoverage, the 
media content analysed in my research falls within the category of meta-
coverage in the field of journalism, what Brin and Drolet (2009, p. 271) 
described as journalistic metadiscourse. I explained that journalistic meta-
discourse is what Carlson (2015) referred to as metajournalistic discourse 
on journalistic platforms.
The concept of paradigm repair can be used to analyse journalistic meta-
discourse on press reform. Journalists use paradigm repair strategies to 
protect press standards and values from scrutiny (Bennett et al. 1985, cited 
in Carlson 2015, p. 4). The paradigm repair strategies discussed in this 
chapter include “threat to the paradigm” (warnings of attacks on journal-
ism), self-assertion (affirming the importance of journalism to democracy), 
minimisation (downplaying the significance of the phone hacking scandal 
and questioning the legitimacy of measures aimed at checking press irre-
sponsibility), individualisation (localising the damage to the community to 
acts committed by a few journalists) and historicisation (using history or 
collective memory to repair (or challenge) journalistic paradigms).
I examined all news articles on the media policy debate in the Guardian, 
Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, The Sun, Daily Mirror and Daily Mail; 
from 14 November 2011 when the Leveson Inquiry was set up, to 14 
November 2014—the aftermath of the sealing of the cross-party Royal 
Charter on press regulation. A total of 870 news articles were examined: 
323 from Guardian, 199 from Daily Telegraph, 173 from Daily Mail, 28 
from Daily Express, 96 from the Sun and 51 from Daily Mirror. A coding 
sheet, a codebook, Nexis UK database and the Statistical Package of the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) were used for my primary investigation. Results 
from this research are used to support my analysis of how the media cover 
debates about their policy.
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CHAPTER 6
Paradigm Repair and Journalistic 
Metadiscourse
Media scandals often lead to scrutiny of press standards with the aim of 
ensuring that the malpractice does not repeat itself and the media fulfil 
their role in a democratic society. Such scrutiny could take the form of 
commissions or inquiries into press standards (see Chap. 3). For example, 
in the case of the NoTW phone hacking scandal, it was the Leveson Inquiry 
into the culture, ethics and practice of the press. These inquiries have con-
sumed huge amount of resources (time, money, etc.) due to the important 
role the media play in democratic societies (see Chap. 4). Despite the 
amount of resources devoted to such enquiries the impact in terms of 
media reforms has been ominously minimal and largely ineffective (Curran 
and Seaton 2010). For instance, less than a decade after the Leveson 
Inquiry and the subsequent setting up of the Independent Press Standards 
Organisation (IPSO) as an improved Leveson-compliant press regulator, 
the press is again accused of publishing several embarrassing stories relat-
ing to the Duchess of Sussex, Meghan Markle. Such stories led to Prince 
Harry’s so-called war against the tabloid press and Meghan’s suing of the 
Mail on Sunday for publishing her hand-written letter to her estranged 
father, on the grounds of misuse of private information, infringement of 
copyright and breach of General Data Protection Regulation (Waterstone 
and Davies 2019).
This book takes the position that media reform efforts are weakened to 
a large extent, because of the way the media cover debates about their 
policy. As explained in Chap. 5, one way through which the media can 
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weaken press reform efforts is by using paradigm repair strategies. 
Paradigm repair occurs when a press paradigm is called into question and 
the press refusing to examine its ways to see if there is need for change and 
instead chooses to protect the existing paradigm(s) through the use of dif-
ferent discursive strategies (Bennet et  al. 1985 cited in Carlson 2015, 
p.  4). Based on information gathered from previous literature and my 
preliminary examination of news articles on the press reform debate, I 
identified two paradigms the press attempted to repair or protect during 
their coverage of the debate. They are the “press freedom” and “journal-
ists as a crusader” paradigms. The strategies used to protect these para-
digms include catastrophisation, historicisation, individualisation, 
self-assertion and minimisation (see Chap. 5). This chapter presents my 
findings on the use of the strategies of catastrophisation and historicisa-
tion. I will begin with an analysis of how catastrophisation was used in the 
media coverage of the press reform debate that followed the NoTW phone 
hacking scandal.
“Threat to the paradigm” and “threat to press freedom” are used inter-
changeably to talk about the press’ use of the strategy of catastrophisation 
to protect its conceptualisation of press freedom. This strategy entails the 
media’s use of diverse techniques to raise an alarm that the paradigm 
under scrutiny (in this case, press freedom) is under attack. My investiga-
tion revealed that the press functioned as two sub-interpretive spheres 
during their coverage of the press reform debate that arose from the 
NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. Sub-interpretive 
spheres emerge from a situation in which journalism, rather than function 
as one interpretive community in its attempt to mark the boundaries of 
their profession (Zelizer 1993), instead functions as multiple homoge-
neous publics (Fraser 1992). The multiple spheres of homogeneous dis-
courses created within a journalistic community are what I refer to as 
sub-interpretive spheres. Multiple sub-interpretive spheres can arise from 
differences and similarities in the press’ interpretations of journalistic para-
digms, such as press freedom, objectivity and news in the printed format. 
Sub-interpretive spheres may or may not be divided along the lines of 
media outfits because they are abstract spheres of discourses. In this book, 
however, the sub-interpretive spheres were divided along the lines of 
newspapers.
As stated earlier, I identified two sub-interpretive spheres in the media 
coverage of the debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking scandal 
and the Leveson Inquiry. One sub-interpretive sphere comprises The Sun, 
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Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph while the 
other consists of the Guardian newspaper. The press reform debate was 
often along the lines of these two sub-interpretive spheres. This grouping 
does not imply that newspapers in each of the two categories agreed on 
every point of the press reform argument. The homogeneity of a sub- 
interpretive sphere does not preclude disagreements on certain issues 
within that homogeneous public. The categorisation of the sub- interpretive 
spheres in this study was based on the degree of similarity in their expres-
sions and interpretations of key points in the press reform debate, particu-
larly their views on what constitutes press freedom. To be able to analyse 
these newspapers’ representation of the press reform debate as sub- 
interpretive spheres as well as individually, this book adopts a confedera-
tion pattern of analysis.
“Confederation pattern of analysis” as a pattern of critique that allows 
analysis of media content both in groups (e.g. of a group of newspapers) 
and individually (individual newspapers). This allows room for the identi-
fication of unique trends and styles within discourse. For instance, though 
The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph all 
advanced a similar interpretation of press freedom, the newspapers dif-
fered in their representation of News of the World’s owner Rupert Murdoch 
and the Press Complaint Commission, as we shall see in Chap. 8. 
Understanding my use of sub-interpretive spheres and the confederation 
pattern of analysis will enable the comprehension of my analysis of the 
journalistic metadiscourse, especially in relation to the grouping and indi-
vidual examination of newspapers. In the next section, I discuss how the 
“threat to the paradigm” strategy was used in the journalistic metadis-
course on the press reform debate.
ThreaT To The Paradigm: Press Freedom 
Under aTTack?
When public outrage against press “deviancy” leads to the setting up of a 
press commission, steps taken by such commissions to check the abuse of 
press freedom have often been interpreted in journalistic metadiscourse as 
a threat to press freedom and, by extension, a threat to democracy (Curran 
and Seaton 2010, pp. 327–338; Steel 2012). One of the ways through 
which it has done this is by using the “threat to the paradigm” or catastro-
phisation strategy to warn that measures designed to check abuse of press 
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power were a threat to press freedom (Thomas and Finneman 2014). 
Table  6.1 not only affirms this argument but also shows the extent to 
which it was done. “Threat to press freedom” was the overall dominant 
theme in the journalistic metadiscourse on the debate that arose from the 
News of the World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. It was 
the dominant theme in 20.6 per cent of the study sample, appearing in 
62.5 per cent of articles in The Sun, 35.7 per cent of Daily Express, 25.5 
per cent of Daily Mirror and 18.1 per cent of Daily Telegraph (see 
Table  6.1). It was only surpassed in the Daily Mail by the theme 
“Critiquing critics of the press”; yet it still managed to exceed the 
Guardian’s usage of the strategy, emerging in 13.3 per cent of articles in 
Daily Mail as against Guardian’s 11.5 per cent of articles. This result 
reflects a trend that runs through the journalistic metadiscourse on the 
press reform debate, where the Guardian operated as a different interpre-
tive community from the rest of the newspapers in my study sample, lead-
ing to my grouping of the Guardian as one sub-interpretive sphere and 
the rest of the press as another sub-interpretive sphere. This division of the 
press reform debate into two interpretive communities will become clearer 
as I delve deeper into the analysis of the media policy debate that arose 
from the News of the World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson 
Inquiry.
This division into two interpretive communities was also identified in 
the debate on the Leveson Inquiry’s proposal for press regulation under-
pinned by statute. “Support for statutory underpinning” of a new press 
regulatory body was the dominant theme in the Guardian newspaper, 
appearing in 22.3 per cent of its sample as against 3.5 per cent in the Daily 
Telegraph, 1.2 per cent in the Daily Mail and zero per cent in The Sun, 
Daily Express and Daily Mirror (see Table 6.1). This result demonstrates 
that apart from the Guardian, all newspapers in my study sample advanced 
a discourse that was opposed to statutory regulation; this includes a regu-
latory body underpinned by statute. As with previous inquiries into press 
regulation and accountability (see Chap. 3), much of the press opposed 
the Leveson Inquiry’s proposal for press regulation underpinned by stat-
ute. This resistance to statutory regulation accounted for arguments 
“against statutory underpinning” emerging as the dominant theme in 
12.7 per cent of the sample for Daily Mail, 10.7 per cent for Daily Express, 
9.8 per cent for Daily Mirror, 6.0 per cent for Daily Telegraph, 5.2 per 
cent for The Sun and 4.0 per cent for Guardian. As Curran and Seaton 
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Table 6.1 Dominant theme in the study sample
Dominant theme Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Threat to press 
freedom
11.5 13.3 25.5 18.1 35.7 62.5 20.6
Support for new 
press’ own 
regulatory system
1.5 4.6 3.9 2.5 3.6 4.2 2.9
Against politicians’ 
Royal Charter
2.8 4.0 3.0 3.1 2.9
Against press law/
statutory 
underpinning
4.0 12.7 9.8 6.0 10.7 5.2 6.9
Press achievements 0.6 6.9 2.0 1.5 7.1 1.0 2.4
Against self- 
regulation of the 
press
0.9 0.6 0.5
Support for 
Leveson Inquiry
10.5 7.8 2.5 7.1 3.1 5.5
Enforce existing 
laws
2.3 3.9 4.5 1.7
Critiquing critics of 
the press
0.6 14.5 2.0 5.0 3.6 8.3 5.4
More dialogue 
needed
1.5 0.6
Privacy 6.2 9.2 9.8 11.1 10.7 3.1 7.9
Against new press 
regulatory system 
formed by the press
2.5 1.0 1.1
Support for 
politicians’ Royal 
Charter
6.8 2.9 2.0 1.0 3.4
Support for press 
law/statutory 
underpinning
22.3 1.2 3.5 9.3
Media owners/
ownership checks 
are needed
5.0 1.2 2.0 4.5 3.6 1.0 3.4
Support for 
self-regulation of 
the press
5.6 1.7 2.0 9.0 3.6 2.1 4.9
(continued)
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(2010) argue, this aversion to statutory regulation by the press is largely 
responsible for weak reforms in press regulation.
Support for or against statutory underpinning of a new press regulatory 
system underpropped several arguments relating to the “threat to press 
freedom” theme in the journalistic metadiscourse on the press reform 
debate. The result reveals that “threat to press freedom” was the most 
prominent argument and issue of concern in the journalistic metadis-
course. The “threat to press freedom” strategy was used liberally in all 
newspapers in the study sample but more prominently in the sub- 
interpretive sphere comprising of The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, 
Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph. Studies have shown that the opposition 
of the British press to statutory regulation goes beyond a commitment to 
protect press freedom, to a determination to control information without 
being accountable for its management (Curran and Seaton 2010; Petley 
2013). Ensuring press accountability was one of the mandates of the 
Leveson (2012f). However, in its coverage of the debate that arose from 
Table 6.1  (continued)
Dominant theme Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Against Leveson 
Inquiry
0.6 8.7 3.6 3.1 2.4
The politicians’ 
Royal Charter may 
never work
2.8 2.3 2.0 0.5 1.7
Promoting 
supporters of the 
press
0.3 2.9 0.7
Promoting 
supporters of the 
statutory 
underpinning 
argument
0.5 0.1
The press behaved 
badly
0.6 6.4 11.8 11.1 4.7
The press is not to 
blame
4.0 5.9 6.5 2.6
Other 13.3 0.6 9.8 8.0 10.7 3.1 8.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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the Inquiry, the media represented proposed measures aimed at ensuring 
press accountability as threats to press freedom.
Table 6.2 reveals that measures aimed at ensuring press accountability 
were represented as “Threat to press freedom” in 27.8 per cent of the 
study sample, emerging as the most frequently used interpretation of 
efforts at reforming the press in the journalistic metadiscourse. The mea-
sures were described as “Threat to press freedom” in 39.9 per cent of 
articles in The Sun, 30.8 per cent of Daily Mail, 30.3 per cent of Daily 
Telegraph, 28.9 per cent of Daily Express, 26.1 per cent of Daily Mirror 
and 20.2 per cent of Guardian (see Table 6.2). This result strengthens the 
finding that “threat to press freedom” was the most prominent argument 
advanced by the press in their coverage of the media policy debate. 
Table 6.2 also revealed that measures aimed at ensuring press accountabil-
ity were interpreted as catastrophe for press freedom and, by extension, 
democracy. Proposed measures were described as “state control or 
Table 6.2 Description of measures to ensure press accountability
Description Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Independent press 
self-regulation
31.1 6.9 5.8 7.7 11.1 8.5 16.8
Tough press 
regulation
12.4 16.2 10.1 13.4 20.0 12.4 13.4
Chilling effect on 
investigative 
journalism
6.5 14.6 15.9 15.5 8.9 9.8 10.6
Threat to press 
freedom
20.2 30.8 26.1 30.3 28.9 39.9 27.8
State control or 
slippery slope to 
press licensing
8.6 11.5 11.6 10.6 17.8 13.1 10.9
Draconian or 
punitive
3.9 10.0 10.1 3.5 4.4 5.9 5.6
Retribution 3.0 4.6 5.8 11.3 6.7 9.2 6.1
Regulation that 
delivers on 
Leveson’s 
promises
11.6 5.4 14.5 6.3 0.0 0.0 7.4
Other 2.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 2.2 1.3 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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slippery slope to press licensing” (10.9 per cent), actions that can have a 
“chilling effect on investigative journalism” (10.6 per cent), “retribution” 
against the press by corrupt politicians (6.1 per cent) and “draconian or 
punitive” (5.6 per cent). These findings demonstrate that in journalistic 
metadiscourse on media policy debates, the media attempt to protect 
existing boundaries of media policy from change by representing measures 
aimed at ensuring press accountability in a negative light. It can be argued 
that such representations contribute to the introduction of weak reforms 
that cannot guarantee an accountable press.
The statistical data will be better understood if we take into consider-
ation the context within which they were used, for example, description of 
proposed measures as “Independent press self-regulation” (16.8 per cent), 
“Tough press regulation” (13.4 per cent) and “Leveson compliant” (7.4 
per cent). Though the sub-interpretive sphere comprising The Sun, Daily 
Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph gave prominence to 
a discourse that kicked against statutory backing of a new press regulator, 
they largely supported the idea of “tough” rules to check press irresponsi-
bility (see Table 6.2). They contended that the press is capable of setting 
up its own regulator that would have tough rules as recommended by the 
Leveson Inquiry but without a statutory underpinning (Shipman 2012, 
p. 16). In fact, all parties in the debate including victims of the press, cam-
paigners for victims and politicians advocated tough measures to check 
press misconduct. That accounted for the high frequency of the use of the 
word “tough” to describe measures aimed at ensuring press accountability 
(see Table 6.2). It was used in 20 per cent of the Daily Express, 16.2 per 
cent of Daily Mail, 13.4 per cent of Daily Telegraph, 12.4 per cent of 
Guardian, 12.4 per cent of The Sun and 10.1 per cent of Daily Mirror. 
“Tough press regulation” was among the top three words used to describe 
measures aimed at checking press behaviour (see Table 6.2). It was sur-
passed only by “threat to press freedom” (27.8 per cent) and “indepen-
dent press self-regulation” (16.8 per cent).
Considering how the word “tough” was used in the journalistic meta-
discourse, I am disinclined to refer to it as an evidence of catastrophisa-
tion, unlike what I thought before I embarked on the study. However, the 
high frequency of its usage makes it significant. The question this raises is, 
“does the high frequency of usage demonstrate strong commitment on 
the side of the press to ensure a post Leveson accountable press”? In 2016, 
two years from the setting up of the Independent Press Standards 
Organisation (IPSO), the Pilling’s review commissioned by IPSO says it 
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demonstrates such commitment but Hacked Off founder Brian Cathcart 
disagrees. In an article published in Byline.com, entitled “IPSO: The 
Toothless Puppet Rolls over for its masters (again)”, Cathcart (2018) 
argues that the post-Leveson press regulator, IPSO, is far from being the 
“the toughest press regulator in the western world”, as it claims. It can be 
argued that the representation of the then-proposed IPSO as “tough” 
during the debate was aimed at stalling the setting up of the Royal Charter 
on press self-regulation (see Chap. 3) or, at worse, excusing the press from 
signing up to a regulatory body that could perhaps make it more 
accountable.
Similar to how the word “tough” was used in the journalistic metadis-
course of the press reform debate, the phrase “independent press self- 
regulation” was not “catastrophised” (used to sound an alarm of threat to 
press freedom); it was used liberally by all parties in the debate to advance 
their proposals. They all claimed that their proposal for press reform would 
guarantee independent press regulation (e.g. see Wintour 2013, p.  9). 
The description was used more frequently in the Guardian, where it was 
often used to criticise the proposal for IPSO as not being independent 
enough to effectively check press excesses. As shown in Table  6.2, the 
phrase “independent press self-regulation” appeared in 31.1 per cent of 
the Guardian as opposed to 11.1 per cent in Daily Express, 8.5 per cent in 
The Sun, 7.7 per cent in Daily Telegraph, 6.9 per cent in Daily Mail and 
10.1 per cent in Daily Mirror. The way “tough” and “independent press 
self-regulation” were used differed from my expectation before the study.
What I found was that the use of catastrophisation was limited to pro-
posals perceived as having the potential to change the press paradigm. For 
instance, as Table 6.3 shows, “threat to press freedom” was the most fre-
quently presented reason why the press should not sign up to the Royal 
Charter on press self-regulation. That reason was contained in 49.8 per 
cent of the study sample, followed by “Slippery slope to licensing of the 
press” (19.9 per cent). In a bid to convince readers that the press should 
not sign up to the Royal Charter on press regulation, much of the British 
press advanced the argument that “the press is able to set up [its] own 
regulator” (16.4 per cent), warning that [signing up to the Royal Charter] 
“could lead to bankruptcy of smaller newspapers” (7.6 per cent) and that 
there were “already too many curbs on the press” (5 per cent). As with the 
results on dominant themes, the “threat to press freedom” argument fea-
tured prominently in all newspapers in the study sample but more promi-
nently in the sub-interpretive sphere comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, 
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Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph than in the Guardian news-
paper, demonstrating that the strategy of “threat to the paradigm” is a 
major weapon used against efforts at reforming the press.
ThreaT To The Paradigm in a democraTic 
PUblic sPhere
This book engages with the public sphere concept both as discourse and 
as platform (see Chap. 4). As platform, it argues that the media ought to 
be a space where all parties in a debate can deliberate on issues that con-
cern them without any form of marginalisation (Habermas 1989). The 
focus is not to exalt one argument or theory over another but to point out 
that all stakeholders in a debate should have proportionate space to 
advance their views on the issue in the media’s public sphere. In relation 
to the public sphere as discourse, this book takes the position that ideas for 
effective media reform and its execution can emanate from media policy 
debates that make room for multiple spheres of homogeneous discursive 
publics (Fraser 1992). In this section, I begin with a discussion on the 
discursive publics that featured in the journalistic metadiscourse of the 
press reform debate, especially in relation to how these discursive publics 
(also referred to as sub-interpretive spheres) engaged with the threat to 
the paradigm strategy. As stated earlier in this chapter, I identified two 
discursive publics in the media coverage of the debate that arose from the 
News of the World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. The 
discursive public that comprised The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, 
Table 6.3 Reasons 
why the cross-party 
Royal Charter for press 
regulation should not be 
patronised by the press
Description Total (%)
Threat to press freedom 49.8
Slippery slope to licensing of the press 19.9
The press is able to set up own 
regulator
16.4
Already too many curbs on the UK 
press
5.0
Could lead to bankruptcy of smaller 
newspapers
7.6
Other 1.3
Total 100.0
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Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph adopted a neoliberal line of argument 
while the second discursive public, made up of the Guardian newspaper, 
advanced arguments based on the theory of social democracy (see 
Chap. 4).
Though there were opinion articles from all newspapers in the study 
sample that argued against the Royal Charter on press regulation, the 
editorials of The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily 
Telegraph advanced the neoliberal argument that signing up to the Royal 
Charter on press regulation was a threat to press freedom because it was 
backed by statute (Dunn and Well 2012, p. 6). The Guardian newspaper 
argued that a statute with the power to ensure that the Royal Charter on 
press regulation would not be easily overturned by politicians is not the 
same thing as statutory regulation of the press (Toynbee 2013, p. 29). The 
Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph used the 
“threat to the paradigm” strategy to advance their arguments. For exam-
ple, they used doom-laden phrases such as “slippery slope to the licensing 
of the press” (Beattie 2013, p.  26), “damage to our democracy” 
(McKinstry 2013, p. 14) and the loss of “300 years of press freedom” 
(Rayner 2012, p. 6) to warn readers that any proposals for press regulation 
with statutory backing was a threat to press freedom. The Guardian news-
paper denounced such warnings as a “false alarm”. It did this by decon-
structing the arguments made by the other newspapers. For example, 
where other newspapers used headlines such as “Royal Charter causes out-
rage as freedom of the press is cast aside after 300 years” (Brown and Little 
2013, n.p.), the Guardian countered such discourses with headlines such 
as “Press freedom: a tug of war, not the end of 300 years of glorious lib-
erty” (White 2013b, n.p.). Guardian’s article read:
The chorus of mostly Tory editorial writers and columnists who have been 
denouncing any external constraint on their right to have a good time keep 
claiming that Britain is facing the end of “300  years of press freedom”. 
Stirring stuff, but not true. Why should we believe their dire predictions for 
the future when they can’t even be bothered to get the past right? (ibid.)
The Guardian criticised the rhetoric of “the 300 years of press free-
dom”, describing it as one born out of the self-interest of media propri-
etors and their staff (White 2013a, n.p.). The Guardian’s argument agrees 
with scholars like Curran (2013) and Allan and Jukes (2015, p. 31) who 
have queried the accuracy of the information that Britain has had 
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approximately 300 years of press freedom. Their argument is predicated 
on the fact that the “taxes on knowledge” (tax on advertising, stamp duty, 
tax on paper) were repealed between 1853 and 1861 (see Chap. 3). This 
raises questions about accuracy during debates about media reform. 
Though all newspapers except the Guardian, regardless of their classifica-
tion, advanced the warnings of threat to the paradigm, the tone of lan-
guage was harsher in the tabloid and mid-market newspapers. For example, 
while The Sun newspaper (Kavanagh 2013, p. 8) used the headline “PM a 
political dwarf: sleepy, dopey, grumpy” for an editorial that condemned 
the then Prime Minister David Cameron’s succumbing to calls for the 
Royal Charter on press regulation to be underpinned by statute, Daily 
Telegraph’s editorial (Daily Telegraph 2013, p. 23) on the same issue had 
the headline “MPs cross the Rubicon on press regulation”. The Sun’s arti-
cle likened David Cameron’s spokesperson and the then Conservative MP 
for West Dorset Oliver Letwin to a “tethered goat”, described the then 
Labour leader Ed Miliband as “geeky” and a “Marxist-born lefty”, the 
former Prime Minister Gordon Brown as an “ex-grunt” and Hugh Grant 
as a “faded showbiz luvvie”. Of all the newspapers, The Sun’s tone of lan-
guage was the most demeaning.
In line with Carlson (2012, p.  113) argument, perceived threats to 
journalism were interpreted as threats to the public. The journalistic meta-
discourse of all the newspapers except the Guardian was often constructed 
to portray the public as the victim of any form of statutory intervention in 
press regulation. Linguistic devices such as hyperboles, “you- centeredness” 
(direct address), sensational vocabulary and powerful imagery were 
employed to make the reader visualise the press as the crusader and the 
public as victims, while politicians, victims of press abuse and campaigners 
for such victims appear as villains. For example, an article in the Daily Mail 
captioned “A rotten day for freedom” stated:
They want to ordain how we run your newspapers. They’ll be coming after 
you next, mes braves. Thou shalt not think impure thoughts. Thou shalt 
conform and applaud the Westminster elite. All hail to The System. All must 
subscribe to egalitarianism. All must suppress their inner eruptions. Control, 
control: This is the impetus. (Letts 2013, n.p.)
In this article, the linguistic device of “you-centeredness” as described 
by Fairclough (1995, cited in Marston 2002, p. 86) was used to persuade 
the reader to see politicians, victims of press abuse and campaigners for 
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such victims as their enemies. This interpretation runs contrary to Lord 
Justice Leveson’s claim (Leveson 2012, pp. 14–15) that his proposal of a 
statutorily backed press regulatory body would protect the members of 
the public from press abuse. As with Putnis’ (2000, pp. 106–110) analysis 
of newspaper coverage of the media policy debate in Australia, echoes 
from George Orwell’s 1984 were used to strengthen arguments against 
statutorily backed press regulation (e.g. see Beattie 2013). The Daily 
Express wrote:
In practice, statutory regulation would mean government censorship. Our 
reading matter would be vetted by official bureaucrats, accountable not to 
the public but to the politicians, Whitehall and probably even the European 
courts. We would soon be sliding down the road towards Orwell’s Ministry 
of Truth, the sinister organisation that directed the press in the novel 1984. 
(McKinstry 2012, p. 14)
Similarly, in its comments section, Daily Mail stated: “But today MPs 
must put such petty bitterness aside. Labour and the Lib Dems should 
remember they are the heirs of Hardie, Orwell and John Stuart Mill—true 
giants in the fight for freedom and democracy” (Daily Mail 2013a, n.p.). 
These quotations also reveal the press’ use of the “us” and “them” con-
trast (Marston 2002, p. 86) to position the reader on the side of the press, 
thus creating an in-group (using “We” and “Our”) with the policymakers 
as the outsiders and potential enemy.
Again, the Guardian countered the other newspapers’ interpretations 
of statutorily backed press regulation including their use of echoes from 
George Orwell’s 1984 and other scholars, as can be seen in these statements:
The Guardian, FT and Independent agreed with the parliamentary route 
[statutory underpinning]. It is unclear why Milton, Wilkes or Orwell would 
be happy to bequeath freedom of expression to the government of the day. 
(Rusbridger 2013, p. 26)
The public rightly snort in derision at high-flown cant about press freedom 
while scoundrels brandish quotes from Milton and Orwell as cover to let 
them bully as they please. (Toynbee 2013, p. 29)
All newspapers except the Guardian used hyperbolic comparisons to 
advance the argument that a statutorily backed regulatory body would 
make Britain a totalitarian regime like Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, 
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Zimbabwe and Saudi Arabia, and warned that even such regimes are 
appalled by Britain’s decision (Johnson 2012, pp. 10–11). A Daily Mail 
headline read, “How even the Kremlin and Iran scorn Britain for shack-
ling a free press—from New York to Sydney, the world condemns appall-
ing and unimaginable gag on liberty” (Daily Mail 2013b), and an article 
written by the then Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, for the Daily 
Telegraph stated:
All my life I have thought of Britain as a free country, a place that can look 
around the world with a certain moral self-confidence. How can we wag our 
fingers at Putin’s Russia, when we are about to propose exemplary and crip-
pling fines on publications that do not sign up to the regulatory body? How 
could we have criticised the Venezuela of Hugo Chavez? (Johnson 
2013, p. 24)
The Guardian newspaper also contested these warnings as can be seen 
in this example:
Then there was The Sun’s claim that, if the press were subject to statutory 
regulation, Britain would, like Russia, Zimbabwe and Iran, have “state 
stooges … deciding what can or can’t be printed in your Sun”. It quoted a 
YouGov poll showing 75% of Britons thought that, under press regulation 
set up by parliament, there was “a risk” that politicians would try to stop 
newspapers criticising them. It neglected to mention that 63% did not trust 
the industry to set up “a fair system of press regulation”. The Mail’s Richard 
Littlejohn argued—or, rather, screamed—that statutory regulation would 
lead to journalists who exposed tax avoiders being jailed. (Wilby 2012, p. 30)
This warning by the neoliberal press of a “threat to press freedom” if 
press regulation is underpinned by statute also surfaced during descrip-
tions of the Leveson Inquiry in the journalistic metadiscourse on the press 
reform debate. Table 6.4 shows that the Leveson Inquiry was described as 
a threat to press freedom in 27.1 per cent of the study sample: in 38.0 per 
cent of The Sun newspaper’s, 33.3 per cent of Daily Express’, 28.2 per cent 
of Daily Mirror ’s, 28.6 per cent of Daily Telegraph’s, 28.9 per cent of 
Daily Mail ’s and 20.5 per cent of Guardian’s descriptions of the Leveson 
Inquiry. The threat to press freedom argument came behind “solution to 
efforts at curbing press excesses” which emerged in 28.4 per cent of the 
study sample (see Table 6.4). It appeared in 48.9 per cent of the Guardian 
newspaper, 20.5 per cent of Daily Mirror, 16.7 per cent of Daily Express, 
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15.8 per cent of Daily Mail, 13 per cent of Daily Telegraph and 8.7 per 
cent of The Sun.
While it is expected that Guardian would have a high percentage of 
references to the Leveson Inquiry as a “solution to efforts at curbing press 
excesses” due to its preferred interpretation of press freedom which is in 
step with much of Leveson’s proposals, the high percentage of references 
to Leveson Inquiry as a “solution to efforts at curbing press excesses” by 
the other newspapers looks contradictory on face value. An exploration of 
the context within which those references were made, however, showed 
that the press, apart from the Guardian, in an effort to promote their then 
proposed self-regulatory body, the Independent Press Standards 
Organisation (IPSO), described it as Leveson compliant and, as such, a 
solution to efforts at curbing press excesses. This accounted for the seem-
ingly contradictory data of the Leveson Inquiry being described as both a 
threat to press freedom (27.1 per cent) and a solution to efforts at curbing 
press excesses (28.4 per cent) in Table 6.4.
In sum, the neoliberal concept of press freedom featured in the debate 
as a paradigm which the commercial press fought hard to protect rather 
than scrutinise to see if there is need for change or modification. The fact 
that Guardian newspaper challenged the neoliberal perspective shows that 
Table 6.4 Description of Leveson Inquiry
Description Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
A threat to press 
freedom
20.5 28.9 28.2 28.6 33.3 38.0 27.1
Harmful to UK’s 
reputation
2.3 3.9 5.1 7.8 5.6 12.0 5.4
A chilling effect 
on journalism
8.7 17.1 20.5 26.0 22.2 15.2 15.0
A fair deal 12.8 3.9 2.6 11.7 0.0 0.0 7.9
Solution to 
efforts at curbing 
press excesses
48.9 15.8 20.5 13.0 16.7 8.7 28.4
Illegitimate/
unfair to the press
0.5 18.4 10.3 3.9 5.6 15.2 7.1
Anti-democratic 3.7 9.2 10.3 7.8 16.7 9.8 7.1
Other 2.7 2.6 2.6 1.3 0.0 1.1 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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the press does not always function as one interpretive community (Zelizer 
1993) when it goes about maintaining the boundaries of its profession. As 
stated earlier in this chapter, the press functioned as two homogeneous 
publics (sub-interpretive spheres) during their coverage of the media 
reform debate. While multiple spheres of homogeneous publics are closer 
to the democratic ideal as argued by Fraser (1992, p. 129), the problem 
here is that the bulk of the press (five out of six newspapers in the study 
sample) advanced the neoliberal perspective as compared to one 
(Guardian) which advanced a social democratic view. While the Guardian 
had a high volume of coverage of 323 out of 870 news articles on the 
debate, all of its stories only reached its print readership of 4.06 million 
between 2011 and 2012 (readership figures for April 2011 to March 
2012, NRS PADD 2012). Even with its combined print and online read-
ership of about 9 million, the reach of Guardian is beaten by the com-
bined readership of the six newspapers: 20.5 million print and 49.4 million 
combined print and online readership (readership figures for April 2011 to 
March 2012, NRS PADD 2012). This shows the imbalance in the poten-
tial power of influence between the neoliberal and the social demo-
cratic press.
The danger this poses to democracy is that propagators of the neolib-
eral perspective have an unfair advantage over the propagators of other 
views because their perspective reaches the bulk of the print readership 
including policymakers. This promotes inequality between arguments that 
could advance the “freedoms of the media” and arguments that could 
protect the “freedoms of the public”. This does not reflect a democratic 
public sphere. The implication is that because the newspapers in this sub- 
interpretive sphere that advanced a neoliberal discourse are commercial 
and, therefore, market driven, any reform with a capacity to inhibit the 
commodification of news, even when it can effectively check malpractice, 
was represented in much of the news as a threat to press freedom. As 
stated in the introductory chapter, one of the aims of this book is to show 
how the media cover debates about their policy and the implication for 
their manner of coverage for media reform efforts and democracy at large. 
Having examined how the strategy of “threat to the paradigm” was used 
in the coverage of the media reform debate, the following section dis-
cusses how the strategy of historicisation was used in the debate.
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hisToricisaTion
Historicisation refers to the use of history to strengthen contemporary 
arguments (see Chap. 5). At first glance, it appeared as if within the jour-
nalistic metadiscourse on the press reform debate, the strategy of histori-
cisation was used to relay media self-critique and demonstrate remorse for 
press misconduct. However, a closer look into the journalistic metadis-
course revealed that the strategy was mainly used for dramatic effects; to 
strengthen arguments for or against statutory underpinning of a new press 
regulatory body, and to argue that the present-day British press is better 
than those of the past. First, historicisation was used to emphasise that the 
press got it wrong in the NoTW phone hacking scandal. All parties in the 
debate including the press, victims of the press, victims’ campaigners, the 
Leveson Inquiry and politicians accepted that the press had behaved badly 
with respect to the phone hacking (e.g. see Moore 2011).
Table 6.5 shows that the top three descriptions of the phone hacking in 
the journalistic metadiscourse were “Bad journalism/irresponsible” (40 
per cent), “Criminality” (33.2 per cent) and “Less serious than portrayed” 
Table 6.5 Description of phone hacking
Description of 
phone hacking
Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Unavoidable 0.8 2.3 4.4 1.7 0.0 2.9 1.9
The work of a few 
bad apples in 
journalism
10.6 3.5 6.7 4.2 16.7 25.7 8.5
Anti-democratic 4.1 1.2 4.4 0.0 0.0 2.9 2.1
Bad journalism/
irresponsible
43.1 39.5 46.7 38.1 50.0 22.9 40.0
It is not new to 
journalism
1.6 0.0 2.2 3.4 0.0 0.0 1.6
Less serious than 
portrayed
21.1 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.9 8.9
Criminality 17.9 44.2 28.9 45.8 33.3 22.9 33.2
Demonstrates the 
importance of a 
free press
0.0 4.7 6.7 5.9 0.0 0.0 3.3
Other 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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(8.9 per cent). The least used among the codes provided was “It is not new 
to journalism” which was used in only 1.6 per cent of the study sample. 
Others were “The work of a few bad apples in journalism” (8.5 per cent); 
“Demonstrates the importance of a free press” (3.3 per cent); “Anti-
democratic” (2.1 per cent); “Unavoidable” (1.9 per cent) and “Other” 
(0.5 per cent) (see Table 6.5). Most of these variables will be expatiated in 
Chap. 8. At this stage, it will suffice to point out that these results reveal a 
high frequency of condemnation of the phone hacking scandal and other 
acts of press misconduct in the journalistic metadiscourse.
This acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the press via the strategy of 
historicisation may or may not be for the purpose of self-critique. It can be 
argued that historicisation was used for infotainment rather than self- 
critique. My investigation revealed that all six newspapers in the study 
sample employed historicisation to affirm press bad behaviour and the 
narrative was often entertaining (e.g. see Sabbagh 2011, p. 19). The rea-
sons could be to boost readership or could just be a subconscious urge to 
entertain readers. This affirms the argument that journalists often exag-
gerate dramatic elements in stories in order to enhance their newsworthi-
ness (Galtung and Ruge 1965, cited in Frost 2007; Hall et al. 1978, cited 
in Allan 2010). It also agrees with Stiegler’s (2013, p. 137) assertion that 
during the coverage of media policy debates, the press use negative stories 
as infotainment.
An example is an article by the Guardian newspaper headline “what 
journalistic ‘operators’ got up to in the past”, an excerpt from Keeble and 
Mair’s book The Phone Hacking Scandal: Journalism on Trial (Greenslade 
2012, n.p.). While acknowledging press bad behaviour, the article high-
lighted the “scoop-getting exploits” of journalists in the 1950s–1960s 
which included “composing quotable quotes because interviewees were 
often inarticulate or tongue-tied”; “impersonating a pop group manager 
in a telephone call in order to trap an impresario suspected of taking back- 
handers when booking bands”; obtaining pictures from a police accom-
plice of a house on fire in which an elderly former actress died and using 
the “services of an “earwigger”, a person employed to listen in to police 
radio calls which was arguably an illegal activity” (ibid).
Another way historicisation was used in the coverage of the press reform 
debate, outside acknowledging bad behaviour, was to argue that the 
present- day press is better than the press of yesteryear. For some, it was 
used to argue that phone hacking is not new in the sense of subterfuge 
being used for news stories. It was also used to call attention to the need 
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to check the concentration of media ownership. For instance, the example 
from the Guardian, “what journalistic ‘operators’ got up to in the past” 
(Greenslade 2012, n.p.), not only acknowledged press excesses through 
historicisation but also used the strategy to affirm that the present-day 
press is, to a large extent, better than that of the past as well as to call 
attention to the problem of concentration of media ownership. Though 
there was wide acknowledgement of press misconduct in the journalistic 
metadiscourse, a study of the context within which this was expressed 
showed that the underlying reason for such acknowledgement of wrong 
was often in defence of the press. This explains why despite the fact that 
40 per cent of the study sample described phone hacking as bad and irre-
sponsible journalism, this view emerged as a dominant theme (under the 
name “the press behaved badly”) in only 4.7 per cent of the study sample 
(see Table 6.1).
Historicisation was also used to strengthen arguments for and against 
press reform. All newspapers examined except Guardian used historicisa-
tion to argue against press reform, particularly against the statutory under-
pinning of a new press regulatory body. For example, in a bid to convince 
readers that statutory regulation is not synonymous with good press 
behaviour, the Daily Mail, in an article headlined “Kate’s right to be 
angry. But only King Canute would think privacy laws can hold back this 
tide” argued that the French press despite being bound by constitutional 
right to privacy printed topless pictures of the Duchess of Cambridge 
taken through clandestine means while the British press refrained from 
doing so. The story which used historicisation to argue that the British 
press has improved since the death of princess Diana concluded by saying 
that “the best protection against violation of privacy is self-regulation”.
On the other hand, the Guardian used historicisation to strengthen 
arguments in support of a statutorily backed press regulatory body 
(Robinson et al. 2011, p. 1). While stressing the need for reform, a report 
by the Guardian entitled “Leveson inquiry: Analysis: Calls for new laws 
after evidence that puts the out-of-control paparazzi in the frame” stated:
It was as if nothing had changed in the years since The Sun, the News of the 
World and Hello! announced they had stopped using paparazzi pictures of 
Kate Middleton after she was mobbed outside her house at the time of her 
25th birthday in 2007—or, of course, since Diana died trying to evade the 
photographers at high speed in Paris in 1997. (Sabbagh 2011, p. 19)
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Each sub-interpretive sphere (Guardian as one interpretive sphere and 
the other five newspapers as another) used the strategy of historicisation to 
buttress their stance for or against statutory underpinning of press regula-
tion. This divide in interpretation runs through much of the journalistic 
metadiscourse on the press reform debate that arose from the News of the 
World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry, defying newspaper 
class divisions. A force stronger than newspaper classification shaped the 
debate and that force needs to be investigated to see that it does not rob the 
press of its autonomy to function as a democratic public sphere. If the force 
is commercialism, then arguments for plurality of media ownership would 
need to go beyond concentration of ownership to plurality of business mod-
els because different patterns of funding appear to produce differences in 
interpretations. The issue of media ownership and its possible impact on 
journalistic metacoverage will be examined in greater detail in Chap. 8.
conclUsion
Using statistical data, this chapter showed how the strategies of “threat to 
the paradigm” and “historicisation” were used in the coverage of the 
debate that arose from the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson 
Inquiry. The strategy of historicisation was used to acknowledge press bad 
behaviour while serving more as an element of drama in the journalistic 
metadiscourse. This affirms the argument of scholars who assert that 
debates are often presented as infotainment and with an element of drama, 
for the purpose of entertaining readers and boosting sales (Galtung and 
Ruge 1965, cited in Harcup and O’Neill 2010). Infotainment, depending 
on how it is used, can be detrimental to democracy. It can lead to the 
dumbing down of news and make readers a consumer audience whose 
appetite is assuaged by such coverage, distracting them from active partici-
pation in efforts at reforming the press.
Historicisation was also used to back up arguments that the present-day 
press is better behaved than the press of the 1950s and 1960s. The Sun, 
Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph used the 
strategy to argue against press reform, thus protecting their conceptualisa-
tion of a free press. The Guardian used the strategy to support press 
reforms, challenging the other papers’ neoliberal interpretation of press 
freedom. Historicisation did not feature as a dominant paradigm repair 
strategy in the journalistic metadiscourse on the press reform debate. 
“Threat to the [press freedom] paradigm” was the most prominent 
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strategy used in the coverage. It featured more prominently in The Sun, 
Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph newspapers.
These newspapers used the strategies of “historicisation” and “threat to 
the paradigm” to protect the neoliberal concept of press freedom. Using 
diverse linguistic devices including hyperboles, “you-centeredness”, adjec-
tives and doom-laden rhetoric, they warned that statutory underpinning 
of a press regulator was a slippery slope to licensing of the press and, as 
such, a threat to press freedom. Using the sustenance of democracy as 
their defence, they kicked against statutory underpinning of a new press 
regulatory body warning that a press regulatory body underpinned by 
statute would harm the reputation of the UK. My investigation revealed 
that their interpretation of press freedom was hegemonic in the journalis-
tic discourse on the press reform debate because much of the British press 
advanced this argument.
Though it can be argued that the Guardian served as an alternative 
public in the debate, the Guardian was one out of six national newspa-
pers. There are also questions about whether the Guardian’s counter- 
discourse was in the public interest or was for the protection of its image 
as a crusader (for more on the crusader image see Chap. 8), as the medium 
through which the extent of the scandal came to light. This question 
became more pertinent because of Guardian’s failure to sign up to the 
regulatory body underpinned by statute (the Royal Charter on press regu-
lation), the same body it had encouraged other press organisations to 
embrace. The Guardian’s decision to support the cancellation of the sec-
ond part of the Leveson Inquiry in 2018 (Guardian 2018) also adds 
weight to that suspicion.
It is important for consumers of media coverage of debates about their 
policy to become aware of the ideologies behind the representations and 
the strategies used to advance the various arguments. “Threat to the para-
digm” and “historicisation” are part of that knowledge needed to fully 
comprehend journalistic metadiscourse on media policy debates. An 
understanding of the way the media cover debates about their policy will 
help the public digest the coverage of debates on media policy intelligently 
and push for healthy and effective media reform. Having examined how 
the media used the strategy of “threat to the paradigm” and historicisa-
tion” in this chapter, the following chapter will show how attributions of 
blame for the scandal were represented in the journalistic metadiscourse. 
It will also reveal how the strategies of individualisation, self-assertion and 
minimisation were utilised in press coverage of the debate.
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CHAPTER 7
Paradigm Repair: Bad Apples 
and Self-Assertion
The chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part shows how the 
strategy of individualisation was used to protect the press freedom para-
digm as well as repair the “journalist as a crusader” paradigm which had 
been badly damaged by the phone hacking scandal and the Leveson 
Inquiry. The second part, entitled “Self-Assertion: The Journalist as a 
Crusader”, shows the extent to which journalists affirm their importance 
in journalistic metadiscourse on media policy debates and the effect this 
had and was intended to have on the debate on press regulation. This is 
followed by a discussion on the political economy of the Guardian’s cov-
erage of the phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. I begin by 
analysing the press’ use of the strategy of individualisation in their cover-
age of the media policy debate.
One of the paradigms that journalists often seek to protect in the event 
of a media scandal is the image of the journalist as a crusader, and one way 
they go about trying to repair this paradigm is by distancing themselves 
from the offender (Cecil 2002, p. 55). This can be done at different levels 
or stages of the scandal coverage. The more commonly discussed in journal-
istic metadiscourse is where an organisation distances itself from the journal-
ist alleged to be at fault (ibid.). Such a journalist is often described as a 
“rogue” reporter (Dawes 2013, p.  17; Carlson and Berkowitz 2014, 
p.  403). This ostracising of the “culprit(s)” emerged in the journalistic 
metadiscourse of the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry 
at their early stages (O’Carroll 2012a). News International (now News UK) 
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as an organisation distanced itself from News of the World’s royal editor Clive 
Goodman and private investigator Glen Mulcaire, who were both given jail 
sentences for their role in the scandal (see Chap. 1). The owner Rupert 
Murdoch denied knowledge and the emanating journalistic metadiscourse 
described the culprits as rogue reporters: a few bad apples that should not 
taint the image of a largely good press. For example, The Sun’s article stated:
So far as we know, despite the biggest police inquiry in history, the bad and 
sometimes possibly criminal behaviour that led to the Leveson Inquiry was 
confined to a tiny number of journalists. The innocent majority have been 
tarred by the inquiry …. And a tiny number of incidents of grotesque treat-
ment of ordinary people were examined. They should be set against the 
huge number of cases of ordinary people who have been helped by the 
papers. Rogues are exposed, injustice reversed, wonderful, inspiring achieve-
ments are celebrated every day by papers such as this. (Satchwell 2012, p. 42)
The truth of this claim has since been debunked by revelations few 
years later that The Sun was also involved in phone hacking (Jackson 2016; 
Waterman 2019). In a public question-and-answer session at Oxford 
University in 2019, Lord Justice Leveson said he had known newspaper 
editors were lying to him during the Inquiry. Concerning The Sun, 
he stated:
It is interesting is it not, that The Sun newspaper has paid out millions to 
people who complained that they were hacked by The Sun, although we 
were told [at the Leveson Inquiry] The Sun wasn’t involved at all? (Leveson 
2019, cited in Evans and Johnson 2019, n.p.)
It can, therefore, be argued that the strategy of individualisation was 
being used to protect a neoliberal interpretation of press freedom that 
makes room for the sorts of journalism practice that led to the phone 
hacking scandal. This agrees with Bennett et al.’s (1985) argument that 
“journalistic self-criticism protects existing paradigms rather than con-
fronts entrenched deficiencies and contradictions” (cited in Carlson 2015, 
p. 4). Table 7.1 shows that the strategy of individualisation (also ostracisa-
tion or localisation of bad apples) was employed by all newspapers in the 
study sample. Though it surfaced in only 8.5 per cent of descriptions of 
phone hacking in the study sample, it was used profusely by The Sun news-
paper where it appeared in 25.7 per cent of its descriptions of phone 
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hacking. Despite being owned by the same proprietor as the News of the 
World, The Sun attempted to protect its crusader image and the neoliberal 
interpretations of press freedom by ostracising the culprits. The paper 
described the phone hacking scandal and other acts of press misconduct as 
the failings of a few journalists as discussed earlier and emphasised in this 
statement: “it is vital for our democracy that a free press is protected, 
whatever the failings of a few journalists” (Dunn and Well 2012, p. 6). 
The strategy of individualisation was used in 16.7 per cent of Daily Express; 
10.6 per cent of Guardian; 6.7 per cent of Daily Mirror; 4.2 per cent of 
Daily Telegraph and 3.5 per cent of Daily Mail (see Table 7.1).
Though the setting up of the Leveson Inquiry and the mandate given 
to it to examine the culture, practice and ethics of the press demonstrated 
that the phone hacking scandal was regarded by policymakers and many 
outside the press as a synecdoche deviance (extension of deviancy from the 
individual to the general); synecdoche deviance (Carlson and Berkowitz 
2014, p.  392) was contested in the journalistic metadiscourse that fol-
lowed the phone hacking scandal; and blame was often localised. So, 
unlike in the case of the media coverage of the demise of two US regional 
Table 7.1 Description of phone hacking: bad apples
Description Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Unavoidable 0.8 2.3 4.4 1.7 0.0 2.9 1.9
The work of a few 
bad apples in 
journalism
10.6 3.5 6.7 4.2 16.7 25.7 8.5
Anti-democratic 4.1 1.2 4.4 0.0 0.0 2.9 2.1
Bad journalism/
irresponsible
43.1 39.5 46.7 38.1 50.0 22.9 40.0
It is not new to 
journalism
1.6 0.0 2.2 3.4 0.0 0.0 1.6
Less serious than 
portrayed
21.1 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.9 8.9
Criminality 17.9 44.2 28.9 45.8 33.3 22.9 33.2
Demonstrates the 
importance of a 
free press.
0.0 4.7 6.7 5.9 0.0 0.0 3.3
Other 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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newspapers, Rocky Mountain News and the printed Seattle Post Intelligencer 
where the perceived problem of an individual newspaper was interpreted 
by the press as a reflection of the challenges faced by all newspapers 
(Carlson 2012, p. 267), here the flaw of the News of the World was local-
ised and the journalistic metadiscourse warned that it should not be inter-
preted as the problem of all newspapers. An example is this headline from 
the Daily Express: “Don’t tar all of the press with the same brush” (Forsyth 
2012, p. 17). This raises questions about the self-interestedness of jour-
nalistic metadiscourse. This affirms that news is not a mirror of reality but 
a representation (Hall 1997), a discourse shaped by different interests, and 
this needs to be considered during the consumption of journalistic 
metadiscourse.
As the Leveson Inquiry progressed, the individualisation of the culprit 
advanced beyond persons to groups (Mason 2012, p.  10). Ostracising 
labels such as “sections of the press” and “parts of the media” were used 
to refer to the tabloid press, especially by the quality press (O’Carroll 
2013, n.p.). They were also used by the mid-markets to distance them-
selves from press bad behaviour:
Indeed, this paper has long shared the public’s distaste over the conduct of 
some sections of the Press and since the phone hacking scandal (exposed by 
a newspaper) we have helped draw up plans for a new and much tougher 
regulatory body. (Daily Mail 2012, n.p.)
The phrase “The work of a few bad apples in journalism” in Table 7.1 
shows that though the strategy of individualisation of bad apples has been 
identified by previous studies as a major paradigmatic marker (Cecil 2002) 
and though it featured in all newspapers in the study sample, the strategy 
was used only in 8.5 per cent of descriptions of the NoTW phone hacking 
scandal and other acts of press misconduct in the journalistic metadis-
course. This does not reflect minimal attributions of blame in the repre-
sentation of the press reform debate. Table 7.1 shows that blame was also 
attributed to other institutions in society. To understand the attributions 
of blame in the journalistic metadiscourse of the media policy debate, it is 
important to examine its political economy.
Political economy of the media is the critical approach to media analysis 
that investigates “how media and communication systems and content are 
shaped by ownership, market structures, commercial support, technolo-
gies, labour practices, and government policies” (McChesney 2008, p. 12; 
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Murdock and Golding 2005, cited in Freedman 2014, p. 24). The key 
focus of the political economy approach to analysis is to ascertain whether 
media structures serve to promote or undermine democracy, and to 
explore and recommend ways of ensuring a media structure that enhances 
democracy (Hardy 2014). Using the political economy critique as a frame-
work, I examined the attributions of blame in the coverage to see if exter-
nal factors, such as media ownership, market structures and technology, 
impacted on the way blame was attributed.
Table 7.2 shows that journalists received the highest amount of blame 
for press irresponsibility (28.5 per cent). This agrees with the data in 
Table 7.1 which revealed a high condemnation of press excesses in the 
journalistic metadiscourse. As explained in Chap. 5, this high amount of 
blame attributed to journalists in the journalistic metadiscourse did not 
translate into a high proportion of self-critique, except where the Guardian 
challenged the neoliberal interpretations of press freedom advanced by 
The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph. 
Interestingly, there were more attributions of blame to journalists in the 
Table 7.2 Attributions of blame for press irresponsibility
Attribution of 
blame
Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
The Labour 
government
0.6 0.0 3.2 2.8 0.0 0.0 1.2
The Press 
Complaints 
Commission
48.1 8.6 6.5 11.9 33.3 17.2 25.6
Newspaper 
proprietors
20.6 13.6 12.9 12.8 6.7 3.4 15.1
Job constraints 5.0 1.2 3.2 0.9 13.3 13.8 4.0
Technology (e.g. 
internet)
2.5 4.9 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.0 3.5
The Conservative 
government
0.0 0.0 9.7 4.6 0.0 0.0 1.9
Journalists 8.1 46.9 51.6 40.4 20.0 24.1 28.5
The criminal 
justice system
8.8 17.3 6.5 17.4 26.7 37.9 15.1
Commercialism 3.8 4.9 6.5 1.8 0.0 0.0 3.3
Other 2.5 2.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 3.4 1.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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discursive sphere comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily 
Mail and Daily Telegraph than in the Guardian newspaper. 51.6 per cent 
of blame in the Daily Mirror was attributed to journalists. In Daily Mail, 
it was 46.9 per cent; 40.4 per cent in Daily Telegraph; 24.1 per cent in The 
Sun and 20 per cent in Daily Express, as against 8.1 per cent in Guardian 
(see Table  7.2). The reason for this was that while the Guardian also 
advanced discourses that condemned the phone hacking and other press 
excesses as bad, and while it was also involved in ostracising the culprit, it 
was not as involved in deflecting the blame to other institutions as the 
other newspapers.
The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) came second in the hierar-
chy of attributions of blame receiving 25.6 per cent of blame for press 
misconduct, the highest coming from Guardian (48.1 per cent of its attri-
butions of blame). The PCC was often criticised in the paper for lacking 
the teeth to ensure good press behaviour. The other newspapers were also 
critical of the PCC but to a smaller degree: Daily Express (33.3 per cent) 
The Sun (17.2 per cent), Daily Telegraph (11.9 per cent) and Daily Mail 
(8.6 per cent) (Table 7.2). All newspapers apart from Guardian and Daily 
Express were quick to make excuses for the PCC. The journalistic metadis-
course comprised statements such as “the PCC could not do much to 
prevent some level of press excesses because it lacked the power to do so” 
(Winnett 2012, p. 18); “what is needed is strengthening of the PCC not 
a new press law” (Embley 2012, pp. 8–9) and “a new self-regulatory body 
should be/has been set up that makes up for all the weaknesses of the 
PCC” (Shipman 2013, p. 16).
The sympathy of The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph 
newspapers for the PCC can be attributed to the fact that the chief execu-
tives or owners of these newspapers were members of PressBoF (The Press 
Standards Board of Finance), the funding body of the PCC. The then 
Chairman of PressBoF, Lord Black of Brentwood, was the Executive 
Director of the Telegraph Media Group; Paul Dacre, the then editor-in- 
chief of Associated Newspapers, publishers of Daily Mail, was a former 
Chairman of PressBoF and, at the time, one of its directors; Paul Vickers, 
the then Secretary and Group Legal Director of Trinity Mirror, publishers 
of Daily Mirror, was also one of PressBoF’s directors (Companies House, 
Press Standards Board of Finance 2014).
The Sun’s sympathy towards the PCC was also expected as The Sun’s 
owner, who was also the owner of the defunct News of the World, had often 
been accused of having a powerful influence over the PCC (Davies 2014, 
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p.  18). The then executive chairman of Rupert Murdoch’s News 
International, Les Hinton, who was also known as Murdoch’s right-hand 
man (Guardian 2011), chaired the committee of editors that drew up the 
PCC Code of Practice for several years (Cole and Harcup 2009). As men-
tioned in Chap. 2, the then owner of Daily Express titles, Richard Desmond, 
had pulled his papers out of the PCC following a rebuke from the body in 
2008 (Desmond 2015, p. 291) which may have accounted for the high 
level of condemnation of the PCC in its journalistic metadiscourse. 
Though Alan Rusbridger, the then editor-in-chief of Guardian newspa-
per, was also a member of the PCC Code Committee, he resigned follow-
ing his dissatisfaction with the committee’s handling of the phone hacking 
scandal allegations (Frost 2015, p. 293). So, though all newspapers in the 
study sample agreed that the PCC had fallen short in its regulation of the 
press, the level of attribution of blame reflected each paper’s political and 
economic relationship with the body. It is, therefore, important that con-
sumers of journalistic metadiscourse consider how political economy may 
have impacted on the news they consume about media policy. This is 
important because citizens who employ critical thinking skills in their con-
sumption of journalistic metadiscourse on media reform will be in a better 
position to support as well as initiate effective media reforms.
Still on attributions of blame, “News proprietors” and ‘The Criminal 
justice system’ received the same proportion of blame (15.1 per cent each) 
for press misbehaviour in the journalistic metadiscourse. This makes them 
third in the hierarchy of recipients of blame for press irresponsibility. This 
is interesting because “media ownership” appeared as a dominant theme 
only in 3.4 per cent of the study sample (see Table 7.2). A close look at 
Table 7.2, however, shows that a high proportion of that blame discourse 
emanated from Guardian newspaper—20.6 per cent as against 13.6 per 
cent from Daily Mail, 12.9 per cent from Daily Mirror, 12.8 per cent 
from Daily Telegraph, 6.7 per cent from Daily Express, and the lowest was 
from The Sun—3.4 per cent (see Table 7.2). Whether in defence of democ-
racy or for the security of its media economy, the Guardian newspaper 
attributed much of the blame for press misconduct to news proprietors 
and used such opportunities to advocate for checks on concentration of 
media ownership in the UK.
The Murdoch media empire was mostly, though not exclusively, used as 
an example of the negative consequences of the concentration of media 
ownership in the Guardian’s opinion sections (Williams 2013, p. 35). The 
paper’s moral justification for its critique of the concentration of media 
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ownership was the need to protect democracy by ensuring plurality of 
views in the public sphere and preventing abuse of media power. Very little 
was said about the need to ensure healthy competitiveness among newspa-
pers, though that was of primary concern to the Guardian as we shall see 
later in this chapter. The rhetoric was that democracy will be at risk if 
media ownership concentration is not checked. As can be seen in the 
headline “Comment: Ownership is the key to the corruption of the media: 
Murdoch’s grip on British politics was the product of corporate control of 
the press. Ending it is a democratic necessity”—(Milne 2012, p. 28) and 
in this statement:
The present level of media concentration is one of the reasons the phone 
hacking scandal erupted because the politicians were scared of News 
International and, as the evidence around phone hacking and Leveson 
revealed, News International was scared of nobody. (Williams 2013, p. 35)
All other newspapers (The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail 
and Daily Telegraph) were different in their representation of the debate 
on media ownership. They were less critical of media proprietors and less 
concerned about the concentration of media ownership as shown in 
Table 7.2. For example, Daily Mail newspaper used deflection strategies 
to redirect focus from newspaper proprietors to the ownership patterns of 
the BBC and internet news websites as can be seen in the headline: 
“Google and BBC should face media ownership review rules watchdog” 
(Thomas 2012, n.p.). The article argued that the real threats are technol-
ogy, proprietorship of internet news websites and the dominance of the 
BBC. Arguably, a more in-depth analysis of the impact of the internet on 
print journalism would have added a more robust angle to the debate.
Unlike the Guardian newspaper which urged the Leveson Inquiry to 
pay more attention to media ownership concentration, Daily Mail argued 
that media ownership is not within the Inquiry’s ambit and it ought not 
to have strayed into it. The paper stated:
the inquiry has strayed ‘into issues of policy, such as cross-ownership rules 
which weren’t really appropriate for a judicial inquiry to determine. Those 
are policy questions for ministers and Parliament’. (Martin 2012, n.p.)
Similarly, an examination of the context within which the issue of media 
ownership was discussed in the journalistic metadiscourse revealed that 
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much of the press adopted an angle of discussion that tactically avoided 
the issue of concentration of media ownership: talking about media own-
ers but rarely in connection to concentration of media ownership. Let us, 
for example, examine references to the defunct News of the World’s owner, 
Rupert Murdoch, by the two discursive publics. While Guardian’s meta-
discourse on ownership was very critical of Rupert Murdoch with regard 
to concentration of media ownership and its consequences, The Sun news-
paper reported little on ownership and on Murdoch. It is important to 
note that The Sun is also owned by Rupert Murdoch (see Chap. 2). The 
paper’s discourse on its owner was minimal and far from critical.
For instance, The Sun’s report on Rupert Murdoch’s appearance at the 
Leveson Inquiry was like a narrative (not critical) and a letter of apology 
from Rupert Murdoch (Grant 2012, p. 12), while Guardian’s report on 
the same event was very critical of the media magnate and accused him of 
“selective amnesia” (Greenslade 2012). The closest The Sun got to cri-
tiquing its owner was an acknowledgement by Rupert Murdoch that he 
had failed. To make the aforementioned story more sympathetic, the age 
of Rupert Murdoch was juxtaposed with his apology: “Mr Murdoch, 81, 
admitted that he failed to personally probe the scandal, adding: “I’m very 
sorry” (Grant 2012, p. 12). It can be argued that The Sun’s report was 
constructed to avert the anger of the public against the Murdoch Empire 
in order to regain their patronage. Considering the paper’s tone of lan-
guage towards the failings of other persons (and institutions), such as poli-
ticians and celebrities, it can be argued that The Sun’s representation of 
Murdoch and its minimal discussion on media ownership in the debate 
were the result of conflict of interests. This may have accounted for the 
minimal attribution of blame to newspaper proprietors in The Sun’s meta-
discourse (see Table 7.2).
Not all newspapers in the sub-interpretive sphere to which The Sun 
belongs were as sympathetic as The Sun towards Rupert Murdoch in their 
metadiscourse, though they were not as critical of the media magnate as 
the Guardian. Most of them gave minimal attention to concentration of 
media ownership, preferring to discuss Murdoch in relation to sensational 
issues such as Murdoch’s chief Rebekah Brooks’ love affair with another of 
his former staff, Andy Coulson which spanned two pages (1371 words—
Nexis UK) in the Daily Mirror (Shaw 2013, pp. 4–5). Rupert Murdoch 
was also mentioned by newspapers in this sub-interpretive sphere in rela-
tion to the unfolding of the scandal, the amount of trouble he was in and 
so on, but rarely in connection to an analysis of the consequences of 
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concentration of media ownership (Flanagan 2012, p. 4; McTague 2012, 
pp. 10–11).
There were sympathies for Rupert Murdoch and even for the defunct 
News of the World in some of the newspapers in sub-interpretive sphere 
comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily 
Telegraph (Glover 2013, n.p.). Of all the remaining four papers in this 
sphere (apart from The Sun), Daily Mail was more sympathetic towards 
the media mogul and his titles, at times defending him and criticising 
attacks on him by politicians, Guardian and the BBC (Slack and Doyle 
2013). The Daily Telegraph was closest to Guardian in writing critical 
comments about Rupert Murdoch. In all, The Sun’s coverage of owner-
ship and its owner agrees with arguments in previous studies that media 
organisations downplay and give limited coverage to views that are critical 
of their owners (McChesney 2008). This is a type of silent strategy, as if to 
say, “just don’t discuss it” or “give minimal coverage to the issue that is 
not perceived to be in your best interest”.
As Bachrach and Barataz (1962, p. 948, cited in Freedman 2014, p. 66) 
rightly noted, the exercise of power also involves “the ability to prevent 
potentially dangerous ideas from being raised” (cited in Freedman 2014, 
p.  66). Congruently, all newspapers apart from Guardian used their 
agenda-setting and gatekeeping powers to keep out from the public sphere 
discussions on concentration of media ownership. Freedman (2014, 
pp. 72–73) stressed the need to identify forces that are responsible for 
silences that permeate media policy. Though some may argue that media 
ownership did not take a prime place in the Leveson Report and as such it 
may not be out of place to talk less about it in the press, but as Hackett 
(2005, p. 90) observed, the media should not stop at transmitting debates 
but should also initiate relevant subjects for discussion. The Guardian 
newspaper did this when it critiqued the sparse treatment of the issue of 
media ownership at the Leveson Inquiry (Evans 2012, p. 47). As we shall 
discuss later in this chapter, the Guardian’s coverage of the issue is also 
not free from query.
The way the press covered the issue of concentration of media owner-
ship during the debate may be connected to their ownership patterns. As 
discussed in Chap. 2, all newspapers in the sub-interpretive sphere to 
which The Sun belongs are commercially owned and are involved in vary-
ing degrees of concentration of media ownership (Cole and Harcup 2009; 
News UK 2015; DMG Media 2017; Telegraph Media Group 2017). The 
Guardian also has a stake in media ownership; this will be explained later 
in this chapter. Some proprietors of newspaper also have publications in 
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large and small quantities outside the UK (see Chap. 2). That possibly 
explains why even though only three companies (News UK, Daily Mail 
Group and Reach) dominate 83 per cent of Britain’s national newspapers 
(Media Reform Coalition 2019), media ownership emerged as a dominant 
theme in only 3.4 per cent of the journalistic metadiscourse on the press 
reform debate that followed the News of the World phone hacking scandal 
(see Table 7.2).
It can be argued that commercial interests influenced the interpreta-
tions and discourses advanced by the press on the issue of media owner-
ship. This confirms that media organisations give minimal coverage to 
arguments that they perceive are not in their interest (Stiegler 2013, 
p. 137). The consequence of this for democracy is that it removes from 
public debates the issue of concentration of media ownership, thus pre-
venting opportunities for deliberations that can lead to the creation of 
policies to guarantee plurality of views and media ownership. It gives the 
press enormous powers that can be exploited for commercial gain to the 
detriment of larger society. Such powers can mean that citizens are at the 
mercy of media owners, and that includes their privacy and the informa-
tion they receive because nothing against media owners is tabled for dis-
cussion in the public sphere. Freedman (2014, p.  73) described such 
silences “as a socially constructed phenomenon that reflects the unequal 
distribution of power in society”. Jansen (1991, p. 134, cited in Freedman 
2014, p. 73) argues that “media policy silences” are constructing forces 
that attempt to “render the system of control of industrial capitalism 
extremely resistant to criticism”. Such information hoarding can also 
reduce trust between the media and the public, especially when the public 
get to know of such omissions. It can also leave media owners unchecked 
and create in them a culture of impunity.
As previously stated, Table  7.2 also shows that “the criminal justice 
system” received as much blame for press irresponsibility as “News propri-
etors” (15.1 per cent). The quantity of attributions of blame to the crimi-
nal justice system were more in the sub-interpretive sphere made up of The 
Sun, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph than in Guardian. The 
Sun contained the highest percentage of blame for the criminal justice 
system than any other newspaper in the study sample (37.9 per cent). 
Daily Express followed with 26.7 per cent, Daily Telegraph with 17.4 per 
cent and Daily Mail with 17.3 per cent. Attributions of blame to the 
criminal justice system were also found in 8.8 per cent of Guardian news-
paper and in 6.5 per cent of Daily Mirror’s. An examination of the context 
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within which these attributions of blame to the criminal justice system 
were made revealed that they functioned differently in each of the discur-
sive spheres.
In the sphere comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily 
Mail and Daily Telegraph, the press used deflection strategies to re-direct 
blame for press misbehaviour to the criminal justice system, thereby exon-
erating themselves from blame and protecting their crusader and press 
freedom paradigms. These papers advanced the argument that phone 
hacking is a criminal offence that can be checked by existing laws. Ironically, 
newspapers in this sub-interpretive sphere were at the forefront of argu-
ments against the second phase of the Leveson Inquiry which was to focus 
on the relationship between the press and the police (Bond 2017). A pos-
sible reason could be that more investigation into the scandal may further 
incriminate the press. Howbeit, their trend of discourse accounted for the 
high proportion of descriptions of phone hacking as “criminal” in 
Table  7.1, and it culminated in claims that the failure of the police to 
reveal the extent of the phone hacking scandal revealed failings on the part 
of the criminal justice system rather than failings on the part of the press 
(McKinstry 2012, p. 14; Luckhurst 2012, p. 25), and that it was a vibrant 
press that exposed the extent of the scandal, not the criminal justice sys-
tem. An article written by a former editor of the Daily Telegraph and the 
Evening Standard and published by the Daily Mail stated:
Somewhere, Leveson lost his way in the course of his inquiry, which he 
allowed to roam untethered across the landscape for many months in a fash-
ion quite unworthy of a competent judge. Above all, he fails to understand 
that the central issue, that illegal phone-hacking and thus gross breaches of 
privacy reflected not a lapse of Press ethics, but large-scale criminality. The 
only organisation that ever was, or ever will be, capable of investigating such 
behaviour is the police. It was Scotland Yard’s failure to probe misconduct 
at News International properly in its review of the investigation in 2009 that 
allowed wrongdoing to continue for so long. (Hastings 2012, n.p.)
The papers in this sphere said that based on these arguments, there is 
no need to change the status quo of press self-regulation, neither was 
there any need for the Leveson Inquiry (this was before the setting up of 
the “Leveson-compliant” IPSO). The Daily Express stated:
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THE absurdity of the entire Leveson business is that we never needed the 
expensive inquiry in the first place, for the behaviour of a minority of jour-
nalists was already against the law. The problem was not an absence of state 
regulation but an initial failure of enforcement by the police. (McKinstry 
2012, p. 14)
As previously stated, arguments relating to the criminal justice system 
featured in 8.8 per cent of articles in Guardian newspaper but was inter-
preted differently. The Guardian used its editorial pages to critique the 
other newspapers’ blame on the criminal justice system. It attempted to 
redirect blame back to the press by pointing out that the failure of the 
police force to reveal that phone hacking was widespread at News of the 
World was the result of an unhealthy relationship between the police force 
and the media (Guardian 2013, p. 34).
It is worthy of note that the discursive public comprising all newspapers 
except Guardian did not totally absolve themselves of all blame. It was 
largely accepted in the journalistic metadiscourse of the debate that fol-
lowed the NoTW phone hacking scandal that the media had behaved badly 
and that there was a need for press regulatory reform. For instance, in one 
of its opinion articles, Daily Mirror stated that “the excesses and criminal 
behaviour of parts of the media over the past few years created an unan-
swerable case for reform” (Daily Mirror 2013, p. 8). This was before it 
was discovered that Daily Mirror was also involved in phone hacking 
(Trinity Mirror 2015). A similar article from Daily Telegraph stated:
Regulation could not have prevented the hacking scandal; this was a crimi-
nal not a regulatory matter, but the PCC failed to draw attention to it after 
the event. So, no change is not an option. There must be effective regula-
tion of the press. A new self-regulatory system must have powers to investi-
gate wrongdoing and to summon journalists and their editors to give 
evidence …. Above all, it must be independent from government, Parliament 
and state. (Luckhurst 2012, p. 25)
However, there was to a small degree the discourse of total exonera-
tion. This discourse absolved the press of all blame in the phone hacking 
scandal and argued that there was no need for press reform. Those who 
advanced such views argued that a little privacy invasion is the hazard of a 
free press (Hume 2013, p. 32). It is important for consumers of journalis-
tic metadiscourse to understand that the purpose of these self-exoneration 
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strategies (individualisation, bad apples, localisation, ostracisation or 
deflection) was to repair the “journalist as a crusader” and “press free-
dom” paradigms, which had come into question as a result of the phone 
hacking scandal. In sum, blame was first accepted and then deflected to 
others including other journalists (a few bad journalists), other media 
organisations (sections of the press) and other institutions (criminal justice 
system). This made the wide acknowledgement of wrongdoing in the 
journalistic metadiscourse, and especially the high attribution of blame to 
journalists, appear hypocritical. This affirms that journalistic metadiscourse 
is highly defensive and characterised by a lack of self-critique (Haas 2006, 
cited in Carlson 2015, p. 9).
The lack of self-critique in the coverage of media policy can be attrib-
uted to the prioritisation profit, including power of influence, over the 
public interest. It is worthy of note that newspaper proprietors do not only 
seek financial profit but also influence (Freedman 2014). Ownership of 
newspapers give the owners enormous amount of influence, especially 
when they have a high readership. Control of the representation of issues 
to many readers empowers them to make demands of politicians in 
exchange for favourable coverage (ibid.). As both financial gain and power 
of influence can be directly or indirectly achieved through high readership, 
gaining a good image before the readership through self-defence and lack 
of self-critique becomes important to the press. In this regard, journalism 
is treated as a commodity.
“Journalism as a commodity” implies that everyone of its coverage will 
be weighed against its ability to generate profit for the company. Any rep-
resentation that would not generate profit for the newspaper must be 
done away with. In this perspective, sustaining democracy is secondary. 
Democracy can be enhanced only if it generates profit (be it financial or 
clout) for the paper. This agrees with Habermas’ (1989, pp. 189–193) 
conceptualisation of a degenerated public sphere where commercial inter-
est merged with the interests of policymakers to turn the public sphere 
from a democratic forum for public debate into a capitalist haven where 
prioritisation of profit and readership became the order of the day.
Congruently, “commercialism” and political leaders (Labour and 
Conservative governments) received only minor attributions of blame in 
the coverage. Table 7.2 shows that political leaders received only 3.1 per 
cent of the blame for press irresponsibility; of that amount 1.9 per cent 
was attributed to the Conservatives (the government in power at the time 
of the NoTW phone hacking scandal) and 1.2 per cent to the Labour 
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government (the opposition party). Commercialism received only 3.3 per 
cent of attributions of blame. No blame was attributed to commercialism 
in The Sun and Daily Express newspapers, and it was blamed for press irre-
sponsibility in only 6.5 per cent of Daily Mirror; 4.9 per cent of Daily 
Mail; 3.8 per cent of Guardian and 1.8 per cent of Daily Telegraph (see 
Table 7.2). This appears to be very much like the silent treatment given to 
the issue of media ownership.
Another area that received less mention than I expected was attribution 
of blame to job constraints of print journalism, especially the constraints 
brought about by the emergence of digital technology. Table 7.2 shows 
that “job constraint” and “technology” received only 4 per cent and 3.5 
per cent of attributions of blame, respectively. Considering the decline in 
the sale of newspapers due to the flow of traffic of both readers and adver-
tisers to online platforms following the emergence of the internet (Allan 
2006, pp. 1–4) and 24-hour news which is arguably a major cause of press 
irresponsibility, one would have expected a sizeable proportion of blame 
to go to technology and the impact of job constraints on print journalism. 
This demonstrates that the debate could have been more robust.
Fenton (2011, n.p.) argues that ethics get thrown to the wind when the 
market comes under pressure. The debate that emerged from the phone 
hacking and the Leveson Inquiry would have been a veritable platform to 
discuss possible ways of tackling this and other challenges, but the focus of 
the debate was too narrow—a zero-sum game of statutory or no statutory 
underpinning of a new press regulator; most other arguments, including 
the warnings of threat to press freedom, emanated from these. Thus, very 
little room was left for deliberation on other issues of concern. Carlson 
(2012, p.  267) spoke of instances where rather than brainstorm on a 
future business model for the printed press, perceived threat to the printed 
press paradigm was “repaired” by re-asserting the “importance and supe-
riority” of the printed press over other forms, especially forms of online 
news. The strategy of self-assertion is another way the media tried to pro-
tect news paradigms in their coverage of the debate that followed the 
NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. How it went 
about doing this is the focus of the next section.
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Self-ASSertion: the JournAliSt AS A CruSAder
Previous chapters have shown how the press used the paradigm strategies 
of “historicisation”, “threat to the paradigm” and “individualisation” to 
cover the debate that arose from the News of the World phone hacking 
scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. This chapter discusses how the paradigm 
strategy of self-assertion was used to repair the “press freedom” and “jour-
nalist as a crusader” paradigms and the implication of this type of cover-
age. The strategy of self-assertion refers to a trend in journalistic 
metadiscourse where the press repairs its paradigm by asserting its impor-
tance without taking steps to evaluate or make changes to the paradigm 
where necessary (Thomas and Finneman 2014, p. 172).
Table 7.3 (an excerpt from Table 6.1) shows that the strategy of self- 
assertion (written as press achievements) was used by all newspapers in the 
study sample but emerged as the dominant theme in only 2.4 per cent of 
the coverage: Daily Express (7.1 per cent), Daily Mail (6.9 per cent), Daily 
Telegraph (1.5 per cent), Daily Mirror (2.0 per cent), The Sun (1.0 per 
cent) and Guardian (0.6 per cent). A look at the context of usage revealed 
that in most cases, the strategy of self-assertion was a sub-theme (not a 
Table 7.3 Dominant theme in the study sample: self-assertion
Dominant theme Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Threat to press 
freedom
11.5 13.3 25.5 18.1 35.7 62.5 20.6
Support for new 
press’ own 
regulatory system
1.5 4.6 3.9 2.5 3.6 4.2 2.9
Against politicians’ 
Royal Charter
2.8 4.0 3.0 3.1 2.9
Against press law/
statutory 
underpinning
4.0 12.7 9.8 6.0 10.7 5.2 6.9
Press achievements 0.6 6.9 2.0 1.5 7.1 1.0 2.4
Against self- 
regulation of the 
press
0.9 0.6 0.5
Support for 
Leveson Inquiry
10.5 7.8 2.5 7.1 3.1 5.5
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dominant theme), used as a means to an end. In the sub-interpretive 
sphere consisting of The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and 
Daily Telegraph, it was often used to warn that the press would no longer 
be able to fulfil its crusader role if it was regulated by statute and that this 
would pose a risk to press freedom and ultimately endanger democracy. 
Such stories had “threat to press freedom” or arguments “against statu-
tory underpinning” as the dominant theme.
For example, Daily Mirror used the strategy of self-assertion to accen-
tuate the importance of a free press. In an article headlined “The key to a 
fair and free press is the difference between two Royal Charters”, the 
paper wrote:
The Daily Mirror is committed to high-quality journalism in the public 
interest giving the working people of Britain a voice in the corridors of 
power. We are proud that the Mirror, by breaking the alibi of club doorman 
Levi Bellfield, helped put the killer of Surrey schoolgirl Milly Dowler behind 
bars. (Daily Mirror 2013, p. 8)
By asserting its worth and stressing the importance of a free press, Daily 
Mirror attempted to garner support for the newspapers’ plan for a Royal 
Charter for press regulation which was later rejected by the government 
(BBC News 2013), while condemning the cross-party Royal Charter on 
press regulation because it was underpinned by statute. As previously 
stated, all newspapers apart from Guardian interpreted any regulation 
underpinned by statute as an impediment to investigative journalism and, 
as such, a threat to press freedom. They argued that the achievements of 
the press would not have been possible under a regulatory system under-
pinned by statute. This article from Daily Express states this clearly:
His [Leveson] mission was not to ban hacking. It was to procure the end of 
investigative journalism (I will call it IJ) …. Needless to say the establish-
ment loathes IJ with a passion and has lusted for years after a way of crip-
pling it. Leveson, a pillar of the establishment like all judges, delivered the 
methodology. (Forsyth 2013, p. 17)
As with other discourses advanced by The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily 
Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph, Guardian countered the argu-
ments these newspapers made with the use of the strategy of self- affirmation 
(O’Carroll 2012b) and then used the same strategy to repair its crusader 
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paradigm. The Guardian newspaper attempted to repair its crusader 
image that had received a dent due to the revelation at the Leveson Inquiry 
that the News of the World did not delete Milly Dowler’s voicemail mes-
sages as the paper had claimed in its publication. The report to correct that 
mistake began by praising Guardian newspaper as can be seen in the head-
line “Leveson report: Judge addresses Guardian’s story on hacking of 
Milly Dowler’s phone: Report praises paper’s public interest journalism, 
NoW probably did not delete voicemail messages” (Booth 2012, p. 15). 
The correction was only a sub-theme in that story. Predominantly, the 
story highlighted the bravado of Guardian in exposing the extent of the 
scandal, how correct the bulk of the story was and other heroic acts 
achieved by Guardian newspaper in the past.
Both sub-interpretive spheres (Guardian versus The Sun, Daily Mirror, 
Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph) employed the strategy of 
self-assertion (also self-affirmation or self-justification) as sub-themes 
aimed at repairing the “journalist as a crusader” paradigm. It can be 
argued that this quest to repair the crusader paradigm was more in the 
interest of the press than for the selfless purpose of comforting and reas-
suring the public that they have in the press, a defender, and a protector of 
democracy. In this light, the quest of The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, 
Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph to repair their crusader paradigm may not 
be unrelated to a desire to protect their commercial interests. As stated 
earlier, all the newspapers in this sub-interpretive sphere are commercially 
owned. Commercial newspapers need high readership figures to attract 
advertisers (Klaehn 2010, p. 28). Repairing this paradigm helps to retain 
the patronage of their readers, thereby enabling high readership figures 
which will secure the profit they make from the sale of the newspapers as 
well as preserve their power of influence and the patronage of advertisers 
(ibid.). Unlike the other newspapers, the ownership structure of the 
Guardian is different; it is funded by the Scott Trust Ltd (Guardian Media 
Group 2015). The question this raises is, “could it be that ownership and 
funding patterns are the determining factor of how debates on media pol-
icy are represented”? The next section attempts to initiate a debate on this 
by exploring the political economy of Guardian’s coverage of the press 
reform debate.
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PolitiCAl eConomy of Guardian’S CoverAge 
of the PreSS reform debAte
As explained earlier, political economy is a media analysis critique that 
investigates “how media and communication systems and content are 
shaped by” ownership structures, government policies and technology, 
amongst others (Murdock and Golding 2005, cited in Freedman 2014, 
p. 24). I investigated the political economy of Guardian newspaper by 
examining the paper’s ownership structure. Guardian newspaper is a sub-
sidiary of Guardian Media Group (GMG) which is owned by Scott Trust 
Ltd, formerly Scott Trust until 2008 (Guardian Media Group 2015, n.p.). 
Unlike other newspapers in my study sample, the Scott Trust is the only 
shareholder of Guardian Media Group (Forgan 2016). The Scott Trust 
does not distribute dividends; its profits are ploughed back into journalism 
(Forgan 2016). Though Scott Trust Ltd is responsible for appointing the 
editor of the Guardian, it has a policy of not interfering with the newspa-
per’s content. The paper claims to safeguard journalistic independence 
and liberal values and argues that its ownership structure (having no share-
holder order than the Scott Trust) makes the paper more accountable to 
its readers (ibid.). One line of argument is that the ownership structure of 
the Guardian facilitated, amongst others, the role the paper played in 
exposing the extent of the phone hacking scandal. This argument is 
strengthened by the fact that it welcomed external intervention in press 
regulation exemplified by its support for statutory underpinning of a new 
press regulator, its support for the Leveson Inquiry, its support for victims 
of the scandal and its advancement of the arguments of victims’ 
campaigners.
Comparing the journalistic metadiscourse of the two spheres, it appears 
Guardian’s coverage of the press reform debate fits better into the image 
of “the journalist as a crusader” and a selfless protector of that paradigm. 
However, that view is contestable. A different line of argument is that 
Guardian newspaper is not a selfless protector of the crusader paradigm 
for three main reasons. Firstly, Guardian newspaper is not as completely 
free of corporate interests as it appears (Klaehn 2010; Guardian Media 
Group 2015). The steps it took to expose the extent of the scandal and 
deflect blame for press bad behaviour may have been premised on its need 
to sustain readership (and power of influence) and take up a powerful 
position in the media market. As Klaehn (2010, p. 28) argued, Guardian 
“is very much part of the business world and establishment …. It is part of 
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the competitive media industry and plays politics to gain clout and reader-
ship” (ibid.).
As previously stated, Scott Trust Ltd, funders of Guardian, is the owner 
of Guardian Media Group (GMG), a business enterprise (Ahmed, cited in 
Cook 2015). Their portfolio of investments includes Ascential plc, “a 
global business-to-business media company listed on the London Stock 
Exchange” (Ascential 2017). Though the company claims that its invest-
ments are there “to secure the financial and editorial independence of the 
Guardian” (Cole and Harcup 2009, p. 77; Scott Trust 2016), it can be 
argued that Guardian may have felt threatened by Rupert Murdoch’s 
media empire and the likelihood of it winning the bid for the remaining 
60.9 per cent of shares in BskyB (it already owned 39.1 per cent of the 
shares) (BBC News 2010) and the detrimental effect that would have on 
their paper’s power and popularity. Guardian’s publication of the News of 
the World’s hacking of Millie Dowler’s voicemail was done at the peak of 
negotiations on the bids. The paper’s fears about its place in the media 
market can be confirmed from its publication headlined “BskyB bid: 
Cautious Hunt set to reject approach from Murdoch”. The article stated:
At issue is whether News Corporation’s buyout of BSkyB would lead to the 
creation of a media company that with £7.5bn of UK turnover is so large 
that rival newspapers and broadcasters are progressively unable to compete. 
Objectors to the deal include an unlikely alliance of the owners of Daily 
Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph and Guardian, who argue that the tie-
 up would lead to a loss of “media plurality” in the UK. (Sabbagh 2010, n.p.)
Let me pause here to mention that the focus of this analysis is not to 
give a moral judgement on whether or not it was right for Rupert Murdoch 
to bid for complete ownership of BskyB, but to show that it is possible 
that Guardian’s coverage of the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the 
debate that followed it could have been inspired by a neoliberal ideology 
(to protect its business from market failure) rather than a quest to liberate 
the masses and protect democracy. That may explain why the Guardian 
newspaper did not sign up to the regulatory body underpinned by statute 
(as of 2020) even though the paper advocated for the press to sign up to 
it in its journalistic metadiscourse. It may also be that though other news-
papers such as the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror and Daily Telegraph were not 
in support of the deal, they could not adopt the “the crusader role” 
employed by the Guardian because they may have been practising the 
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same dark arts as News of the World (as has been revealed in the case of 
Trinity Mirror and The Sun), or because it could affect their profit in some 
other ways.
This line of argument is further strengthened by the Guardian’s sup-
port for the cancellation of the second phase of the Leveson Inquiry which 
was to investigate the relationship between the press and the police 
(Guardian 2018). Having played the crusader role in its coverage of the 
first part of the Leveson Inquiry, many expected the Guardian to advocate 
for Leveson 2 to take place, but the paper disappointed many including 
campaigners for media reform, some victims of press abuse and several 
academics when it published its position in an opinion article, headlined 
“The Guardian view on Leveson part two: look ahead, not behind”. In 
this article, the paper supported the government’s position that the cul-
ture, practice and ethics of the press can be improved and journalism in 
the public interest can be promoted without recourse to the second part 
of the Leveson Inquiry (Guardian 2018). This decision of the Guardian 
was tagged an act of betrayal by campaigners of media reform including 
some academics (Jukes 2016; Cathcart 2018; Guardian 2018b).
But was that an act of betrayal or another phase of Guardian’s contin-
ued tactics to promote its media economy? By using the word “betrayal”, 
the critics of Guardian’s position on Leveson 2 assume the paper had 
played the crusader role in its coverage of Leveson 1. Maybe it did that to 
an extent, but my investigation reveals some cracks in this image of the 
Guardian as the crusader. The paper’s underlying concern appears to be 
the protection of its media economy. This concern resurfaced during 
Guardian’s defence of its position on Leveson 2. Employing the strategy 
of threat to press freedom in a way that it had previously condemned, the 
paper highlighted what it believed should be the government’s focus in 
the place of Leveson 2:
The concentration of power in the hands of a few tech and press barons is a 
menace to society. Media plurality rules should be used to defuse this threat. 
Journalists must be responsible for standards and ethics but it is wrong to 
think a state body should hold the exercise of power by the press to account. 
(Guardian 2018, n.p.)
By 2018, the Guardian had begun to use the rhetoric it condemned in the 
past to protect its media economy. Note also that a problem to the press 
was again represented as a problem to the public, a menace to society. 
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Though it can be argued that the change in the paper’s editorial position 
was the result of a change in the editor-in-chief of the paper—Alan 
Rusbridger was replaced by Katharine Viner in 2015 (Guardian 2015)—
there are still reasons to suspect that the Guardian may not have been a 
selfless crusader in the media reform debate. It can, therefore, be argued 
that in both interpretive spheres, the underlying motivation was neither a 
defence for democracy nor a reassurance to the public that, in journalism, 
they have a crusader who is there to protect them from opportunistic poli-
ticians but rather that the motivation was market-driven, a move to secure 
their media economy. In this neoliberal setting, profit is primary; democ-
racy may or may not be a by-product (it could be if it generates profit). 
This raises serious questions about the capability of the media to serve as 
a democratic public sphere in debates about media reform. Some form of 
external intervention, free of such levels of self-interest, would be needed 
to ensure that the media serves as a democratic public sphere in debates 
about their policy.
ConCluSion
The way the strategies of individualisation and self-assertion were used in 
the coverage of the press reform debate that followed the NoTW phone 
hacking scandal reveals that the media highly value the paradigm of the 
“the journalist as a crusader” (the voice of the voiceless; the hero who 
fights for the good of the less privileged). The reason being the ability of 
the crusader persona to earn the press high patronage which is essential for 
both political and commercial power. This explains why much effort was 
put into protecting this image. Although there are times when journalists 
fulfil this role (Bernstein and Woodward 1974; BBC News 2011), in the 
coverage of the media policy debate, claims to this status was more of an 
act of image laundry; the strategy of self-assertion is the tool used to 
achieve this. The two sub-interpretive spheres (Guardian versus other 
newspapers examined) examined used it for that purpose. It is important 
for consumers of journalistic metadiscourse to bear this in mind when they 
consume debates about media policy especially when such debates follow 
a scandal involving the media.
Another important finding was that the journalistic metadiscourse fea-
tured high acknowledgement of guilt which did not translate into self- 
critique. It can, therefore, be argued that the high acknowledgement of 
guilt in the journalistic metadiscourse was a Public Relations (PR) stunt. 
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Acknowledgement of guilt is used as a PR technique when offence is obvi-
ous and the offender attempts to attract mercy by playing the role of “the 
repentant sinner”. Number 6 of Forbes’ 13 golden rule of PR crisis man-
agement says, “first apologise, then take action”. For more on how accep-
tance of guilt is used as a crisis management strategy, see Moon and Rhee 
(2012; Hearit 2006). So, when consuming journalistic metadiscourse, it is 
important to be aware of the fact that attributions of blame could be a 
crisis management strategy; whether or not the apologies are sincere can 
be deciphered from the action that follows. In the case of the journalistic 
metadiscourse on the debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking 
scandal, apologies were followed by deflection of the blame to others 
including to other new organisations, other journalists and other institu-
tions. The strategy of individualisation (also ostracisation) was used to 
achieve this. A culprit is identified and condemned as a bad apple who 
should not be allowed to tarnish the crusader image of journalists; usually 
the good journalists are the group to which the writer belongs or sup-
ports. As stated earlier, individualising labels such as “parts of the media”, 
“sections of the press” or “rogue reporter” were used by the different 
newspapers to distance themselves from the culprit(s) as part of efforts to 
protect the crusader image and argue against stringent press reform.
This book argues that while the acknowledgement of guilt is a wel-
comed response, deflection of blame should be replaced by media self- 
critique. The action that follows such acknowledgement of guilt needs to 
be significant enough to ensure high press standards. However, the fear of 
losing economic and political power has kept the media from submitting 
itself to any significant action that will lead to change. While in PR crisis 
management strategy the action needs to be significant enough to con-
vince their customers that the crisis would not repeat itself, in the case of 
media misconduct, individualisation is used to convince the readers that 
there is need for only little or no change, giving the impression that the 
change does not have to be significant because the bad egg has been 
removed or taken care of. What the public need to realise is that this per-
formance of the press is to gain their patronage—they are the ones being 
courted. Failure to understand this can lead to public patronage of press 
arguments on media policy that can wreck their lives. In Chap. 8, I expand 
on how the public can play a role in media reform. The next chapter shows 
us more of how the media cover debates about themselves using the strat-
egy of minimisation.
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CHAPTER 8
Minimisation: The Pizza Charter
Media scholars have observed that mainstream newspapers trivialise and 
denigrate efforts at ensuring press accountability, in a bid to protect their 
self-interest (McChesney 2008, p. 451). It is this trivialisation and deni-
gration of attempts at reforming media policy that is referred to as the 
strategy of minimisation. In the media reform debate that arose from the 
News of the World phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry, the 
strategy of minimisation emerged in discourses that cast doubts on the 
legitimacy of the Leveson Inquiry through allegations of conflicts of inter-
est, revenge, lack of objectivity and neutrality, and through the use of the 
character smear technique. All these were geared towards protecting the 
neoliberal interpretation of press freedom. Minimisation refers to a trend 
in journalistic metadiscourse where the media downplays a wrongdoing or 
an alleged wrongdoing as part of efforts to protect a press paradigm. The 
strategy of minimisation was used by all newspapers examined but fea-
tured more prominently in the sub-interpretive sphere comprising The 
Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph. It mani-
fested in a number of ways: (1) playing down the cross-party Royal Charter 
on press regulation, (2) playing down the Leveson Inquiry, (3) playing 
down the scandal, (4) in a discourse of “unfair” treatment of the press and 
(5) critiquing critics of the press’ position.
Following negotiations that led to the final drafting of a Royal Charter 
on press regulation which saw the charter being underpinned by statute, 
the press (apart from the Guardian), obviously displeased by the 
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outcome, sought to undermine the decision by portraying the meeting as 
unserious and unfair: “Unfair” because, according to newspapers in this 
sphere, Hacked Off, the campaign group for victims of press abuse, was 
invited to the meeting and the press was not (Forsyth 2012, p. 12); and 
“Unserious” because, according to them, the meeting took place around 
2am and they had pizza for refreshment. The emerging journalistic meta-
discourse in all newspapers apart from Guardian undermined the meeting 
because of the resultant Royal Charter underpinned by statute. As if in 
collaboration, one with another, they all were careful to point out that the 
meeting was over a pizza meal:
• This week, the Queen will be told to approve a shabby Royal Charter, 
stitched up at a secret 2am pizza party in Ed Miliband’s office by 
party leaders and Hacked Off vigilantes. (Kavanagh 2013c, 
p. 8—The Sun)
• No wonder the New York Times, perhaps the world’s most respected 
newspaper, opposed this state Royal Charter, agreed in a late night 
pizza stitch-up by politicians and a pressure group, with the press 
excluded. (Daily Mirror 2013, p. 8)
• To date, there has been no compromise at all. The Royal Charter 
currently before Parliament is unchanged from the deal agreed by 
Mr Grant’s friends over pizza in March. (Slack 2013, n.p.—Daily Mail)
• But the useless article who, munching a pizza at 2am in a closed 
room with the above, gave 300 years of press freedom away with a 
whimper was David Cameron’s “strategic adviser” Oliver Letwin, 
another Old Etonian and apparently, a born capitulator. (Forsyth 
2013, p. 15—Daily Express)
• They were cobbled together late at night over pizza and Kit-Kats 
with no thought for the legal and constitutional issues involved. 
(Mason 2013, p. 27—Daily Telegraph)
By playing down the meeting, the press sought to undermine the deci-
sion reached in that meeting and warn of the threat such a decision posed 
to press freedom and that it would ultimately prove harmful to democracy. 
As with most other arguments advanced by this sub-interpretive sphere, 
the Guardian newspaper condemned their coverage of the negotiations. 
Media commentator/City University’s Emeritus Professor of journalism 
Roy Greenslade published in the Guardian a rebuttal by the Hacked Off’s 
Executive Director, Brian Cathcart, in which Professor Cathcart dismissed 
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the pizza charter story as “another silly myth” stressing that no pizzas 
were served at the meeting and Hacked Off was invited in “to honour the 
prime minister’s promise to hear the views of victims” (Cathcart 2013 
cited by Greenslade 2013). By labelling the meeting a pizza and kit-kat 
gathering, the press sought to de-legitimise the Royal Charter on press 
self-regulation by representing the negotiations that led to its final draft-
ing as unserious and unfair. Another way the press used the strategy of 
minimisation to advance their position in the press reform debate was by 
describing measures aimed at reforming the press as revenge. How they 
did this will be the focus of the next section.
Press Freedom Under AttAck: PoliticiAns 
seek revenge?
“Snub the press charter … it’s a monstrous folly by politicians out for 
revenge: Boris slams gag on newspapers” is a headline from Daily Mirror 
that summarises the discourse of minimisation we shall discuss in this sec-
tion (McTague 2013, p. 24). Attempts by politicians to reform the press 
have often been interpreted as “political self-interest” (Putnis 2000, 
p. 110). Table 8.1 shows that this strategy, which is referred to as “retribu-
tion” on the table, featured in 6.1 per cent of the coverage. Though this 
may seem small when compared with the use of some other descriptions, 
for example “threat to press freedom” (27.8 per cent), it is important to 
note that “retribution” is just one aspect of the strategy of minimisation. 
Others will be discussed later in this chapter. “Retribution” was used most 
frequently in the Daily Telegraph (11.3 per cent) followed by The Sun (9.2 
per cent), Daily Express (6.7 per cent), Daily Mirror (5.8 per cent) and 
Daily Mail (4.6 per cent). It appeared least in the Guardian newspaper 
(3.4 per cent). The result reveals that this minimisation strategy featured 
more in the sub-interpretive sphere comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, 
Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph than in the sub-interpretive 
sphere made up of the Guardian. By representing statutory underpinning 
as a revenge tool, all newspapers apart from Guardian sought to de- 
legitimise the Royal Charter, the purpose possibly being to garner public 
support in its debate against press regulation underpinned by statute.
This sub-interpretive sphere sought to undermine the Royal Charter by 
interpreting the move by politicians to underpin the Royal Charter with a 
statute as one born out of a revenge for the press’ exposure of the MPs’ 
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expenses scandal (Forsyth 2013, p.  15) as can be seen in the headline 
“MPs want revenge on press over expenses” (Daily Mail 2013, n.p.). The 
MPs’ expenses scandal came to light in 2009 when Daily Telegraph news-
paper published uncensored leaked information from the MPs’ expenses 
files that showed that some members of the British Parliament had mis-
used their privilege to some allowances (BBC News 2009). The news 
sparked public outrage and led to resignations, prosecutions, repayment 
of expenses and apologies by some MPs (Crace 2014, p. 64). All newspa-
pers apart from Guardian also argued that if the Royal Charter was backed 
by statute, “journalists would live in fear that if they angered MPs—by 
exposing another expenses scandal, for example—they could get revenge 
by making the rules even more draconian” (Daily Mail 2013, n.p.).
This use of the retribution theme, in the press coverage of the debate 
that followed the phone hacking scandal, affirms claims made by previous 
studies on how the press represent debates about themselves (Carlson and 
Berkowitz 2014; Thomas and Finneman 2014). McChesney (2008, 
p. 451) is of the view that such coverage is born out of the refusal of media 
Table 8.1 Description of measures to check press misconduct: minimisation
Description Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Independent press 
self-regulation
31.1 6.9 5.8 7.7 11.1 8.5 16.8
Tough press 
regulation
12.4 16.2 10.1 13.4 20.0 12.4 13.4
Chilling effect on 
investigative 
journalism
6.5 14.6 15.9 15.5 8.9 9.8 10.6
Threat to press 
freedom
20.2 30.8 26.1 30.3 28.9 39.9 27.8
State control or 
slippery slope to 
press licensing
8.6 11.5 11.6 10.6 17.8 13.1 10.9
Draconian or 
punitive
3.9 10.0 10.1 3.5 4.4 5.9 5.6
Retribution 3.0 4.6 5.8 11.3 6.7 9.2 6.1
Leveson compliant 11.6 5.4 14.5 6.3 0.0 0.0 7.4
Other 2.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 2.2 1.3 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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owners to be accountable to authority. Media magnates possess enormous 
powers as a result of weak press regulatory systems, powers which even 
political leaders are wary of, because they can be used to mar political 
careers (Papandrea 2000, p. 12, cited in Putnis 2000, p. 105, 451). As 
stated earlier, such “freedom” earns them not only money but also influ-
ence. Warnings of retribution or political self-interest serve as defence 
mechanisms to protect this enormous power. As previously stated, politi-
cal self-interest is not the only form of minimisation strategy used by the 
press in their coverage of the press reform debate. The sub-interpretive 
sphere made up of Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily 
Telegraph also attempted to denigrate the Leveson Inquiry, its report and 
other proposals to reform the press, by promoting discourses that ques-
tioned the legitimacy and relevance of the inquiry. The next section exam-
ines how they used the paradigm strategy of minimisation to do this.
leveson inqUiry: not objective, not neUtrAl
Studies have shown that the press resist reforms aimed at making them 
accountable by portraying institutions given the responsibility for such 
reforms as incompetent, illegitimate or lacking the moral justification to 
reform the press (Pickard 2015, pp. 177–189). In his coverage of media 
policy debates in Australia, Putnis (2000, p. 110) observed that the press’ 
comments about the body set up to reform it were disparaging. The media 
challenged the political intellect of the body. Similarly, Pickard (2015, 
pp.  177–189) found that the American press disparaged the Hutchins 
Commission and its report even before the report was officially released. 
He wrote, “Indeed, in the weeks leading up to and following the report’s 
publication, it was disparaged in various media coverage as the product of 
a communist cabal endeavouring to subvert press freedoms” (Pickard 
2015, p. 178). In the case of the press reform debate that followed the 
NoTW phone hacking scandal, the press disparaged the Leveson Inquiry, 
political leaders and the Royal Charter on press self-regulation. Table 8.2 
reveals that the use of this discourse of minimisation that described the 
Leveson Inquiry as illegitimate and unfair featured in 7.1 per cent of the 
coverage. It was expressed more prominently in the sub-interpretive 
sphere comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and 
Daily Telegraph: appearing in 18.4 per cent of Daily Mail, 15.2 per cent 
of The Sun, 10.3 per cent of Daily Mirror, 5.6 per cent of Daily Express, 
3.9 per cent of Daily Telegraph and 0.5 per cent of Guardian. This 
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discourse of minimisation questioned the objectivity and neutrality of the 
inquiry. One way it did this was by alleging that there were “potential 
conflicts of interest” involving some members of Lord Justice Leveson’s 
team of assessors.
This discourse questioned the fairness and impartiality of the inquiry 
based on the fact that three out of its six assessors had “direct or indirect 
links” with Common Purpose, a charity which the papers alleged had links 
to Hacked Off, the campaign organisation that represented victims of 
press abuse and was advocating for tighter press control (Daily Mail 
2012). In an 11-page article (3030 words on Nexis UK—Daily Mail 
2012) headlined “A nuclear bomb that dropped on the press—and the 
motley crew who seized their chance”, the Daily Mail attempted to estab-
lish that Sir David Bell, a member of Lord Justice Leveson’s team of asses-
sors had links that meant there was a conflict of interest that should 
de-legitimise the Leveson Inquiry. The detail of the alleged links is that 
“Sir David Bell is a co-founder of the Media Standards Trust, the group 
behind the Hacked Off campaign. He is also a trustee and former chair-
man of Common Purpose, a charity that runs leadership courses”.
The other two Leveson Inquiry assessors were also linked to Common 
Purpose (Kavanagh 2013a, p. 8). This conflict of interest discourse also 
Table 8.2 Description of Leveson Inquiry: minimisation
Description Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
A threat to press 
freedom
20.5 28.9 28.2 28.6 33.3 38.0 27.1
Harmful to UK’s 
reputation
2.3 3.9 5.1 7.8 5.6 12.0 5.4
A chilling effect 
on journalism
8.7 17.1 20.5 26.0 22.2 15.2 15.0
A fair deal 12.8 3.9 2.6 11.7 0.0 0.0 7.9
Solution to efforts 
at curbing press 
excesses
48.9 15.8 20.5 13.0 16.7 8.7 28.4
Illegitimate/
unfair to the press
0.5 18.4 10.3 3.9 5.6 15.2 7.1
Anti-democratic 3.7 9.2 10.3 7.8 16.7 9.8 7.1
Other 2.7 2.6 2.6 1.3 0.0 1.1 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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accused the then Prime Minister David Cameron of not declaring he had 
links with Common Purpose in the register of ministerial interests until 
after the inquiry had been set up (Allen 2013, n.p.). By pointing these 
direct and indirect links to Common Purpose, the papers used their power 
to control information to discredit the Leveson Inquiry, portraying it as 
partial and a conspiracy to stifle press freedom. This article from The Sun 
summarises the press’ argument:
He [Sir David Bell] was a founder of Common Purpose, a shadowy organ-
isation dedicated to curbing the Press. He helped set up the Media Standards 
Trust which virtually scripted Leveson proceedings, Hugh Grant’s Hacked 
Off, and the disastrous Bureau of Investigative Journalism which led the 
BBC to falsely suggest Lord Alistair McAlpine was a paedophile. (Kavanagh 
2013a, p. 8)
The Guardian newspaper (Wilby 2012, p.  30) carried a counter- 
discourse relating to the allegations of conflicts of interest propagated by 
the other papers, particularly as it related to Sir David Bell. In an editorial 
with the headline “Cameron’s dilemma: the press can still ruin careers: 
Coverage of the Leveson inquiry proves why the press must be reformed, 
but also shows the risk involved in doing so”, the Guardian pointed out 
that such treatment given to Sir David Bell by the press was what could 
lead to statutory regulation of the press (Wilby 2012, p. 30). A similar 
article from the Guardian with the headline “Laughable Daily Mail ‘inves-
tigation’ smears Leveson Inquiry assessor” (Greenslade 2012, n.p.) 
described the discourse advanced by the other papers as “a classic example 
of conspiracist innuendo”; “a farrago of distortion with added vilifica-
tion”. It then went on to deconstruct the argument, interpreting it as 
“prejudice against the Leveson Inquiry” (ibid.).
The undermining journalistic metadiscourse of lack or potential lack of 
fairness of the Leveson Inquiry also included complaints of unfair treat-
ment of the press because law firms and business enterprises found to have 
been involved in clandestine activities were not brought before an inquiry 
or prosecuted as was being done to journalists (Slack and Doyle 2013, 
n.p.). For example, an article in The Sun with the headline “You’ve nicked 
hackers … now expose the buggers” lamented: “Our Serious Organised 
Crime Agency has been sitting for years on proof that major law and drug 
firms paid ex-cops to bug private phones and computers; hacking is 
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illegal—and universal. But the only people in the dock are journalists” 
(Kavanagh 2013b, p. 8).
The journalistic metadiscourse accused politicians of spending too 
much time and resources on the Leveson Inquiry to the detriment of 
“matters of higher social and economic importance”. An example is an 
article published by The Sun with the headline, “Stop gagging the press 
and fix the economy; that’s what you tell MPs” (Wood 2012, p. 6). This 
discourse spelt out the cost of the Leveson Inquiry and tried to convince 
the public that a huge amount of tax payers’ money was being wasted on 
an unnecessary course, for political reasons (McKinstry 2012). An exam-
ple is this excerpt from the Daily Express:
Yet now that principle [press freedom] is under grave threat. Today, Lord 
Leveson finally issues his recommendations on the future of the press fol-
lowing his lengthy, £5.6 million inquiry into media standards in the wake of 
the phone hacking scandal at the News of the World newspaper … That statu-
tory framework is certainly what many politicians at Westminster want, since 
they despise the idea that rumbustious newspapers should be able to chal-
lenge their power and expose their wrongdoing. But any form of state con-
trol would be a disaster for democracy … THE absurdity of the entire 
Leveson business is that we never needed the expensive inquiry in the first 
place, for the behaviour of a minority of journalists was already against the 
law. (McKinstry 2012, p. 14)
The reasons for this “expensive gagging of the press”, the press argued, 
was to cover up the politician’s messy role in the scandal as well as stifle the 
press so that it could no longer challenge corrupt politicians; it was also 
described as an emotional response to public outrage over a criminal 
offense whose penalty had already been provided for in law, and, worse of 
all, their actions would (or had) dealt a terrible blow to press freedom. 
Though the protection of press freedom is essential for the sustenance of 
democracy, it is important for the public, policymakers and other stake-
holders to discern when the call for the protection of press freedom is 
actually a quest for the protection of the mechanisms that facilitate abuse 
of press power. The resolve to protect such mechanisms results in the use 
of the “pay back” technique on anyone who attempts to weaken the 
potential for the press to abuse its power (Putnis 2000, p. 105). In the 
journalistic metadiscourse on the press reform debate, pay back took the 
form of minimisation; for instance, the press embarked on what can be 
described as a character smear of those who opposed its resistance to strin-
gent reforms. The next section is an analysis of how this was done.
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chArActer smeAr: critiqUing critics
“Critiquing critics of the press” was one of the minimisation techniques 
employed by the press to run down proposals for reform that it considered 
to be against its interest. It involved what can, arguably, be described as a 
character smear of persons with views opposed to those of the press in the 
media policy debate that followed the phone hacking scandal. To gauge 
the extent of its usage, I noted where the press made disparaging com-
ments about individuals or institutions that were actively involved in advo-
cating tighter press controls. Such remarks took the form of castigating 
the individual and pointing out that such a person was among those call-
ing for statutory backed press regulatory body.
An excerpt from the dominant themes table (Chap. 7), herein referred 
to as Table 8.3, reveals that this character smear technique featured as a 
dominant theme in 5.4 per cent of the coverage. It is concerning that this 
emerged among the top ten, out of 24 dominant themes in the coverage. 
It was used most by Daily Mail, appearing as the dominant theme of 14.5 
per cent of its coverage. Unexpectedly, “Critiquing critics of the press” 
came ahead of the “threat to press freedom” theme in Daily Mail (see 
Table 8.3). However, it can be argued that it acted as a feeder to the threat 
to press freedom argument. In The Sun, this character smear minimisation 
technique came second among dominant themes in the paper’s coverage 
of the debate, just after the “threat to press freedom” argument. It also 
emerged as the dominant theme in 8.3 per cent of The Sun, 5.0 per cent 
of Daily Telegraph, 3.6 per cent of Daily Express, 2.0 per cent of Daily 
Mirror and 0.6 per cent of Guardian (see Table 8.3).
This character smear technique was used to cast a shadow of doubt on 
the integrity and legitimacy of the Leveson Inquiry. For instance, The Sun 
newspaper revealed what it referred to as the “Loverson scandal”, and 
based on it, much of the press contested the legitimacy of the Leveson 
Report (Nash and Schofield 2013, p. 2). The “Loverson Scandal” came to 
light in April 2013 when The Sun newspaper carried a story alleging a love 
affair between David Sherborne, counsel to actor Hugh Grant and other 
victims of the NoTW phone hacking scandal, and Carine Patry Hoskins, 
one of Leveson’s team of advisers. The story disclosed that David 
Sherborne and Carine Hoskins spent a holiday together at the Greek 
Island of Santorini four months before the end of the inquiry (Nash and 
Schofield 2013, p. 2). The pair later explained that they went on the holi-
day together to discuss the possibility of a future relationship and decided 
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against it, but changed their minds after the inquiry. Lord Justice Leveson 
(and much later, the Bar Standards Board) excused the action of Sherborne 
and Carine saying it did not stand in the way of a credible report from the 
inquiry (ibid.).
The “Loverson scandal” was used by the press, with the exception of 
the Guardian, to de-legitimise the Leveson report and call for a revoca-
tion of the Royal Charter. The emerging discourse warned that the rela-
tionship between a lawyer in Leveson’s team of advisers and the barrister 
representing campaigners for statutory regulation of the press shows the 
whole inquiry was not impartial but a “panto stitch-up”: a conspiracy to 
stifle press freedom. The papers then went on to call for the Leveson 
Report to be scrapped, as can be seen in this headline from Daily Mail, 
“Calls for press regulation plan to be scrapped after revelations” (Seamark 
2013, p. 14). A similar article from The Sun reads: “Press must withdraw 
Table 8.3 Dominant theme in the coverage: critiquing critics
Dominant theme Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Threat to press 
freedom
11.5 13.3 25.5 18.1 35.7 62.5 20.6
Support for new 
press own 
regulatory system
1.5 4.6 3.9 2.5 3.6 4.2 2.9
Against politicians’ 
Royal Charter
2.8 4.0 3.0 3.1 2.9
Against press law/
statutory 
underpinning
4.0 12.7 9.8 6.0 10.7 5.2 6.9
Press achievements 0.6 6.9 2.0 1.5 7.1 1.0 2.4
Against self- 
regulation of the 
press
0.9 0.6 0.5
Support for 
Leveson Inquiry
10.5 7.8 2.5 7.1 3.1 5.5
Enforce existing 
laws
2.3 3.9 4.5 1.7
Critiquing critics of 
the press
0.6 14.5 2.0 5.0 3.6 8.3 5.4
 B. OGBEBOR
161
from panto stitch-up” (Kavanagh 2013a, p. 8). The discourse, particularly 
that of The Sun newspaper, employed demeaning language to belittle the 
parties involved in the “scandal”, Lord Justice Leveson and the Leveson 
Inquiry as can be seen in this excerpt:
STROPPY Lord Justice Leveson was accused yesterday of being the “only 
person” who did not know his inquiry’s barrister was having an affair with a 
rival lawyer. The Sun revealed in April how married mum-of-two Ms Patry 
Hoskins, was dating perma-tanned Mr Sherborne, who worked for alleged 
newspaper victims. The snooty law chief, who refused to talk about press 
regulation told the Commons Culture Committee he had not heard earlier 
rumours about the fling—dubbed the Loverson scandal. (Ashton 2013, p. 6)
The amount of money paid to the lawyers was also highlighted, prob-
ably to attract public contempt and reduce the public’s acceptance of the 
Leveson Report, as can be seen in the Daily Telegraph’s headline, “Leveson 
lawyer who had affair was paid £220,000 of taxpayers’ money” (Swinford 
2013, n.p.). Though the “Loverson Scandal” featured in the Guardian, it 
was not interpreted in the same way. The paper only went as far as men-
tioning that Lord Justice Leveson defended Carine Hoskins’ involvement 
in the “developing relationship”, saying that it did not compromise the 
Leveson Report because she only played a minor role such as proofreading 
the report (O’Carroll and Halliday 2013, p. 17). On the other hand, those 
who supported the press’ position in the debate were given “a good press” 
(Chapman 2013, n.p.).
conclUsion
In summary, my investigation into how the strategy of minimisation was 
used in the press coverage of the debate that followed the News of the 
World phone hacking scandal revealed that the strategy was used in vary-
ing degrees by all newspapers in the coverage. It manifested in the forms 
of press disparagement of the Royal Charter which they nicknamed the 
Pizza Charter; interpretations of press reform proposals as acts motivated 
by political self-interest; by de-legitimising the Leveson Inquiry, describ-
ing it as illegitimate and unfair; and by using the character smear tech-
nique against supporters of stringent press reforms. This list is not 
exhaustive. This agrees with the claim of previous studies that during the 
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coverage of media policy, newspapers trivialise and denigrate efforts at 
ensuring press accountability in a bid to protect their self-interest (Stiegler 
2013, p. 137).
Such coverage of media policy debates is bound to rob citizens of their 
freedom of expression in media policy debates. Politicians, campaigners 
for media reform and any other stakeholder can withhold views that can 
translate into effective media reform because of the fear of pay back or 
being minimised by the press. Such fears can be likened to what is experi-
enced in authoritarian governments where citizens are afraid to critique 
political leaders because of the fear of “pay backs”. By using the strategy 
of minimisation during media policy debates, the media stifle, rather than 
enhance, democracy. One way to check such stifling of democracy is to 
enlighten consumers of journalistic metadiscourse on media reform 
debates on the various strategies used by the media in the coverage. 
Knowledge of the various minimisation techniques used by the media, the 
extent to which they are used and how they are used will provide partici-
pants of media policy debates with a better understanding. The press on 
their part will need to refrain from the use of strategies that will under-
mine its claim to the promotion of democracy.
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CHAPTER 9
Journalistic Metadiscourse: Access 
to the Media’s Public Sphere
In a democratic society, it is expected that all sections of society have access 
to the press because it serves as a major medium of information and com-
munication. If individuals are to contribute to policymaking through par-
ticipating in public debates, then all sections of society will need to have 
access to the press, especially when issues that concern them are the sub-
jects of debate; this has not been the case. The press has often been accused 
of giving more access to elite and official sources to the detriment of the 
less powerful in society (Galtung and Ruge 1965, cited in Harcup and 
O’Neill 2010, p. 270). Reference to “elite” sources here is not so much 
the politically powerful, as may have been the concept of Galtung and 
Ruge but is what Harcup and O’Neill referred to as “the power elite”. The 
power elite could be celebrities, policymakers and the press, amongst others.
The danger of favouring the debates of the “power elite” is that the 
views of a stratum of society dominate the media discourse while those of 
the less powerful are hardly heard. The “power elite” can become the 
primary definer of the debate (Hall et al. 1978. pp. 57–59, cited in Allan 
2010, p. 84). The primary definers define the trend of the debate because 
they often come high up in the news narrative and as such the rest of the 
debate may be a response to their argument or to their definition of the 
subject. Relating this to media reform, ideas and interpretations for press 
reform may be limited to those mentioned or advocated by the primary 
definers. This can result in the media transmitting a narrow spectrum of 
ideas on media reform. Their proposals or arguments on media reform 
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may also get more reads if readers stop at the first few paragraphs of a 
report on media policy. In the journalistic metadiscourse on the press 
reform debate that followed the NoTW that followed the phone hacking 
scandal, the press emerged as a major power elite. This chapter shows how 
the press took advantage of its powers to control information to give more 
quality access to arguments that it perceived to be in its interest, to the 
detriment of other stakeholders in the press reform debate.
To a lesser degree, policymakers, victims of press abuse and their cam-
paigners also emerged as key sources used in the journalistic metadiscourse 
on the press reform debate. In this book, a source refers to “any person, 
institution, or document to which the reporter explicitly attributed infor-
mation” (Hallin et al. 1993, p. 754). Table 9.1 reveals that 46.1 per cent 
of news sources on the debate were press related; out of this number, 37.3 
per cent were journalists (not editors), 3.7 per cent were news editors; 2.8 
per cent were from press bodies such as the PCC and IPSO, while 2.3 per 
Table 9.1 Frequency of sources
Sources Frequency of sources Percentage of sources
Campaigners for victims of press abuse 537 4.5
Leveson Inquiry 827 7.0
Royal Charter 97 0.8
Campaigners for press freedom 495 4.2
The press 4420 37.3
Press body such as IPSO 331 2.8
News editors 441 3.7
Newspaper and magazine publishers 278 2.3
Conservative spokesperson 776 6.5
Police 253 2.1
Labour shadow government 573 4.8
Coalition Liberal Democrats 325 2.7
Cross-party 85 0.7
Culture, media and sport 255 2.2
Government spokesperson 453 3.8
Other politicians 454 3.8
Victims of press abuse 559 4.7
Ordinary members of the public 184 1.6
Judiciary 263 2.2
Other 252 2.1
Total 11,858 100.0
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cent came from newspaper and magazine publishers (see Tables 9.1 and 
9.2), demonstrating a clear inequality in the distribution of sources used 
by the press in its coverage of the debate.
This inequality in the distribution of sources was also identified in the 
category of writers of articles in the study sample. Understandably, news-
paper staff wrote the bulk of the stories on the coverage, accounting for 
91.5 per cent of writers of articles on the debate (see Tables 9.3 and 9.4). 
What is of interest is the distribution of other contributors (writers) from 
outside the newspaper’s staff. Out of the remaining 8.5 per cent of con-
tributors (outside the newspaper’s staff), 4.3 per cent were press related: 
2.2 per cent were from “other media” organisations, 1.4 per cent were 
written by campaigners for press freedom and 0.7 per cent were from for-
mer media executives (see Table 9.4). The remaining 4.1 per cent were 
shared among eight other contributors. This result does not reflect a dem-
ocratic public sphere. It agrees with arguments by previous studies that 
the media is dominated by a narrow spectrum of sources (Graber and 
Dunaway 2014). The dominance of the media as sources within an already 
narrow spectrum of sources is a double cause for concern. The gap 
between press-related sources and other sources in the discourse (see 
Table 9.2) demonstrates how the gatekeeping power of the press can be 
used to their advantage (Lewin 1947, 1951, cited in Shoemaker and Vos 
2009, p. 1).
Kurt Lewin (1947, 1951) used the theory of gatekeeping to show 
“how food made its way from the grocery store or garden to the dinner 
table” (cited in Shoemaker and Vos 2009, p. 109). White (1950, cited in 
Shoemaker and Vos 2009, p. 112) extended the gatekeeping concept to 
Table 9.2 Source types 
in related categories
Source type Percentages
Press-related sources 46.1
Policymakers 24.5
Press abuse victims–related sources 9.2
Leveson and Royal Charter 7.8
Judiciary 2.2
Police 2.1
Ordinary members of the public 1.6
Other 2.1
Total 100.0
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Table 9.3 Category of writers
Category of writers Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
The newspaper’s 
staff/
representative
88.2 98.3 94.1 91.5 92.9 88.5 91.5
Campaigners for 
victims of the 
press
0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7
Victims of press 
abuse
0.9 0.3
Campaigners for 
the press
1.2 1.2 2.0 0.5 4.2 1.4
Representatives of 
associations
0.9 0.3
Former media 
executives
0.6 0.5 7.1 1.0 0.7
A member of the 
public
2.0 1.0 0.3
Government 1.5 0.3
Politicians 1.2 2.5 1.0 1.1
Business/
corporate 
organisations
0.6 0.1
Academics 1.5 2.0 0.5 1.0 0.9
Other media 4.3 1.0 3.1 2.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 9.4 Category of 
writers in groups
Writers Per cent
Newspaper staff 91.5
Press-related sources 4.3
Policymakers 1.4
Press abuse victims–related sources 1.0
Academics 0.9
Representative of associations 0.3
Corporate organisations 0.1
Ordinary members of the public 0.3
Total 100.0
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mass communication research. Applying this theory to news, Shoemaker 
and Vos (2009, p. 1) pointed out that the enormity of information avail-
able to the media and the limited amount of space to transmit it necessi-
tated the need for the press to filter information in order to transmit a 
manageable quantity to the public. The process by which the media decide 
which stories among the lot to tell, which not to tell, who speaks about 
them (sources) and what versions of interpretation to relay to the public is 
what is referred to as gatekeeping (Shoemaker and Vos 2009; White 1950, 
cited in Vos and Heinderyckx 2015, p. 3).
In the words of Shoemaker and Vos (2009, p. 1), gatekeeping “is the 
process of culling and crafting countless bits of information into the lim-
ited number of messages that reach people each day” (Shoemaker and Vos 
2009, p. 1). This process of selection can be based on cultural, economic 
and ideological factors. Examples of such factors include a newspaper’s 
political ideology, its ethos, ownership and business interests. This endows 
the media with enormous powers because they have the power to decide 
whether to allow some arguments or sources into the news or whether to 
give them limited access or to keep them out completely (Rozell and 
Mayer 2008, p. 328). This gatekeeping power, if not checked, can be used 
in a way that gives the press undue advantage in their transmission of 
debates, especially debates about themselves (Van Heerden 1996, cited in 
Fourie 2001, p. 205). Shoemaker and Vos (2009, p. 122) affirmed that 
gatekeeping can be used in the selection of sources.
The gatekeeping theory is closely linked to agenda-setting (McCombs 
et al. 1997; McCombs 2004, 2014). Agenda-setting “is the process of the 
mass media presenting certain issues frequently and prominently with the 
result that large segments of the public come to perceive those issues as 
more important than others” (Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2009, 
p. 147). Agenda-setting studies have shown that media messages, depend-
ing on a number of political and social factors, can influence an individu-
al’s action as well as determine his or her depth of knowledge on the issues 
represented (Negrine 1989, pp. 3–4). Agenda-setting studies have “estab-
lished that journalists and editors have great power both to shape the main 
topics of importance to audiences as well as the details of those issues” 
(Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2009, p.  154). My intention is not to 
argue for or against media effects but to highlight the fact that how the 
media cover debates about their policy is important because it could 
(depending on other social and political factors) shape the public’s percep-
tion and consequent action about media reform. The results of my research 
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confirms that in the coverage of the media reform debate, the press used 
their gatekeeping powers to see to it that their voices dominated the 
debate, particularly regarding arguments on how the press should be 
regulated.
In their use of press-related sources, a trend emerged which I would 
like to flag up for further investigation. It is a trend in which newspapers 
reported the publications or transmissions of other media organisations 
about the debate: a situation that can be described as “media coverage of 
media coverage of media issues”—a kind of second-level metacoverage. 
This manner of coverage was done by the two sub-interpretive spheres, 
each using it to strengthen their own argument while countering oppos-
ing views in the press reform debate. Headlines such as “Times editor says 
papers will go ahead with own regulator” in the Guardian newspaper 
(O’Carroll and Halliday 2013, p. 16); ‘The Economist call press regulation 
deal ‘a shameful hash’ ” in the Guardian newspaper (Greenslade 2013b); 
“Now the Economist rejects rotten plan to shackle free press” in Daily 
Mail (Chapman 2013, n.p.) and “The Spectator says NO to the press 
regulator” in the Guardian newspaper (Greenslade 2013a, n.p.) are some 
examples of this second-level metacoverage. This pattern of coverage fea-
tured more in Guardian than in other newspapers in the study sample.
Guardian newspaper used this second-level metacoverage both to 
commend papers that were of a similar view to its position in the debate 
and to condemn those newspapers that were of a different view. For exam-
ple, in an article headlined “Editors speak out on regulation” Neild (2013, 
p. 8) in his report for the paper analysed the editorial sections of Financial 
Times, Independent and itself—Guardian, celebrating their views on stat-
utory underpinning of the new press regulator and pointing out that all 
three [at the time] did not consider statutory underpinning as a threat to 
press freedom:
An editorial in today’s FT said the failure to agree on a regulatory regime 
would threaten vital economic reforms and could result in a backlash. “What 
is now needed is a practical gesture of goodwill to break the deadlock and 
avoid a sweeping press law” it said. The Guardian, in its editorial, … warned 
that by refusing to give ground on regulation, editors were gambling with 
the freedoms they sought to protect. The Independent said that the argu-
ments against some form of statutory underpinning had lost perspective. 
“Even reasonable half-way measures are characterised as press freedoms 
eroded and democratic principles laid waste,” it said. (Neild 2013, p. 8)
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In a similar article, it wrote, “Finally, medals to the Financial Times, the 
Independent and the Guardian for holding out against ferocious peer 
pressure from the rest”. Meanwhile, in another article headlined “Will the 
press repent its nasty ways?” Guardian used this second-level metacover-
age to condemn other media for arguing that statutory underpinning 
amounted to a threat to press freedom. The papers were used as sources in 
order to ridicule them and portray their arguments as lacking substance, as 
can be seen in this excerpt from Guardian:
I loved the heroics of Spectator editor Fraser Nelson, saying he’d never pay 
any fine from an “underpinned regulator”: “Whether I’d go to prison or not 
is up to the enemies of press freedom to decide. At least it would make clear 
what they are proposing.” …Oh, the lofty rhetoric of the Sun, quoting from 
those they would have hounded at the time—JF Kennedy, Ralph Miliband, 
Adlai Stevenson, John Stuart Mill and Gandhi. But it has been sad to see 
some of the wiser commentators on the Times and Telegraph follow their 
masters’ voice, warning that the end is nigh when they must know quite well 
that’s nonsense. (Toynbee 2013, p. 29)
Similarly, Daily Mirror and Daily Telegraph reported the comments of 
other media organisations, using the method to either advance or counter 
arguments. An example is an article from Daily Mirror which attributed 
the closure of the News of the World to inaccurate reporting on the part of 
Guardian:
Roll forward five months and a much smaller story appeared on the front of 
The Guardian. The headline—“New inquiry into Dowler hacking 
launched”—gave little clue as to the revelation in the story, namely that the 
deletion exposé was wrong. The single-most stomach-churning element of 
the whole saga was, in fact, incorrect. It seems the messages had most likely 
been deleted automatically and not by journalists “thirsty for more” as the 
initial Guardian report claimed. (Embley 2012, pp. 8–9)
There were also headlines such as “Politicians in control risks media like 
Russia’s, warns Lebedev” (Ross 2012, p. 8). Evgeny Lebedev, the owner 
of the London Evening Standard and Independent newspaper (solely 
online at the time of this study), was speaking on The Andrew Marr Show 
on BBC1. This dominance of the opinions of the press in the journalistic 
metadiscourse on the debate affirms that the media does not serve as a 
democratic public sphere during debates about their policy. Both spheres 
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of journalistic metadiscourse took advantage of their gatekeeping powers 
to allocate disproportionate amounts of space to their voices in the press 
reform debate. As stated earlier, about half of the total number of sources 
used in the coverage were press related.
The press became the major power elite with the dominant voice while 
the rest of society were, apparently, at its mercy in the debate. Though it 
can be argued that there are various channels through which the public 
can participate in this debate, such as from online news websites and blogs 
that advance counter discourses, it has been established through previous 
research that considerable numbers of people still depend on the main-
stream press for hard news content (Haas 2012, p. 148). Despite the dive 
in newspaper readership in the UK (Newsworks 2016; Department for 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019), the national press examined in 
this study, at the time of writing, still had an average daily readership of 
12.2 million which demonstrates the number of people in society consum-
ing discourse from this doubly narrow spectrum of sources. Interestingly, 
the views of the press were not only expressed by press-related sources but 
were also passed across through other sources such as policymakers. In 
this book, policymakers refer to the government, government institutions 
and politicians.
Out of the remaining 53.9 per cent of sources (apart from the press’ 
46.1 per cent), policymakers made up 24.5 per cent of sources: 6.5 per 
cent of the number were Conservative Party spokespersons, 4.8 per cent 
were from the Labour Party, 3.8 per cent were Government spokesper-
sons, another 3.8 were “other politicians”, 2.7 per cent were from the 
Liberal Democratic Party who were then in coalition government with the 
Conservatives; 2.2 per cent of sources were from the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sports (DCMS); and 0.7 were cross-party—a team 
made up of the three major political parties—Conservatives, Liberal 
Democrats and Labour (see Tables 9.1 and 9.2). Similarly, policymakers 
made up a significant proportion of contributors outside of journalists (see 
Tables 9.3 and 9.4), making them another significant group used as 
sources.
Policymakers play a vital role in media policy debates, in the sense that 
they are the decision-making sphere; they are the forum where contesta-
tions in the media’s public sphere can progress to the stage of a consensus 
and the stage where the debate can influence political action. In this case, 
the political action to be taken is a decision on how to ensure an account-
able press but as Putnis (2000, p. 105) observed, “the interdependence of 
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politics and the media renders media policy making a particularly fraught 
and contentious process”. That is because the media and policymakers 
depend on each other for a number of purposes. O’Heffernan (1991, 
p. 38) divided policymakers’ use of the media into four categories. He 
noted that policymakers use the media “for immediate useful informa-
tion”; “in the early stages of an issue to make a decision”; as “the only 
source of policy information” in times of crisis and as “critical information 
for policy making” (ibid.). It is important to note that policymakers’ uses 
of the media go beyond the making of policy to other more personal rea-
sons, such as the promotion of their political image or popularity 
(Silverstone 2007, cited in Sanders 2008, p. 38).
As Putnis (2000, p. 105) pointed out, policymakers are not uninvolved 
parties in media policy creation or reform because “they crave media sup-
port; and their political fortunes are influenced by media reporting”. Their 
power to make policy decisions also makes the media dependent on poli-
cymakers for what they consider to be favourable media policies. Collusion 
or mutual support between politicians and the media has the potential to 
shape media content and affect media policy reform. Politicians are known 
to have entered mutual agreements with media proprietors to give favour-
able coverage to their political party in exchange for media policies that 
favour the proprietors’ corporate interests. For instance, the Labour 
Party’s Tony Blair was said to have made an agreement with Rupert 
Murdoch before the 1997 general election in the UK, whereby his papers’ 
support for the Labour Party was earned as a reward for cross-media own-
ership rules that favoured the media mogul (Franklin 2002, p.  30). 
Franklin described the period as one “characterised by an extraordinary 
degree of non-decision making in media policy” (ibid.).
Similarly, former Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron’s close 
relationship with Rupert Murdoch was also suggested as one of the rea-
sons for his election successes (Mason and Martinson 2016). Within 18 
months, from April 2015 to September 2016, “News Corp executives had 
20 meetings with senior government representatives” in Downing Street 
(Mason and Martinson 2016, n.p.; Media Reform Coalition 2017). 
Shortly after taking up office as Prime Minister, Theresa May visited the 
media magnate Rupert Murdoch in New  York, when she visited for a 
United Nations meeting (Mason and Martinson 2016), affirming the cosy 
relationship between policymakers and the media. This reciprocal relation-
ship is arguably the reason why Rupert Murdoch who lost his initial bid 
for the remaining shares of BskyB (he owned 39 per cent at the time) in 
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the heat of the phone hacking scandal was able to relaunch his bid for Sky 
in 2016, through his 21st Century Fox company (Guardian 2016; BBC 
News 2017). Note that in 2014, BskyB (a merger of British Satellite 
Broadcasting and Sky Television) further merged with Murdoch’s Pay- 
Television companies in Germany (Sky Deutschland) and Italy (Sky Italia) 
to form Sky (Reuters 2018).
Rupert Murdoch’s relaunch of the Sky bid shows that the phone hack-
ing scandal was not enough to put the owner of the defunct News of the 
World on the government’s blacklist. As part of rebranding after the News 
of the World phone hacking scandal, Rupert Murdoch divided his media 
empire into 21st Century Fox, comprising of his cable network program-
ming, filmed entertainment, television, direct broadcast and satellite TV 
(21st Century Fox 2017); and News Corporation comprising of his print 
media (News Corporation 2017). 21st Century Fox was vying for an 
£11.7 billion takeover of the broadcast company (Dean 2017). The deal 
was cleared by the European Commission competition authorities but fol-
lowing a petition posted on the campaigning website 38 Degrees, which 
gathered over 300,000 signatures (38 Degrees 2017; Sweney 2016, n.p.), 
the deal was referred to Ofcom, the communications watchdog, for a pub-
lic interest assessment in relation to media plurality and broadcasting stan-
dards (Dean 2017, n.p.). Though Ofcom reported that the deal could 
give the Murdoch family “increased influence”, 21st Century Fox was 
eventually given the go-ahead to participate in an auction for Sky along 
with Comcast and Walt Disney (Guardian 2016; King 2016). Though 
this contest culminated in 21st Century Fox company’s loss of the Sky bid 
to Comcast in 2018, it can be argued that Rupert Murdoch was allowed 
to bid for Sky despite the involvement of his defunct News of the World in 
the phone hacking scandal because of the cosy relationship that existed 
between him and the government (Financial Times 2018; Waterson 2018).
The relationship between policymakers and the media during periods 
of media policy debates has also been adversarial. Adversarial in the sense 
that the press gives indirect warnings to politicians that there would be 
casualties (political payback) if they go ahead with press reforms, especially 
where statutory regulations are proposed (Putnis 2000, pp.  105–110; 
Curran and Seaton 2010; Pickard 2015, pp. 177–189). History has con-
firmed that there are indeed casualties for persons or institutions that 
advocate stringent press reforms. For example, David Mellor, when he was 
National Heritage Minister (now the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sports), in 1989 warned the press that they were “drinking in the last 
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chance saloon”; in other words, the press had one more chance to improve 
their conduct or be slammed with a privacy law (Keeble 2008, p. 136). He 
lost his job over a sex scandal revealed by the press in 1992 (Keeble 2008, 
p. 136; Fletcher 2015). Similarly, Maria Miller, who was Culture Secretary 
during negotiations for a Royal Charter underpinned by statute, was 
forced to resign from the role over an expenses scandal reported by the 
press (BBC News 2014). Though the MPs’ expenses scandal first emerged 
in 2009, the problem with her expenses was brought to the fore by the 
press in 2014, after she began negotiations to underpin the press regula-
tory body with a statute. This demonstrates the power of the press to 
manage information to its own perceived advantage.
Resistance to press reform shapes the way media policy debates are 
covered and the way they are covered can determine the outcome of media 
policy. Considering the importance of the media to the sustenance of 
democracy, steps need to be taken to ensure that media representation of 
media policy does not jeopardise efforts at effective media reform. In the 
journalistic metadiscourse on the press reform debate, the press apparently 
used their gatekeeping powers to ensure that policymakers who expressed 
support for their position in the debate had more opportunities to func-
tion as contributors in their newspapers. For instance, policymakers who 
were contributors to Daily Telegraph were largely in support of the argu-
ment that statutory underpinning was a threat to press freedom (Johnson 
2012a, p. 4; Mason 2012, p. 26), while those who were contributors to 
news articles in Guardian countered the argument that statutory under-
pinning posed a threat to press freedom (Lester 2012, p. 30; Fowler 2013, 
p. 24; Huhne 2013, p. 36). And in the articles, some policymakers virtu-
ally reproduced the newspaper’s position in the debate. For example, Boris 
Johnson, who was the then Mayor of London (at the time of writing, he 
had become UK’s Prime Minister), wrote an article in The Sun titled “It’s 
one of the glories of this country that we have free, exuberant media. They 
keep public life much cleaner & that makes Britain a wonderful place to 
live” (Johnson 2012b, pp. 10–11). The dominant theme of that report 
was “against press law and statutory underpinning”.
On the other hand, an article written by a member of the House of 
Lords, Norman Fowler, and published by Guardian newspaper expressed 
support for statutory underpinning of a new press regulatory body (Fowler 
2013, p. 24). The fact that Norman Fowler, a former Conservative Cabinet 
minister and party chairman, gained access to publish his view on the 
debate in the left-wing-leaning Guardian goes a long way to show that 
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the primary criteria for access in this metacoverage may have been tied to 
the position of the newspaper in the debate. It appeared as if the press had 
said “you either dance to our tune or find somewhere else to publish your 
view”. This trend can, arguably, be described as collusion between politi-
cians and the media.
When it was revealed in 2016 that four newspapers (The Sun, 
Independent, Mail on Sunday and Independent on Sunday) were privy to 
information that the then chairman of the Commons Culture, Media and 
Sport Committee, John Whittingdale, had previously been involved in a 
relationship with a woman he met on an online dating website who hap-
pened to be a sex worker, and had not published it, some media reform 
campaigners and the Labour Party alleged that some sort of deal may have 
taken place between this executive and the press (BBC News 2016). John 
Whittingdale, who was then the Conservative MP for Maldon and East 
Chelmsford, denied any such deal with the press, and the newspapers 
claimed they decided not to publish because he was not a minister at the 
time of the relationship and as such it was not in the public interest (ibid.). 
Though this sounds reasonable, history has shown that the same “reason-
able” position is not applied to all politicians as the unsubstantiated pig-
gate publication by Daily Mail shows. In the piggate story Ashcroft and 
Oakeshott (2015) claimed that while studying at Oxford University, the 
then Prime Minister took part in an initiation ceremony at a Piers Gaveston 
event in which he “inserted a private part of his anatomy into the animal’s 
mouth”. The Daily Mail did not reject this story even though David 
Cameron was not a PM when it allegedly happened. This suggests the 
special treatment given to John Whittingdale may be a form of collusion.
There were also assumptions that Boris Johnson may have danced to 
the tune of the bulk of the national press in the press reform debate 
because he had an ambition to become the next Prime Minister of Britain 
after David Cameron and would, therefore, need the support of this large 
section of the national press. It is interesting to note that at the time of 
writing, Boris Johnson had become the Prime Minister of Britain. Whether 
or not there was a deal between the press and John Whittingdale or even 
a personal move by Boris Johnson to seek the press’ favour for political 
ambition, the fact remains that some politicians in both spheres largely 
reproduced arguments of the press in the debate. It is worthy of note that 
while the Leveson Inquiry condemned the relationship between the press 
and politicians for being “too cosy” (Leveson 2012, p.  1969; Winnett 
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2012, p. 11), the very coverage of the inquiry and that of the rest of the 
debate appear to have been shaped by a similar level of closeness.
The consequence for democracy here is that checks needed to prevent 
abuse of power by both the fourth and third estates of the realm gradually 
become eroded (Allan and Zelizer 2010, p. 48). As discussed in Chap. 2, 
the press in a democratic society is expected to keep political and other 
powerful institutions in check by exposing corruption, providing informa-
tion they need to make quality decisions and providing the masses with 
the relevant information they need to vote in the right political leaders. 
That is why collusion between the press and politicians poses a threat to 
democracy. It can, for instance, result in the emergence to power of a poli-
tician who though without the quality to lead cosied up to the press or 
benefited its financial interest in some way. It can also weaken the power 
of politicians to make policy decisions that can ensure a responsible press.
Another significant group of sources (though to a smaller degree when 
compared with the press—46.1 per cent, and policymakers—24.5 per 
cent) in the media coverage of the press reform debate is press abuse vic-
tims–related sources. They were used as sources in 9.2 per cent of the 
coverage: 4.5 per cent were campaigners for victims of press abuse, while 
4.7 per cent were the victims themselves. The categorising of campaigners 
for victims and the victims themselves was a little difficult because some 
prominent campaigners for victims, like Hugh Grant, were also victims of 
press abuse. At such times, the context of the story determined the group 
they fell into. For instance, if Hugh Grant was used as a source with regard 
to victims, he was recorded as a victim, but if he was cited with regard to 
victim campaigners, then he was considered a campaigner for victims. The 
following section analyses the use of sources related to victims of 
press abuse.
Victims as “the stakeholders”
Though the number of press victims–related sources is far less than the 
number of press and policymakers-related sources (see Tables 9.1 and 
9.2), the victims of press abuse and their campaigners still emerged as one 
of the stakeholders whose voices featured in a significant proportion of the 
debate, accounting for 9.2 per cent of the sources and 1 per cent of the 8.5 
per cent of contributors that are not newspaper staff (see Tables 9.1, 9.2, 
9.3 and 9.4). While I agree that this demographic is very important to the 
debate and ought to have been given more space in the journalistic 
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metadiscourse, I argue that the construction of victims as “the stakehold-
ers” is further marginalisation of other sections of society.
One major problem with the construction of victims as “the stakehold-
ers” is its composition. A look at the victims used as sources revealed that 
they were mostly famous (well-known) people. They included persons 
whose life stories attained the status of newsworthiness because of their 
celebrity status or high public profile (Harcup and O’Neill’s 2010, p. 270). 
Among them were actor Hugh Grant (Sweney 2013, n.p.), comedian 
Steve Coogan (O’Carroll 2012, n.p.), singer Charlotte Church (Glover 
2012, n.p.) and author JK Rowling (Luckhurst 2012, p. 25).
Another group of victims used as sources included persons who became 
famous because of their connection to a newsworthy event such as the 
Dowlers (Rayner 2012, p.  6), the McCanns (Beattie 2013, p.  26), 
Christopher Jefferies (Allen and Evans 2012), the 7 July 2005 London 
bombing survivor (Hill 2012), or persons closely related to any of the two 
categories of victims (Cohen 2013). So, famous people that have been 
hurt by the press were constructed as “the stakeholders”. That is of course 
a narrow spectrum of stakeholders of the British press. Though victims of 
crime such as the Dowlers and the McCanns have been described as ordi-
nary people in some news articles, that is contestable. The debate can thus 
be classed as an elitist debate. Though it may be argued that the press 
would more likely invade the privacy of the rich or famous than the ordi-
nary citizen in society, studies show that ordinary citizens are also affected 
by press excesses: an example is minority groups who are often stereotyped 
in the news. Such people ought to have been adequately represented in 
the debate on press standards in the media’s public sphere.
People from other sectors of society such as those who have not faced 
any form of press misconduct should have also formed a relevant demo-
graphic as their views may be much more neutral in relation to how to 
balance the issue of privacy with that of press freedom. My intention here 
is not to belittle the importance of the victims of press misconduct to the 
debate but to argue that they are only one relevant demographic out of a 
number and that should have been reflected in the journalistic metadis-
course. There is the tendency that victims advocating for press reform can 
make suggestions out of anger and frustration at the press. Therefore, a 
mix of those that have experienced press abuse and those that have not 
been directly hurt would have made a more balanced group of stakehold-
ers. What emerged instead was a rhetoric or discourse that constructed the 
victims of press abuse as the only demographic that needed the service of 
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an accountable press. As such, whatever proposal was going to be made by 
the Leveson Inquiry must pass “the victims test”. Policymakers, the press 
and even the victims themselves all advanced this rhetoric as can be seen in 
this statement written by Guardian’s Dan Sabbagh:
Victims have a veto. David Cameron, giving evidence, said that the test of 
the effectiveness of the Leveson Inquiry would be its impact on those who 
have suffered from press intrusion. “If families like the Dowlers feel this has 
really changed the way they would have been treated, we would have done 
our job properly,” he said. (Sabbagh 2012, p. 11)
This portrayal of victims as “the stakeholders”, the only demographic 
to benefit from press reforms, was more pronounced in the Guardian 
newspaper where several headlines contained a reference to the victims as 
can be seen in the headline, “Leveson report: PM defies press victims: 
1.30pm … Lawyer for Milly Dowler’s parents says PM has ‘failed the 
Dowler test’” (Wintour and Sabbagh 2012, p. 1). A similar headline from 
Guardian stated: “When Leveson reports, parliament must act swiftly…. 
We would be betraying the media’s victims if we ignored its findings” 
(Miliband 2012, p. 26). This construction of victims as “the stakeholders” 
was also identified in the other newspapers’ coverage of the media reform 
debate, although not with the same intensity, and it was used a bit differ-
ently—to critique arguments advanced by the victims’ campaigners as can 
be seen in the headline “Hacked off don’t speak for victims, insists 7/7 
father” (Cohen 2013, p. 28). This construction of victims as “the stake-
holders” may have accounted for victim-related sources emerging among 
the top three sources used in the coverage as shown in Table 9.2.
From the statistics, we see that just three groups (press related, policy-
makers and press abuse victims) made up 79.8 per cent of the sources (see 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2). While I share the view that the press were vital partici-
pants because the debate was about them, policymakers were important 
because they were the decision-making sphere, and the victims were vital 
because they had first-hand experience relevant to the debate, I argue that 
limiting the debate in the media’s public sphere to this narrow spectrum 
of stakeholders risks leaving out large sections of the society that do not 
fall within these major categories but are inarguably stakeholders in the 
debate on press standards. In a democracy, how the press should be regu-
lated is a matter that concerns the whole of society and that ought to have 
been reflected in the distribution of sources. The risk to democracy here is 
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that only a few sections of society dominated a debate on a matter that 
concerns all. One of the problems with this is that some sections of society 
may develop apathy towards the debate and not see it as a matter that 
concerns them. It can be argued that this narrow spectrum of sources 
reduced the diversity of views about press reform expressed in the media 
and limited the options that were available to policymakers from which 
they made decisions on how to regulate the press.
conclusion
The coverage of the press reform debate featured a doubly narrow spec-
trum of sources, “doubly narrow” because the range of sources was nar-
row and within the narrow spectrum, access tilted heavily in favour of 
press-related sources. Policymakers came next to the press in the hierarchy 
of access to deliberations about media policy in the media’s public sphere. 
One of the challenges with making effective media policies is that both the 
media and policymakers are self-interested parties. The power of political 
leaders to make policy decisions on the media and the power of the press 
to either make or mar a political career make them collaborate with one 
another for “favourable” press coverage to promote a political career in 
exchange for “favourable” media policies that advance the interest of the 
commercial press. I argued that the reciprocal relationship between poli-
cymakers and the press makes it hard for policymakers to advance effective 
media reforms.
This collaboration between the press and policymakers reflected in how 
some politicians advanced the arguments of the bulk of the press in their 
opinion articles. As long as the media possess the power to mar political 
careers, it would be difficult for the politicians to give complete backing to 
effective press reform. That is why this book argues that external pressure 
outside the press and the government is essential for the creation of the 
kind of media policy that will produce an accountable press. This will be 
discussed further in Chap. 10. This chapter also points out that in the 
coverage of the press reform debate, victims of press abuse were repre-
sented as “the stakeholders” rather than “a stakeholder” of the debate. I 
acknowledged the importance of the victims to the debate but argued that 
limiting the stakeholder status to those who have been hurt by the press 
results in a limited range of views and risks shutting down more neutral 
voices that could have enriched the debate in the media’s public sphere. 
Having examined how sources were distributed in the press coverage of 
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the media policy debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking scandal, 
the next chapter discusses the importance accorded to diverse issues of 
concern in the public sphere.
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CHAPTER 10
Representation of Media Policy
The term “media policy” as used in this book refers to “all law and regula-
tion dealing with an information production chain that includes informa-
tion creation, processing, flows and use” (Braman 2004, p. 153). Media 
policies in modern democracies are diverse with a single nation having 
different media policies for different sorts of media. For instance, in the 
UK, policies for the broadcast media differ in some ways to those for 
newspapers, and policies for newspapers differ from those for social media 
and so on (Freedman 2008, p. 15; Psychogiopoulou 2012, p. 231). Since 
this book deals with the printed press, my focus will be on media policies 
in relation to newspapers. As stated earlier, newspapers in Britain are self- 
regulated. The Editors’ Code of Practice sets guidelines that the press is to 
adhere to and failure to do so attracts penalties (see section on press regu-
lation earlier in this book).
There are also policies such as the competition rules instituted by the 
government to check for unfair competition in media ownership (see ear-
lier in this book). All these policies are put in place to ensure that the press 
fulfils its function in society which, as explained in Chap. 4, includes ensur-
ing an informed citizenry, providing a democratic forum for public 
debates, introducing relevant topics to the public sphere for deliberations 
and by so doing sustaining democracy. The potential of the press to either 
sustain or destroy democracy makes the development of media policy that 
can guarantee an accountable press vital to every democratic society. That 
is why when there is perceived abuse of press power, calls are made for 
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inquiries or commissions to be set up to investigate the press practices with 
the purpose of calling the press to order where necessary. As discussed in 
Chap. 3, attempts to call the press to order often result in public debates 
about how to create or reform media policies.
The coverage of debates about media policy presents a unique situation 
in which the media has the responsibility of managing debates on their 
policy. In Western democracies, it is widely accepted that what legitimates 
the media is its claim to the protection of democracy (see Chap. 4). In 
debates about media policy, the media is, therefore, expected to serve as a 
democratic public sphere (see Chap. 4). The normative expectation in a 
democratic society is that during such debates, the media should give 
access to all parties in the debate irrespective of whether the party advances 
arguments different from the position of that media organisations in the 
debate. If this does not take place, any view different from that of the press 
will not be given access into the media’s public sphere. If the media must 
serve as a free marketplace of ideas (Mill 1966; Curran and Seaton 2010), 
then the various arguments and issues of concern during media policy 
debates will need to be accorded equal priority in the press. Was that the 
case in the coverage of the debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking 
scandal and the Leveson Inquiry? The answer is no. My investigation 
revealed a serious shortcoming in the coverage of media policy debates, a 
situation where the media gives quality space to arguments it considers to 
be in its favour while discourses calling for stringent reforms are either left 
out or given less quality space in media narratives on press reform.
RepResentation of Media policy: HieRaRcHy 
of iMpoRtance
The inverted pyramid style of news writing suggests that journalists would 
often put the issues they consider to be most important at the top of the 
narrative (Pottker 2003, p. 501; Franklin et al. 2005, p. 122). Though 
this style of writing news is being contested, it is still the prevalent form of 
news writing. As such, it was the method used in this book, to measure the 
importance accorded to different arguments in the press reform debate. 
Table 10.1 presents the arguments that emerged at the top position in the 
narrative structure of articles in the coverage of the media policy debate 
that arose from the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. 
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In my analysis, “the top” is regarded as the first position in the narrative 
structure of a news article.
The top three in the hierarchy of importance were arguments relating 
to press freedom (25.9 per cent), press law and statutory regulation or 
underpinning (19.3 per cent) and, interestingly, the public interest (10.8 
per cent). The least in the order of importance was “against self- regulation” 
(0.6 per cent). Arguments relating to “press freedom” featured more 
prominently in the sub-interpretive sphere made up of The Sun, Daily 
Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph, appearing as the 
Table 10.1 Hierarchy of importance: frequency of arguments at the top position 
in the narrative
Issues of concern Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Against press laws 
and statutory 
regulation/
underpinning
6.0 24.5 41.7 26.5 23.5 24.3 19.3
Press freedom 21.6 26.5 25.0 33.3 23.5 25.7 25.9
Public trust 1.8 0.0 4.2 5.9 0.0 0.0 2.1
Against politicians’ 
Royal Charter
9.6 9.2 4.2 2.9 5.9 6.8 7.3
Against 
self-regulation
1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Against the 
Leveson Inquiry
3.6 14.3 0.0 2.0 11.8 18.9 7.9
Support for press 
laws and statutory 
regulation
3.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Privacy 14.4 7.1 4.2 8.8 5.9 1.4 8.9
Public interest 8.4 7.1 8.3 18.6 23.5 8.1 10.8
Against new press 
regulatory system 
formed by the press
5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Support for 
politicians’ Royal 
Charter
10.2 1.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1
Support for the 
Leveson Inquiry
10.8 1.0 0.0 1.0 5.9 2.7 4.8
Other 5.4 7.1 4.2 1.0 0.0 17.6 6.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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first subject of discussion in 33.3 per cent of Daily Telegraph; 25.7 per cent 
of The Sun; 26.5 per cent of Daily Mail; 25 per cent of Daily Mirror and 
23.5 per cent of Daily Express compared to 21.6 per cent of Guardian (see 
Table 10.1). Arguments related to press freedom in The Sun, Daily Mirror, 
Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph warned that statutory 
underpinning of a new press regulatory body, as proposed by the Leveson 
Inquiry and subsequently applied to the Royal Charter on press regula-
tion, was a threat to press freedom. The Guardian’s discourses relating to 
press freedom were mostly counter-arguments to the position of the other 
newspapers, as explained in previous chapters.
Some issues received no mention at the top of the narrative structure of 
some of the newspapers. This trend of giving prime place in the narrative 
structure to arguments perceived to be in their interest, with little or no 
mention of opposing views within that sphere of importance, was identi-
fied in the sub-interpretive sphere comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, 
Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph. In both The Sun and the 
Daily Express, identical issues received no mention in this sphere of impor-
tance. They include “public trust”, “against self-regulation”, “support for 
press law and statutory regulation/underpinning”, “against new press 
regulatory system formed by the press” and “support for politicians’ Royal 
Charter”. For the Daily Mail, it was “public trust”, “against self- 
regulation” and “against new press regulatory system formed by the 
press”. Similarly, the Daily Mirror kept out of this quality space arguments 
“against self- regulation”, in “support for press laws and statutory regula-
tion/underpinning”, arguments “against new press regulatory system 
formed by the press” and, interestingly, arguments in “support for the 
Leveson Inquiry” and arguments “against the Leveson Inquiry”. The 
same trend was identified in the Daily Telegraph which did not include at 
the top of the narrative structure arguments “against self-regulation”, in 
“support for politicians’ Royal Charter” and “against new press regulatory 
system formed by the press”. This affirms that the commercial press used 
their gatekeeping powers to accord more importance to arguments or 
issues they considered to be in its favour during the media policy debate.
The Sun gave prime place (at the top of the narrative structure) to argu-
ments that warn of threats to press freedom (25.7 per cent): “against press 
laws and statutory regulation/underpinning” (24.3 per cent) and “argu-
ments against Leveson Inquiry” (18.9 per cent). A similar trend played 
out in other newspapers in this sub-interpretive sphere. However, in the 
Daily Express “public interest” featured prominently at the top of its 
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narrative structure (23.5 per cent). Though this is commendable, the 
interpretation of what constitutes the public interest raises questions which 
will be examined more closely later in this chapter. It is worthy of note that 
in the sub-interpretive sphere comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily 
Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph, arguments against the new press 
regulatory system formed by the press did not feature at all in this sphere 
of importance.
Despite its importance to democracy and the sustenance of newspaper 
readership, the issue of “public trust” was among the subjects that received 
the least attention in the journalistic metadiscourse. A closer look at the 
context within which the issue of public trust was used by the press 
revealed that they rarely discussed their own need to build public trust but 
instead turned its readers’ attention to other institutions facing the same 
challenge. The journalistic metadiscourse contained instances where insti-
tutions other than the press were criticised for the lack of public trust on 
their operations. An example is this article from Daily Telegraph:
NEW Labour’s policy of “spin” and media “manipulation” has damaged 
democracy and undermined public trust in politics, Lord Leveson said. 
(Ross 2012, p. 10)
Here, the Labour Party rather than the press received the blame for the 
public’s lack of trust. Only few stories touched on the need for the press 
to build public trust (Huhne 2013, p. 28). The implication of this manner 
of coverage for democracy is that the problem of lack of public trust is not 
addressed and as such is not tackled. The need to pay more attention to 
the issue of public trust is given credence by the results of a survey carried 
out by YouGov which shows that only 7 per cent of the public trust news-
papers to behave responsibly (Media Standards Trust 2009) while as much 
as 75 per cent believe “newspapers frequently publish stories they know 
are inaccurate” (Ibid., n.p.). Such a high level of lack of trust in the media 
can result in a breakdown of effective communication between the media 
and the public.
As discussed in Chap. 2, the media plays a very important role in mod-
ern democracy. It serves as a medium for information dissemination and 
mobilisation to many in society. Where trust between the press and the 
public becomes eroded, people may lose faith in deliberations in the 
media’s public sphere, no longer depend on the press for information or 
not take the content of their productions seriously. This can impact 
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negatively on effective governance as well as on the political, economic 
and social wellbeing of any society. If citizens are no longer interested in 
debates within the public sphere, this will of course impact on their par-
ticipation in debates about media policy. One of the consequences is that 
they would neglect their role in ensuring effective media reform. Unlike 
“public trust”, the issue of the “public interest” was given substantial 
space at the top of the narrative structure of stories on media reform, mak-
ing it the third issue of concern in the hierarchy of importance. It was 
surpassed only by “press freedom” and “arguments against press law and 
statutory regulations”. Overall, it appeared at the top of the narrative 
structure in 10.8 per cent of the issues at the top.
As discussed in Chap. 2, the press had often used the public interest 
defence as an excuse to invade the privacy of people with a public profile 
and indulge in other clandestine activities. The controversy in defining 
what constitutes the public interest is what prompted Lord Justice Leveson 
to propose an optional pre-publication advice service for newspaper edi-
tors (Leveson 2012, para. 62, p. 15). Ironically, the journalistic metadis-
course on the coverage of the inquiry and the ensuing debate on press 
standards also faced the controversy of what exactly constitutes the public 
interest; even conflicting arguments were said to be in the public interest. 
Both sub-interpretive spheres of discourse (Guardian versus The Sun, 
Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph) stressed the 
importance of journalism done in the public interest. Newspapers in both 
spheres laid claim to practising journalism in the public interest. Such 
claims were usually made when they felt the need to repair their cru-
sader image.
For instance, when the Guardian newspaper discovered it was wrong in 
accusing the News of the World of deleting messages from the voicemail of 
the murdered school girl, Milly Dowler, the story that attempted to 
acknowledge its mistake had as its headline: “Leveson report: Judge 
addresses Guardian’s story on hacking of Milly Dowler’s phone: Report 
praises paper’s public interest journalism NoW probably did not delete 
voicemail messages” (Booth 2012, p. 15). The Sun did the same when 
some of its staff were arrested for allegedly making payments to public 
officials for stories (Kavanagh 2012a, p. 12). Similarly, Daily Mirror while 
trying to promote the press’ Royal Charter on press regulation, which was 
later rejected, said: “The Daily Mirror is committed to high-quality jour-
nalism in the public interest, giving the working people of Britain a voice 
in the corridors of power” (Daily Mirror 2013, p. 8). Journalism done in 
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the public interest is one of the normative expectations of journalism in a 
democratic society. The use of “public interest” as a defence and image 
repair strategy explains why it emerged as one of the key subjects of the 
debate even though it received far less attention than the issue of press 
freedom (see Table 10.1). Indeed, the subject of “public interest” served 
different purposes in the journalistic metadiscourse of the press reform 
debate that followed the phone hacking scandal. One way it functioned 
was as a reason for the press’ opposition to statutory regulation. For exam-
ple, an article in The Sun stated:
But let’s not bring good journalism to its knees in the process by introduc-
ing state regulation that can and would be used by those seeking to stifle 
genuine wrongdoing that is firmly in the public interest. (Moore 2011, p. 13)
The statement is one of many comments made to drive home the point 
that statutory underpinning would endanger public interest journalism. It 
was used by Daily Express when it rebuked the National Union of 
Journalists (NUJ) for allowing itself to be “brainwashed by Leftist dogma”:
Shamefully, it [the NUJ] has joined the calls for statutory press regulation, 
arguing that the “right to free expression cannot be absolute” but must be 
“balanced by the public interest”. To a Left-winger the “public interest” 
means the suppression of unacceptable opinions. (Daily Express, 29 
November 2012, p. 14)
The Sun advanced the same argument in an article with the headline 
“Regulating the press is not in public interest … it’s in the interests of 
politicians; 300 years of freedom under threat this week” (Hodges 2013, 
p. 10). The article debunked claims by politicians on the left that their 
argument for the Royal Charter on press regulation to be underpinned by 
statute was because it was in the public interest. It stated:
And ask yourself if they really are pressing for media regulation because they 
think it’s in the “public interest”. The answer, of course, is it is nothing to 
do with the public interest. It is all about their interests. This week 300 years 
of Press freedom is in the balance. And it could end because our politicians 
want it to. (ibid.)
The press also debunked claims by campaign organisations that their 
call for press laws was in the public interest. It then went on to promote 
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the discourse of the British press as an architect of “journalism in the pub-
lic interest”, each paper or class of paper promoting itself as working in the 
interest of the public. The Sun quoted Tim Luckhurst, a Professor of 
Journalism at Kent University, as saying: “Popular newspapers are bold 
defenders of the public interest. It protects our liberties and holds power 
to account. MPs should search their conscience and vote for freedom of 
expression unlimited by state intervention” (Dunn 2013, pp. 6–7). The 
press debunked the claims of all other parties in the debate to the pursuit 
of a form of journalism that would be in the public interest while main-
taining that the journalism being practised by the British press was in the 
public interest. It can be argued that such arguments sought, amongst 
others, to maintain the status quo in press standards (Beckford 2012, 
p. 21). In summary, the emergence of high mentions of the “public inter-
est” at the top of the narrative structure on the press reform debate did 
not reflect concern for the public; it was instead used for self-interested 
purposes such as protecting the crusader image of the press and arguing 
against statutory regulation or underpinning of press regulation. One area 
where the “public interest” clause is often quoted by journalists is in 
defence of invasion of privacy. When can privacy invasion be in the public 
interest?
It is worthy of note that one of the major contentions in the press 
reform debate was how to strike a balance between the protection of press 
freedom and the protection of privacy. While campaigners for victims 
sought to protect privacy (O’Carroll 2013, n.p.), much of the press chan-
nelled their resources towards the protection of the neoliberal concept of 
press freedom (Forsyth 2013, p. 15). All newspapers examined appeared 
to have been against more privacy laws (Roberts 2011, n.p.; Embley 2012, 
pp. 8–9; Forsyth 2012, p. 12; Kampfner 2012, p. 29; Moir 2012, n.p.). 
Instances where this was demonstrated include the coverage of the inva-
sion into the privacy of the Duchess of Cambridge in France (Greenslade 
2012, n.p.; Kampfner 2012, p. 29) and the response of the French press 
to ex-IMF (International Monetary Fund) boss Dominique Strauss- 
Kahn’s alleged sexual escapades (Forsyth 2012, p. 12; Kavanagh 2012b, 
p. 10). Newspapers in both spheres pointed to these as proof that proper 
self-regulation, not more privacy laws, was what the British press needed 
as can be seen in the Guardian’s article with the headline “Proper self- 
regulation works better than the law to protect privacy”. The article stated:
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The court victory secured on behalf of Prince William and his wife certainly 
doesn’t prove that the French privacy law is so good that we should have 
one here. Just the opposite. (Greenslade 2012, n.p.)
There were, however, some differences in the depth and treatment of 
the issue of privacy among the papers. Guardian’s treatment of privacy 
consisted of analyses of academic works on the issue of privacy, news on 
incidents of invasion of privacy by the press, critical analysis of the Leveson 
Inquiry’s proposals on privacy and discussions on regulations on privacy as 
contained in the Royal Charter on press regulation. Like all other papers 
in the study sample, Guardian newspaper was against the proposal of 
exemplary fines for papers who refuse to sign up to the new regulatory 
body even if the paper wins the case as can be seen in its article headlined 
“Tory and Leveson plans for exemplary privacy damages ‘may be unlaw-
ful’ ” (O’Carroll 2013, n.p.) but its opposition to it was not as intense as 
that from other papers. It argued that the printed press could overlook 
that flaw in the Royal Charter and still sign up to it. One key distinguish-
ing feature between Guardian’s treatment of the issue of privacy and that 
of some other papers was that it rarely used the platform of discussions on 
privacy to criticise campaigners for tighter privacy laws.
The Daily Telegraph’s treatment of the subject of privacy was closer in 
form to that of Guardian newspaper in that its opposition to tighter pri-
vacy laws was not as intense as those of The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Mail 
and Daily Express. This may not be unconnected to the fact that Guardian 
and Daily Telegraph are both quality newspapers. However, there was not 
much in-depth analysis on the issue of privacy in Daily Telegraph. Most of 
Daily Telegraph’s articles on privacy were in its news section (Adams 2011, 
p. 17; Rayner 2012, p. 7) as if it deliberately avoided giving opinion on the 
issue of privacy. The few discussions on privacy were mainly warnings that 
privacy invasion by the internet was a bigger problem than that done by 
the printed press (Johnson 2012, p. 24).
The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Mail and Daily Express were not that cau-
tious in their approach to the coverage of privacy. The bulk of their stories 
on privacy were attacks against those who campaigned for tighter privacy 
laws, both celebrities and representatives of campaign organisations. 
Unlike the Guardian and Daily Telegraph, they minced no words in 
expressing their revulsion against tighter privacy laws and the people who 
propagate such arguments, as can be seen in this article from Daily Mail 
newspaper:
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Sienna Miller is on the cover of Vogue this month and, if not actually invad-
ing her own privacy, then at least tiptoeing across it over five gorgeously 
scrumptious pages inside … In the accompanying interview, Sienna talks 
about being the subject of sustained paparazzi interest … ‘Miller said; That 
level of scrutiny has a massive effect on me personally …. It was just a fish-
bowl.’ Yet isn’t it laughably hypocritical of her to dive naked into that very 
same fishbowl when it suits? … Don’t make me laugh. Sienna is handled 
with the kiddiest of kid gloves the interviewer wonders if Miller will marry 
fellow British actor Tom Sturridge, the father of her four-month-old child, 
but refrains from asking. She doesn’t want to pry! Is this really what the 
British press has come to? What a joke. (Moir 2012, n.p.)
Though as tactless with words as the other three (if not more), The Sun 
gave privacy minimal attention (see Table 10.1). On all four fronts, there 
was little or no in-depth analysis on privacy protection. The stories centred 
on their campaign against tighter privacy laws and news narratives on inci-
dents of privacy invasion which, it can be argued, served as entertainment 
to their readers. In summary, the treatment of the issue of privacy in the 
journalistic metadiscourse on the debate that followed the phone hacking 
scandal was largely shallow and characterised by a lack of self-appraisal. 
This finding confirms the claim by previous studies which say the press 
avoids or gives limited coverage to criticisms against themselves and that 
journalistic metadiscourse is characterised by a lack of self-critique (Eason 
1988; Haas 2006, cited in Carlson 2015, p. 9; Alexander et al. 2016). A 
similar argument posits that alternative views are marginalised and/or 
silenced in debates about the media (Casey et al. 2008, p. 194; Savigny 
2016, p. 12). The next section discusses alternative views in the journalis-
tic metadiscourse on the press reform debate and the implication of such 
manner of coverage.
tHe Media policy debate: alteRnative views
Aforementioned scholars have argued that alternative solutions that do 
not fall in line with popular views in the public domain receive minimal 
treatment thereby narrowing the options placed in the public sphere for 
deliberation. In this book, alternative views refer to all views in the debate 
that were not mainstream arguments. This comprised views that were not 
common, were different from popular opinion or only featured occasion-
ally. After a preliminary study of articles on the coverage, I came up with 
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the following alternative views: strengthen checks on media ownership 
concentration; enforce existing laws on crimes such as phone hacking; 
avoid all forms of Royal Charter; a cultural revolution of journalists and 
proprietors is key to press reform; some level of privacy invasion is a neces-
sary hazard of a free press; and do not expect too much from the press (see 
Table 10.2). Table 10.2 shows that the most frequent alternative view in 
the study sample was “enforce existing laws on crimes such as phone hack-
ing”. This appeared in 40.7 per cent of all alternative views in the study 
sample. It made up 75 per cent of alternative views in Daily Express, 66.7 
per cent of alternative views in Daily Mirror, 58.2 per cent of alternative 
views in Daily Telegraph, 36.4 per cent of alternative views in Daily Mail, 
30.8 per cent of alternative views in The Sun and 28 per cent of alternative 
views in Guardian. The results show that this argument featured more in 
the sub-interpretive sphere comprising The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily 
Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph.
Table 10.2 Percentage within alternative views
Alternative views Guardian 
(%)
Daily 
Mail 
(%)
Daily 
Mirror 
(%)
Daily 
Telegraph 
(%)
Daily 
Express 
(%)
The 
Sun 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Strengthen checks 
on concentration of 
media ownership
24.0 4.5 16.7 14.5 0.0 3.8 14.4
Enforce existing 
laws on crimes such 
as phone hacking
28.0 36.4 66.7 58.2 75.0 30.8 40.7
Avoid all forms of 
Royal Charter
1.3 36.4 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 8.8
Cultural revolution 
of journalists and 
proprietors is key
4.0 2.3 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.0 5.1
Some level of 
privacy invasion is a 
necessary hazard of 
a free press
9.3 9.1 8.3 0.0 0.0 34.6 9.7
Do not expect too 
much from the 
press
0.0 4.5 8.3 10.9 0.0 11.5 5.6
Other 33.3 6.8 0.0 0.0 25.0 19.2 15.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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The next in line was the view “strengthen checks on concentration of 
media ownership”. This view followed with far fewer occurrences, with 
14.4 per cent of alternative views. It was advanced in greater proportion 
by the Guardian newspaper, making up 24 per cent of its alternative 
views. It emerged as 16.7 per cent of the Daily Mirror’s alternative views, 
14.5 per cent of Daily Telegraph’s, 4.5 per cent of Daily Mail’s, 3.8 per 
cent of The Sun’s and not at all in Daily Express’ alternative views. The 
results suggest this argument may have been stifled in the commercial 
press due to a conflict of interest caused by concentration of media owner-
ship (McChesney 2008). The alternative views that received the fewest 
representations were “cultural revolution of journalists and proprietors is 
key” to media reform and “do not expect too much from the press” 
emerging as 5.1 per cent and 5.6 per cent, respectively, of alternative views 
in the coverage of the media policy debate.
One view that was not included in the list of alternative views but 
turned out to be an alternative view was that the process of getting a new 
press regulatory body was rushed and that with more time they could have 
arrived at a decision that was acceptable to all parties (Rusbridger 2013, 
p.  26). Though this call for more time was included in the dominant 
themes table, it appeared as the dominant theme, “more dialogue needed”, 
in only 0.6 per cent of the study sample and only in the Guardian news-
paper. Another such theme was that press membership to the new press 
regulatory body should be made compulsory by law (Cathcart 2013, 
n.p.). Though this view had the potential to prevent the Desmond syn-
drome (a media organisation refusing to join the press regulatory body—
Desmond 2015, p. 291), it was, apparently, nipped in the bud and was not 
developed by any of the newspapers.
conclusion
The coverage of the debate that followed the NoTW phone hacking scan-
dal demonstrates that during debates about their policy, the media allocate 
more quality space to arguments perceived to be in their interest than to 
those considered to be against their interest. For example, warnings of 
threat to “press freedom” featured more frequently than any other theme 
at the top of the narrative structure of news articles on the media policy 
debate while arguments against self-regulation and against the new press 
regulatory system formed by the press were among issues that had the 
fewest occurrences within this sphere of importance (the first two 
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paragraphs of a news story). The advantage of featuring more prominently 
within this space is that the views expressed at the top of the story would 
likely get more reads than others lower down in the narrative structure of 
the story because more people tend to read the first few paragraphs of a 
story even when they do not read the whole article.
The emergence of quality media reform would require robust debates 
on media policy within a democratic public sphere. There is need for 
equality in the representation of views on media policy. Views and issues 
of concern should be accorded priority in a news article not because they 
are the position of the media but because of the weight of their impor-
tance in the debate. Failure to do so will disadvantage ideas, some of which 
may contribute to the emergences of strong media reforms. My investiga-
tion revealed that though prominent space was given to the issue of the 
“public interest”, discussions related to the subject were aimed at asserting 
the importance of newspaper, each newspaper claiming that they practice 
journalism in the public interest. The various interpretations of “public 
interest” in the journalistic metadiscourse demonstrate that the problem 
of “what constitutes the public interest” is far from over. Considering the 
impact of irresponsible journalism on society, it is high time the public 
started playing an active role in defining what constitutes the public inter-
est. For example, the public can become more vocal in criticising news 
publications that are not in the public interest, support newspapers that 
engage in public interest journalism and withdraw their patronage from 
defaulting newspapers.
This chapter also analysed alternative views; these are arguments 
expressed in the media policy debate which were given very little atten-
tion. The alternative views expressed in the debate that followed the 
NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry are “enforce exist-
ing laws on crimes such as phone hacking”, instead of the introduction of 
more stringent regulations; “strengthen checks on concentration of media 
ownership”; “avoid all forms of Royal Charter”; promote “cultural revo-
lution of journalists and proprietors”; “people should not expect too 
much from the press” and the view that “some level of privacy invasion is 
a necessary hazard of a free press”. There was also a call for more time for 
dialogue towards arriving at a media policy reform acceptable to all parties 
involved. The manner of coverage of the press reform debate did not 
encourage the exploration of these and other alternative views to press 
reform. This agrees with the argument of Savigny (2016, p. 12) that alter-
native views are marginalised or silenced in debates about the media. The 
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coverage of the press reform debate facilitated a zero-sum game of “statu-
tory” or “no statutory” regulation/underpinning. All other arguments 
fed these two positions. The debate was too narrow and lacked robustness 
such that other options, for example, public reformism, were not explored 
as a means of achieving press accountability. This manner of coverage is 
toxic to democracy.
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CHAPTER 11
Conclusion
Democracy feeds from people’s participation in their own governance 
(Lincoln 2009 [1863]). That would, from the maximalist approach to 
democracy, require citizens’ participation in the decision-making pro-
cesses of matters concerning them (Lipset and Lakin 2004, p. 20; Ewald 
2013, p. 52). One way this is done is through citizens’ participation in 
public debates within a democratic public space, what Habermas (1989) 
refers to as the public sphere. In today’s large democracies, the media 
serves as a space for public debates with the hope that through such 
debates, it can impact on policy decisions. The normative expectation is 
that the media ought to serve as a democratic public sphere, not only dur-
ing debates about other institutions in society but also during debates 
about their policy. Aforementioned studies contend that this has not been 
the case (Stiegler 2013; Carlson and Berkowitz 2014). The susceptibility 
of the media to exploit their power as the facilitators of the public sphere 
to promote their views above those of other stakeholders during debates 
about their policy gives relevance to the study of the coverage on media 
policy debates.
The study of the coverage of media policy debates thus serves as an 
accountability system to check abuse of this public sphere by the media 
during debates about their policy. The NoTW phone hacking scandal pro-
vided an opportunity for this study because it stirred up a debate on press 
reform that was widely covered by the press. Broadly speaking, the book 
attempted to show how the media covered the press reform debate that 
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arose from the NoTW phone hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry. Its 
hope was that in the process, it would provide information for stakehold-
ers (including members of the public, policymakers, campaigners for 
media reform and academics, amongst others) on how to ensure effective 
media reform in addition to enlightening readers on how to consume 
metacoverage on media policy. Let me pause here to briefly explain how 
the terms “metacoverage”, “metajournalistic discourse” and “journalistic 
metadiscourse” were used in this book.
In this book, metacoverage refers to all types of self-coverage by the 
media. In Chap. 5, I argued that because of the original meaning and 
composition of the word, it should not be limited to journalists covering 
themselves during political campaigns as used by previous scholars (Esser 
et al. 2001). As explained in Chap. 5, the word “meta”, in this context, is 
a Greek preposition meaning “with, after” (Liddell et al. 2015 [1883]). 
The use of the word as a prefix in the English language became popular in 
the nineteenth century. Examples are words like “meta-thorax”, “meta-
phor” and “metabolic” (Dixon 2014, pp.  165–166). It also metamor-
phosed into the term “self-referential”. One way in which it is used is that 
“a meta-X is an “X” describing an “X”” (ibid.). An example is metadata 
which means data about data (Baca 2008, p. 1). In this book, I argued 
that considering the composition of the word “metacoverage” (coverage 
about coverage) and the fact that self-referential media coverage is diverse, 
the word can adequately be used as an umbrella term for all forms of self- 
referential coverage by the media. Based on this, this book advocates that 
metacoverage be defined as all forms of self-referential coverage by 
the media.
Going by that definition, the discussion in this book falls within the 
category of metacoverage in the field of journalism, what Brin and Drolet 
(2009, p.  271) described as journalistic metadiscourse. I explained, in 
Chap. 5, that journalistic metadiscourse is what Carlson (2015) referred 
to as metajournalistic discourse on journalistic platforms (see Chap. 5). 
My analysis of the journalistic metadiscourse of the press reform debate 
was based on a study of how the debate was covered in six of the top ten 
British national newspapers (based on combined print and online reader-
ship figures for April 2011 to March 2012, NRS PADD 2012), two from 
each class of newspaper (at the time of investigation). For quality newspa-
pers, I examined Guardian and Daily Telegraph; representing the mid- 
markets were Daily Express and Daily Mail, and for the red top tabloid 
newspapers, I examined The Sun and Daily Mirror.
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The research used the method of content analysis and some principles 
from critical discourse analysis to investigate how these newspapers cov-
ered the media reform debate. The results revealed that there were two 
spheres of discourse in the press coverage of the debate. The spheres of 
discourse were referred to, in this book, as sub-interpretive spheres. The 
Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph made up 
one sub-interpretive sphere while Guardian advanced the second sphere 
of discourse. The sphere to which many of the newspapers belonged inter-
preted press freedom based on neoliberal ideologies which advocated 
press self-regulation without state interference. While the second sub- 
interpretive sphere consisting of the Guardian newspaper welcomed state 
interference in the form of a statute-backed press regulatory body, arguing 
that minimal state intervention in press regulation to check press account-
ability would not result in a loss of press freedom. I argued that the 
Guardian’s style of coverage of the press reform debate leaned towards a 
social democratic approach.
Analysing findings from my investigation based on these two spheres 
helped to reveal the major division in the press’ attempt to maintain, assert 
and/or renegotiate their professional boundaries through journalistic 
metadiscourse in the aftermath of the NoTW phone hacking scandal. The 
grouping of newspapers into spheres of discourse does not mean there 
were no differences among newspapers within the same sphere. What it 
means is that newspapers in the same sphere had similar interpretations on 
major issues in the debate. The uniqueness and difference in interpretation 
of each of the newspapers were also considered in the analysis. In showing 
how the debate was covered, I explored how paradigm repair strategies 
were used in the coverage, the extent to which they were used, the way 
sources were used, how blame was attributed and the quality of space 
given to the various arguments in the coverage of the press reform debate 
that followed the phone hacking scandal.
My investigation revealed that the press used five paradigm repair strat-
egies to protect as well as repair its “press freedom” and “crusader image” 
paradigms. In agreement with the findings of Thomas and Finneman 
(2014), this study found that the press used the strategies of (1) “threat to 
the paradigm” (warning of threats to journalism’s paradigms, also cata-
strophisation); (2) “self-assertion” (affirming journalism’s value to a dem-
ocratic society); (3) “minimisation” (downplaying the significance of the 
phone hacking scandal and therefore questioning the legitimacy of the 
inquiry) and (4) “individualisation” (localising the damage to acts 
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committed by a handful of journalists, also bad apples or localisation) in 
their representation of the press reform debate. I added to this a fifth one, 
the strategy of “historicisation” (using history to explicate contemporary 
meaning [in this case, the press’ preferred meaning]).
“Threat to the paradigm” was the dominant paradigm strategy used in 
the coverage. All newspapers examined in my investigation, apart from 
Guardian, used a high percentage of their space to warn that any form of 
state intervention in press regulation was a threat to press freedom. 
Linguistic devices such as hyperboles, “you centeredness” or direct 
address, adjectives and doom-laden rhetoric were used to spread the warn-
ing that press freedom was under attack. This affirms that when media 
scandals lead to calls for further regulation of the press, the resultant 
debate is often constructed in journalistic metadiscourse as a threat to 
press freedom (Carlson 2012; Steel 2012). While not completely ruling 
out the existence of such threats, consumers of journalistic metadiscourse 
will need to take into consideration the political economy behind 
such claims.
In Chap. 6, I showed how the coverage featured a blame game demon-
strating a lack of willingness to accept change to the status quo. Blame was 
first accepted before self-exoneration strategies (individualisation, bad 
apples, localisation) were used to deflect the blame to other institutions, 
journalists or media organisations. For instance, blame for the phone 
hacking scandal was attributed to the criminal justice system, the Press 
Complaints Commission (PCC), other newspaper proprietors, politicians, 
technology, job constraints and commercialism. So, though there was 
wide acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the press, such acknowledge-
ments only served as platforms from which blame was deflected to others. 
This made the high percentage of attribution of blame to journalists 
appear hypocritical. In Chap. 7, I argued that the apologies were probably 
a PR stunt to attract forgiveness from the public in other to retain their 
patronage. The strategy of historicisation was used in a similar fashion. It 
was used to acknowledge press bad behaviour, but in some cases, the 
detailed description of the bad behaviour served as infotainment (informa-
tion designed to entertain). Infotainment can be detrimental to democ-
racy because it can lead to the dumbing down of news and make the public 
a consumer audience, whose appetite is assuaged by such coverage 
(McManus 1994, p. 24; Franklin 1997). This can distract the public from 
active participation in efforts at reforming the press.
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My investigation also revealed that measures aimed at ensuring press 
accountability were interpreted in the sub-interpretive sphere comprising 
The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph as 
unfair, illegitimate, unnecessary, a waste of resources, harmful to the repu-
tation of the country and motivated by a thirst for revenge. This book 
showed that the strategy of minimisation (see Chap. 5) was used to achieve 
this. It was used to denigrate people and institutions that advocated any 
policy perceived as not being in the interest of the commercial press. 
Among those de-legitimised were the Leveson Inquiry, the Royal Charter 
on press self-regulation, politicians, victims of press abuse and campaign-
ers for victims of press abuse. The press’ minimisation of opposing views, 
along with the arguers of such views, shows how the media take advantage 
of their position as the facilitators of the public sphere to trivialise and 
denigrate efforts at reforming the press in a bid to prevent checks on news 
gathering methods that may destroy lives while generating high reader-
ship, power and money (McChesney 2008, p. 451). Measures aimed at 
ensuring press accountability were described as a “chilling effect on inves-
tigative journalism”, “state control”, “slippery slope to licensing of the 
press” and a loss of “300 years of press freedom”. From these construc-
tions, it can be seen that efforts at reforming the press were mostly por-
trayed in a negative light. The Guardian newspaper challenged most of 
these representations, and especially the claim that a statutorily backed 
press regulatory body would result in a loss of “300 years of press free-
dom”. However, it did not sign up to the Royal Charter on press regula-
tion, raising doubts questions about the motive of its position in the media 
reform debate.
The strategy of self-assertion (also self-affirmation or self-justification) 
emerged as a minor theme designed to assert the importance of journalism 
within articles that stressed that a statutorily backed regulatory body 
would pose a threat to press freedom. This strategy was also used to pro-
tect the crusader image of the press when it comes under attack because of 
deviant behaviour. For example, when the Guardian realised that News of 
the World may not have deleted the voicemail of Milly Dowler as the paper 
had earlier published, the strategy of self-assertion was used to highlight 
the crusader attributes of the paper. When such self-affirmations emerge in 
journalistic metadiscourse on media reform debates, it is very likely that 
some error has been committed.
In terms of access to the media’s public sphere, this book argues that 
the coverage of media reform debates features a doubly narrow spectrum 
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of sources. I described it as “doubly narrow” because the range of sources 
was narrow, and within the narrow spectrum, press-related sources domi-
nated the discourse. The sources used were categorised into press-related 
sources, policymakers, sources related to press abuse victims, Leveson and 
the Royal Charter, the judiciary, the police, academics, business organisa-
tions and ordinary members of the public (any individual not linked to a 
corporate body). The content analysis results showed that press-related 
sources were the most used (46.1 per cent) while ordinary citizens were 
the least used (1.6 per cent), demonstrating that the press gave dispropor-
tionate access to its own interpretations in the debate, to the detriment of 
the arguments of other stakeholders. I critiqued the representation of vic-
tims as “the stakeholders” rather than “a stakeholder” of the debate. While 
acknowledging the importance of the victims to the debate, I argued that 
limiting the stakeholder status to those who had been hurt by the press 
results in a limited range of views and risks shutting down more neutral 
voices that could have enriched the press reform debate.
The coverage followed a trend in which arguments perceived to be in 
the media’s self-interest were given more quality space (high up in the nar-
rative structure) than those considered to be against their interest. For 
example, “press freedom” featured more frequently than any other theme 
at the top of the narrative structure while arguments “against self- 
regulation” and “against the new press regulation formed by the press” 
were among issues that had the least appearances at the top of the narra-
tive structure. This is one example of how the gatekeeping powers of the 
media are prone to abuse when the media cover debates about their policy. 
This privileging of the press over other stakeholders in the media policy 
debate was more prominent in The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily 
Mail and Daily Telegraph than in Guardian newspaper. I argue that this 
manner of coverage can have an adverse effect on efforts at ensuring effec-
tive media reform because the bulk of the arguments that gets transmitted 
to the public may be those that protect the status quo in media regulation.
The issue of “public trust” received only minimal coverage, showing 
the need to give this issue more attention in debates about press standards. 
There were some alternative views in the debate that can be further 
explored. They include the need to make press membership to a reformed 
press regulatory body compulsory by law, enforce existing laws on crimes 
such as phone hacking, strengthen checks on concentration of media own-
ership, allocate more time to discussions on media reform and promote 
cultural revolution of journalists and proprietors. Unlike what Stiegler 
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(2013, p. 137) found with the coverage of net neutrality in 2010, the 
media policy debate that followed the phone hacking scandal received very 
wide coverage in the press. While the overall wide coverage is commend-
able, a close look at the number of articles from each newspaper reveals an 
uneven amount of coverage among the newspapers. The bulk of the arti-
cles came from Guardian newspaper (323 out of 870). It was followed by 
Daily Telegraph with 199 articles and Daily Mail with 173 stories. The 
Sun, Daily Mirror and Daily Express were not that liberal with their cover-
age of the media policy debate having only 96, 51 and 28 news articles on 
the debate, respectively. The implications of the overall coverage will be 
the focus of the next section.
Coverage of Media PoliCy
The way the media covered the press reform debate that emanated from 
the News of the World phone hacking scandal reveals trends in the coverage 
of media policy that warrant scrutiny because from an understanding of 
the manner of coverage would come insight into how to manage the cov-
erage of media policy in such a way that it does not weaken media reform. 
Clearly, the press did not serve as democratic public sphere in its coverage 
of the debate. Instead, the press used its gatekeeping powers to advance its 
own views while limiting or preventing arguments which were against its 
self-interest from gaining entrance into the public sphere. It can be argued 
that this reduced the quality of the debate on press reform by inhibiting 
the kind of robust deliberations that produce plurality of views on media 
reform (ibid., p. 36). What emerged was a manner of coverage in which 
diverse paradigm repair strategies were used by the commercial press to 
give prominence to a discourse based on neoliberal ideologies where the 
press can only be self-regulated and where government must not intervene 
in press regulation if the press must be free to hold power to account.
Proponents of social democracy argue that this neoliberal conceptuali-
sation of press freedom primarily serves the business interest of media 
owners who use the “threat to press freedom” argument as a weapon 
against any form of regulation that restricts their ability to invade the pri-
vacy of public figures in search of scoops that will improve the sale and 
readership of their papers (Pickard 2015, p. 4), what Curran and Seaton 
(2010) described as a struggle to maintain “power without 
responsibility”.
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While I agree that the press should be free from state control in order 
to serve as the watchdog of the powerful in society, I am also of the view 
that some level of statutory regulation can enhance rather than inhibit 
democracy (Cushion 2012, p. 198; Heywood 2017, p. 123). However, 
the focus of this book is not to advocate either social democratic or neo-
liberal perspectives but to contend that the media ought to serve as a 
democratic public sphere, a space where robust debates on diverse per-
spectives of media reform can hold. Such robust debates have the capacity 
to produce quality approaches to media reform. Neoliberal perspectives 
ought not to be hegemonic in debates about media policy.
However, this book documented that Guardian newspaper toed the 
social democratic line of argument, arguing that a little dab of statute to 
prevent the Royal Charter from being abrogated easily (the law establish-
ing it cannot be repealed without a two-thirds majority from both Houses 
of Parliament) will not amount to a loss of press freedom. As I pointed in 
Chap. 5, the fact that Guardian newspaper challenged the neoliberal per-
spectives of the other newspapers demonstrates that there was some level 
of diversity in the coverage, but the level of diversity was minimal. Though 
it can be argued that Guardian had a high amount of coverage (323 out 
of 870 news articles) on the debate, it is important to note that all of its 
articles were read by only its print readership of 4.06  million between 
2011 and 2012 (readership figures for April 2011 to March 2012, NRS 
PADD 2012). As stated earlier, even with its combined print and online 
readership of about nine million, the circulation of Guardian is much 
lower than the combined readership of the other five newspapers: 20.5 mil-
lion print and 49.4 million combined print and online readership (reader-
ship figures for April 2011 to March 2012, NRS PADD 2012). This 
coverage reveals an imbalance in the potential power of influence between 
the neoliberal and the social democratic press. The danger this poses to 
democracy is that neoliberal perspective will dominate the public sphere 
producing a narrow spectrum of views. And as Cushion (2018) has shown, 
the influence of the print media goes beyond its readership because it 
sometimes serves as a secondary source of information to the British 
broadcast media. Therefore, such manner of coverage can result in popu-
lar support for policies that are based on only neoliberal views, even when 
those views are based on self-interest.
And, indeed, the promotion of self-interest was evident in the coverage. 
Arguments perceived as not being in the interests of the press were 
accorded a weak position in the hierarchy of importance in news narrative; 
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alternative views were blocked out and paradigm repair strategies were 
used to protect news paradigms. All these combined to keep quality 
options that could have provided effective checks on press power. What 
emerged was a zero-sum game of “statutory” or “no statutory” regula-
tion. Several other options and alternative views were not explored. For 
example, despite its huge potential to do so, there was not much talk 
about how the public could help to reform the press.
The length the commercial press went to protect its neoliberal percep-
tion of press freedom is disturbing. The study of the coverage highlighted 
the enormous gatekeeping powers in the hands of the press and its ability 
to use them to its advantage to the detriment of any person or institution 
that dares to rise against it (Stiegler 2013, p. 137). There is obviously a 
need for such powers to come under check because they have the potential 
to give birth to autocracy and inequality in society (Rozell and Mayer 
2008, p. 328). Steps need to be taken to ensure that the press serves as a 
democratic public sphere not only when it covers other institutions, but 
also when it covers debates about its policies.
This book recommends that measures to ensure a democratic public 
sphere should come from within and outside the press. From within, the 
press needs to make conscious efforts to ensure that it serves as a demo-
cratic public space during debates about its policies. That means the range 
of sources should be more diverse to represent all sections of society; the 
press should not take undue advantage of its position as the facilitator of 
the public sphere to dominate the discourse; key issues of concern in the 
debate should be given proportionate space in the news narrative; and the 
conceptualisation of “the stakeholders of the press” should be expanded 
to include more neutral voices outside celebrities and other victims of 
press abuse. Taking the position that the ownership structure was respon-
sible for the emergence of two sub-interpretive spheres, I recommend that 
efforts to diversify news content should go beyond plurality of owners to 
plurality of business models.
However, I acknowledge that drawing up a list of recommendations for 
the press to follow does not axiomatically translate into a cultural revolu-
tion of the press. It will require willingness on the part of the press to 
become a democratic public sphere before it can adopt any of these rec-
ommendations. This book recognises the challenge in asking the press to 
serve as a democratic public sphere during debates about themselves 
because bias is inevitable and every organisation or industry may exhibit 
some level of bias in its own favour (Elmessiri 2006, p. 49; Livermore 
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2011, p.  50). However, the fact that bias is inevitable does not mean 
action cannot be taken to check bias in self-coverage. That is why steps to 
make the press accountable should also come from outside the press. 
Many appear to have recognised this fact but have narrowed their gaze to 
the state as being the only custodian of the public interest (Heywood 
2017, p. 123). It is high time the public took their place as major custodi-
ans of their own interest.
One media accountability system with huge potential to reform the 
press, yet is underexplored, is non-governmental public reformism. Public 
reformism seeks to improve the standard and viability of journalism 
through concerted action (Curran 2011, p.  31), such actions as could 
enhance the democratic performance of the media. Examples of such 
actions include strategies to promote a public interest culture among pro-
fessional journalists, the public ownership and funding of leading broad-
casting organisations, subsidising minority newspapers, public action to 
support independent news production and giving vouchers to citizens for 
annual donation to a news medium of their choice who has fulfilled some 
public interest function including offering free access to online news 
(ibid.).
In agreement with Curran’s call for public reformism (ibid.), Pickard 
suggests that public media be strengthened to sustain the journalism that 
the commercial media no longer supports (Pickard 2015, pp. 228–231). 
Freedman (2014, pp. 104–106) also recognises the power of the public to 
reform the press and induce it to fulfil its role in the sustenance of democ-
racy. According to Freedman, “developments like the internet have not 
only undermined the power of the traditional gatekeepers but have put in 
their place, a ‘public society’ to which there can be no meaningful resis-
tance” (ibid.). Jarvis (2011) puts it this way:
Publicness is a sign of our empowerment at their expense. Dictators and 
politicians, media moguls and marketers try to tell us what to think and say. 
But now in a truly public society, they must listen to what we say. (Jarvis 
2011, p. 11)
Despite the threat of oligopoly and manipulation of online platforms by 
corporate internet giants like Google and Facebook alongside other elite 
voices, the power of the public to serve as a force for media reform is still 
very tangible (Castells 2013). In his The Contradictions of Media Power, 
Freedman (2014, pp. 25–30) acknowledged the power of the public to 
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reform the press. One area of public reformism that has not been much 
explored is public reformism without government intervention. A major 
component of public reformism that is void of government intervention is 
“the willpower of the public”. Willpower is defined by McGonigal (2011, 
p. 8) as “the ability to control our attention, emotion, and desires”. Riley 
(2011, p. 3) views willpower as “the attitude of the mind which is directed 
with conscious attention to some action”. Willpower has often been anal-
ysed in terms of self-control: how to break bad habits such as overcoming 
addictions, eating less and sticking to your resolutions. Most of these are 
things that relate to the individual’s self-development. This is what I refer 
to as “willpower as an internal force for self-development”.
But willpower can also be used to change societies (Baumeister and 
Tierney 2012). That is what I refer to as “willpower as an external force 
for societal development”. In line with the argument of some psycholo-
gists (McGonigal 2011; Riley 2011, pp. 1–2; Taylor 2017) that willpower 
can be used to “create the life you want”, I argue that the public can direct 
their willpower to create the press they want. The saying “we get the press 
we deserve” (Gladstone et  al. 2011; Boston 2015) makes sense when 
viewed under the lenses of willpower. It can therefore be argued that the 
public’s inaction and/or action have played a major role in the manner of 
press we have and can play a major role in what it becomes. The public has 
power to reform the press. That is not to say the public is the sole solution 
to all forms of degeneration in the public sphere. What it means is that the 
public can play a key role in ensuring an accountable press, the kind of 
press that can efficiently serve democracy. The public is not the helpless 
and powerless victim of press power as some have described them (Salter 
2007). The problem is that the public is yet to fully grasp the enormous 
power it possesses, one which can be used to effectively reform the press. 
As Tom Baistow pointed out:
There is no shortage of ideas, as the evidence of the Royal Commission 
showed. Only the will is lacking. If we don’t generate that among both 
public and parliament we shall end up with the press we deserve, but the 
press no real democracy can afford. (Baistow 2015 [1970], p. 56)
Baistow observed that “it will take considerable time and a conscious, 
organized effort to educate” the public to use their willpower for press 
reform (ibid.). McGonigal (2011) found that the brain can be trained for 
greater willpower. Similarly, Baumeister and Tierney (2012, p. 1) show us 
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that willpower is like a muscle that can be strengthened with practice. All 
these go to show that with adequate enlightenment, orientation and sen-
sitisation, the public can recognise their power to reform the press and use 
it effectively. The willpower of citizens can be used to purchase or not 
purchase newspapers; to visit or not to visit a news website; to boycott the 
patronage of a newspaper in diverse ways and so on. In fact, the 2019 
Guardian’s financial success was largely attributed to the public. Waterson 
(2018) wrote, “The Guardian and the Observer have broken even for the 
first time in recent history aided by record online traffic, reduced costs and 
increased financial contributions from readers”. The public can decide to 
fund public interest journalism through such contributions.
There have been other instances in the past where the public has used 
its willpower to challenge press excesses or perceived misconduct. An 
example is the reaction of the public to The Sun newspaper’s coverage of 
the 1989 Hillsborough disaster in which 96 football fans died (Scraton 
2005, pp. 62–74; 2016). In Liverpool, members of the public and non- 
governmental groups such as anfieldroad.com and the Hillsborough 
Justice Campaign (HJC) staged boycotts against The Sun newspaper to 
protest the paper’s publication of false information blaming Liverpool 
football fans for the Hillsborough disaster (Anfield Road 2007; Contrast.
org 2017a, b; Conn 2017). Another instance is the public outcry against 
the News of the World for hacking into the voicemail of murdered school 
girl Milly Dowler, in addition to other acts of phone hacking (see Chap. 
1). The public outrage and its publicity resulted in advertisers withdraw-
ing patronage and the eventual closure of the newspaper in July 2011.
Non-governmental agencies can also choose to ban reporters of errant 
newspapers from covering their programmes especially where such pro-
grammes sell. An example is Everton Football Club who banned The Sun 
newspaper journalists from their football stadium, Goodison Park, and 
their Finch Farm training ground after one of The Sun’s columnists, Kelvin 
MacKenzie (it so happened that this same person was the paper’s editor at 
the time of the Hillsborough incident), likened one of their players, Ross 
Barkley, who is of mixed race, to a gorilla (Parveen 2017).
In all the examples, public outrage drew apologies from the newspapers 
involved and touched one of their soft spots—their readership (Cozens 
2004). In the case of the News of the World, they paid the ultimate price—
closure. It would, however, be stretching willpower too far if it is used 
indiscriminately to frustrate media organisations out of business. As 
Baumeister and Tierney (2012, p.  1) discovered, there can also be 
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excessive use of willpower. Effective discipline is one that leads to change 
not destruction. With the decline in the sales of newspapers (the circula-
tion of UK national dailies plunged from 11.5 million daily copies in 2008 
to 5.8 million in 2018), media reform needs to ensure that it averts rather 
than enhances the death of newspapers (Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport 2019, pp. 25–26). Frequent closures of newspapers will 
not be beneficial to citizens, society, the economy, media owners and even 
democracy. That is because it could result in side effects including job 
losses, a consequent increase in the number of employment benefit recipi-
ents and reduced diversity in media platforms.
The need for adequate education on how willpower can be used by the 
public to reform the press cannot be overemphasised. Non-governmental 
charities for public interest journalism and journalism institutions can 
develop a curriculum on how to train members of the public to exercise 
their power to check press accountability in an informed and productive 
manner. Care needs to be taken to see that such powers are not hijacked 
and abused by groups with selfish motives. I do not claim that public 
reformism will completely eradicate press excesses. What I argue is that 
sustained and well-managed pragmatism on the part of the public can 
keep the press in check to a considerable degree. As Stiegler (2013, p. 139) 
puts it, “With a vocal public who willingly air their grievances, news media 
are more likely to adhere to ethical standards of journalism”. The public 
can also develop themselves to understand how the press cover themselves 
(ibid., p. 138). This can enable them to recognise stories or arguments 
that are based on self-interest. An informed citizen can make a decision 
that can aid democracy just as ill-informed citizens can collectively work 
against democracy. Use of public willpower offers a method of press 
reform that excludes two potential self-interested parties (the press and 
the state). Public reformism is only one among several options that can 
emerge from a debate on media policy in a democratic public sphere. If 
well developed, taught and managed, non-governmental public reform-
ism can emerge as one of the major ways of sustaining high-quality 
journalism.
While demanding good behaviour from a child considered to be a devi-
ant [as with the press], it is important to listen to that child to know what 
he or she sees as impediments to good behaviour. The press has often 
attributed the increasing dumbing down of quality journalism in the UK 
to pressure to make ends meet due to loss of revenue caused by the exodus 
of readers and advertisers to social media who are not as stringently 
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regulated as the mainstream media. The Cairncross Review acknowledged 
this as a challenge and made recommendations that if well implemented 
may help, to some extent, in this regard. The Cairncross Review was set 
up by the British government in 2019 to investigate the challenges facing 
high-quality journalism in the UK and to come up with recommendations 
that can help to secure its future (Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport 2019, p. 5).
SuStainable JournaliSM and the CairnCroSS review
The Cairncross Review, which was commissioned by the UK government 
and led by Dame Frances Cairncross, aimed to find out as well as recom-
mend ways of ensuring a sustainable future for high-quality journalism in 
the UK. To do this, the Review examined the state of “the news media 
market, the threats to the financial sustainability of publishers, the impact 
of search engines and social media platforms, and the role of digital adver-
tising” (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019, p. 5). 
The Review received evidence from stakeholders of the media industry 
including journalists, academics, entrepreneurs and representatives of the 
media industry. Based on the evidence gathered, it concluded that “the 
news publishing business is undergoing an extraordinary period of con-
traction in both of its main traditional sources of revenue: advertising and 
circulation” (ibid.).
Elaborating on the seriousness of the threat to the continued existence 
of the printed press, the Cairncross Review pointed out that print sales of 
national and local newspapers have fallen by about 50 per cent in the last 
decade, between 2007 and 2017, and have continued to drop. The 
national newspaper daily circulation fell from 11.5  million in 2008 to 
5.8 million in 2018. The local newspaper weekly circulation fell from 63.4 
million in 2007 to 31.4 million in 2017 while print advertising which was 
a major source of revenue fell by 69 per cent within the period. The Review 
pointed out that the proportion of UK adults who read print news each 
week has fallen from 59 per cent of the adult population in 2013 to 36 per 
cent in 2018. Majority of people now get news entirely or mostly online. 
Most online news is available for free and provided by “aggregators such 
as Google News or Apple News” or “posted on Facebook’s news feed”. As 
the Review emphasised:
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They are much less likely to see the mixed bundle of politics, finance, enter-
tainment and sport that constitutes many papers, and more likely to see an 
individual story, chosen by a computer program and not necessarily clearly 
labelled with the name of a particular publisher. (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport 2019, p. 6)
This manner of news consumption, it argues, has implications for the vis-
ibility of public interest news and for trust in news.
Despite the fact that public trust for newspapers was more than that for 
social media (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019, 
p. 5), in 2018, 74 per cent of adults and 91 per cent of 18- to 24-year-olds 
in the UK searched for news online every week, (Reuters cited in 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019, p.  6). The 
Review acknowledged that some mergers are as a result of dwindling rev-
enues in the printed press industry. Dwindling revenue has also resulted in 
reduced staffing (from 23,000, in 2007 to 17,000 in 2019), closed local 
offices and lack of funds to invest in the transformations that are needed 
to stay relevant in the digital age (Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport 2019). As the Review noted, one person in ten in the UK now 
reads a regional or local printed paper each week (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport 2019).
In sum, the Cairncross Review sought to find out if the market in which 
publishers operate is fair, considering the rapid growth of the big online 
platforms such as Google and Facebook and because traditional news 
media complained that these online platforms affect the market in such a 
way that warrants government intervention. As stated earlier, they had 
complained that online platforms take a large share of the market for 
advertising and provide the routes that many people use to find news 
online. The Cairncross Review was, therefore, expected to offer recom-
mendations intended to create a better balance between publishers and 
platforms, and to persuade the online platforms to use their position in 
more accountable ways (ibid.).
The Cairncross Review recommends that online platforms (Google and 
Facebook, and possibly Apple) should be required to create codes of con-
duct that will govern their commercial arrangements with news publishers 
(Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019, p. 10). A regu-
lator which should have powers to insist on compliance will oversee the 
setting up of the code of conduct (ibid.). This regulator will include mem-
bers with skills in economics and digital technology. Negotiations between 
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publishers and online platforms can then be guided by this code. The 
Cairncross Review advised that “if the powers of the regulator proved 
insufficient, government should implement stronger measures” 
(Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019, p.  10). The 
Review also recommends that the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA) should investigate the online advertising market to ensure fair 
competition (ibid.). Through a close examination of “the position of dif-
ferent players, their roles, costs and profitability, the CMA will be able to 
identify how efficiently the online advertising market is working, and what 
remedies, if any, are needed” (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and 
Sport 2019, p. 10).
The Review advised that online platforms’ efforts at improving their 
users’ news experience should be placed under regulatory supervision to 
ensure good quality news provision. The regulator will ensure that online 
platforms continue and expand the initiatives they have developed to help 
users identify reliability and trustworthiness of sources. The Cairncross 
Review recommends that the government should work with Ofcom, the 
online platforms, news publishers, broadcasters, voluntary organisations 
and academics to develop a media literacy strategy that would identify 
gaps in provision and opportunities for more collaborative work 
(Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019, p. 10). Although 
the Review was not asked to comment on the BBC, it advised that Ofcom 
should explore the BBC’s market impact. It wants the BBC to do more to 
help local publishers, for example, using its technical and digital expertise 
to direct traffic from its online site to local publishers. The Review recom-
mends that the government launch a fund to help news publishers meet 
the current need for innovations and transformations in print journalism 
in the digital era. This new fund will focus on innovations (new approaches 
and tools) aimed at improving the supply of public interest news. The 
fund would be managed by Nesta at the start, and in due course by the 
Institute for Public Interest News which the Review recommends (see 
later in this chapter).
The Cairncross Review advised the government to introduce two forms 
of tax relief “aimed at encouraging (1) payments for online news content 
and (2) the provision of local and investigative journalism” (Department 
for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2019, p. 10). Under this proposal, 
the zero-rating of VAT which already exists for the printed news formats 
will be extended to digital newspapers and magazines, including digital- 
only news publications. The Review also recommends the creation of a 
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form of tax relief, under the Charities Act, “but if necessary along the lines 
of the Creative Sector reliefs, to support public-interest journalism” 
(ibid.). Simply put, this tax relief involves “extending charitable status to 
non-profit publishers, who could then enjoy the significant tax advan-
tages” (Townsend 2019, n.p.). This form of tax relief was first proposed 
by the Lords Communications Committee in 2012 (ibid.).
Direct funding for local public interest news was another recommenda-
tion made by the Review. This would entail the modification and expan-
sion of the Local Democracy Reporting Service currently managed by the 
BBC. As of 2019, the BBC-managed Local Democracy Reporting Service 
sponsored 144 reporter contracts with local publishers but there have 
been complaints that only big regional publishers benefitted from the 
scheme. The Review advised that in due course, management of the ser-
vice should be passed to, or shared with, the proposed Institute for Public 
Interest News. One of the key recommendations of the Cairncross Review 
was its call for the establishment of an Institute for Public Interest News. 
In collaboration with news publishers, the online platforms, Nesta, Ofcom, 
the BBC and academic institutions, this body will have the responsibility 
of promoting efforts aimed at ensuring the future sustainability of public 
interest news. Here, priority attention would be given to measures which 
incentivise the provision and consumption of public interest news. Funds 
for such incentives should emanate from a source that is free from direct 
government control.
It would be interesting to investigate the execution and outcome of 
these proposals in future research. How much of these recommendations 
would be implemented? Where implemented, to what extent did the 
implementation result in the sustainability of high-quality journalism? 
Media scholars such as Petley (2018) have called for more clarity in the 
Review’s definition of high-quality journalism. Based on past and current 
outcomes from government’s efforts on media policy, there are fears that 
the funding would end up as a boost to the mainstream printed press to 
the detriment of local publishers. As (Townsend 2019, n.p.) noted:
Ultimately, the usefulness of this review will stand or fall on whether the 
government is willing to face down a press lobby which is accustomed to 
flexing its muscles and—as the Leveson enquiry graphically demonstrated—
has successfully bullied successive UK governments for decades.
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The sustenance of quality journalism is a top concern of stakeholders of 
media policy. The sustainability of high-quality journalism in the UK 
would require on the part of the press the facilitation of a democratic pub-
lic sphere during their coverage of media policy debates; on the part of the 
public, knowledge of how to consume journalistic metadiscourse on media 
policy and more pragmatic participation in efforts at reforming the press; 
on the part of academics, developing innovative frameworks for non- 
governmental public reformism; and on the part of the government, a 
commitment to implementing recommendations in such a way as to 
achieve their purpose.
Considering the wide readership of news from online platforms, possi-
ble research for future studies would be to investigate how online news 
platforms covered the debate. A comparative analysis between this main-
stream coverage and the online coverage of the debate would be useful. 
Similarly, an empirical study of how the broadcast media covered the 
media policy debate would help to reveal the differences and similarities 
between the printed press and broadcast media coverage of media policy 
debates. The findings can be analysed against the backdrop of Cushion 
et al.’s (2018) study which revealed the enduring influence of the press 
agenda over the television news agenda. It would be helpful to find out if 
that is the case in media policy debates. This is significant because of the 
wide reach of a combination of the press and broadcast media in the 
UK. Having shown strategies adopted by the media in self-coverage, a 
study of how the public consumes journalistic metadiscourse would also 
provide an interesting area for further study. And finally, future research 
can also evaluate the implementation of the Leveson Report and the 
Cairncross Review to reveal the extent to which they fulfilled their purpose.
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